|Projekat Rastko Gracanica - Pec: Istorija: Response to Noel Malcolm`s book "Kosovo. A Short History"|
In recent years we have been witnessing the proliferation, in the most influential national historiographies of the world, of a literature dealing with "the Kosovo issue" which, failing to approach the existing historiographic insights critically, and resorting to analogies, stereotypes and blanket statements, obscures the truth, complies with political propositions and displays its obsessive attraction by this topic, blurring the boundary line between facts and their interpretation. The professional and scientific circles are now faced with Noel Malcolm`s Kosovo. A Short History, a book based on a dubious data in which the author tries, with an "intolerable ease" and scientific pretentiousness to present the history of Kosovo and centuries-old relationships between the Serbs and Albanians. The author’s conception shows a recognizable method of a biased approach to the topic and use of available evidence favouring the Albanian sources and references, and revealing ignorance or disregard of relevant archival evidence and historiographic literature by Serb and Yugoslav historians, particularly that published between 1912 and 1997.
This book, emerging during the profound Yugoslav crisis initiated by the suppression of the separatist movement of the Kosovo and Metohija Albanians, represent an attempt to interpret the "Kosovo issue" by a voluminous monograph which tries, relying on available, frequently contradictory data and historiographic results, to offer new insights into the population and area where ethnic, religious, social, cultural and political problems pervade and face the Serb-Albanian relationship.
Seeking a serviceable path through heterogeneous evidence and various research results of Yugoslav and Albanian historiographic sources pertaining to this issue, N. Malcolm has chosen a scholarly approach, trying to use, relying on a journalistic manner as well as recommended and selected scholarly insights, present his "story of Kosovo" as far as the very end of the twentieth century. Emphasizing the complexity of the relationships arising from the Serb-Albanian historiographic discourse, Malcolm for the most part uses uncritically the opinions and insights of Albanian historians, archaeologists, ethnologists, philologists and political scientists, whereas he relies on the results of Serb and Yugoslav historiography only if they fit the general context and the evidence he refers to.
To Malcolm, as well as to the majority of foreign authors, the twentieth century Kosovo has been a terra incognita, but the outcome of the Yugoslav crisis has imposed it as an area of geo-strategic visions in NATO military projections within the Balkans. The book Kosovo. A Short History appeared at the time of an intensified international pressure on the FR Yugoslavia following the Dayton Agreement which did not define clearly the issue of Kosovo. Malcolm’s book dealing with Kosovo is the continuation of his experiences with the war in Bosnia, to which he defined his position in the book about Bosnia, which launched him as an "outstanding" expert in the passions inflamed by the war leading to the NATO intervention. In this book, he links, on the ethnic level, the essence of the Albanian-Serb antagonism to the political solutions resulting from the war of the Balkan states (Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria) against Turkey in 1912 and the establishment of Albania in 1913. The return of Serbia to the areas of Kosovo and Metohija, its medieval ethnic and cultural-historical foothold, is a fact serving Malcolm as starting point in his search for relevant insights and evidence that would prove his thesis about an ethnic conflict, non-integrated Kosovo and the discrimination of the Albanians in Serbia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (Yugoslavia). Distorting the available evidence and interpreting the data so that they fit such a purpose, Malcolm ignores the fact that, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Albanians really carried out repressive measures of the Turkish regime and that they entered the twentieth century imbued with a profound religious and political hatred encouraged by permanent terror, blackmailing and crimes against the Serbian population in the Kosovo vilayet, particularly between 1878 and 1912. Malcolm does not see that, within defense plans of Turkey during the Eastern crisis in the period 1875-1878, arose the anti-Serb Albanian movement which, used to defend the territories of Turkey lost in the wars with Serbia and Montenegro, in fact stood in the way of national liberation aspirations and state plans of the Albanians. The fact that after the definition of the borders between Serbia and Albania, a part of Albanian ethnic population found itself in Serbia, as a result of the decision of the Ambassadors’ Conference in London, did not represent a precedent, because larger or smaller ethnic groups of neighbouring peoples were to be found in almost all of the Balkan states.
Starting with the thesis that the population of Kosovo had not been integrated into Serbia, Malcolm refers to the non-ratified decision of the Ambassadors’ Conference in London on the basis of which the Albanian state was established, on May 30th, 1913. Then the victorious states in fact did not ratify the agreement between Turkey and the Balkan allies, as provided by the last article of the agreement, but did so before the end of 1913 and in the early 1914, signing individual peace treaties with Turkey. The representatives of Great Powers mainly demarcated the northern and north-eastern borders of Albania. Russia’s foreign minister Sazonov sent dispatches to diplomatic representatives in Athens, Belgrade, Sofia and Cetinje on 17 April 1913. Serbia and Montenegro were notified that the London Conference had came to terms concerning Albania’s northern borders, asking them to fully protect the Catholic and Muslim population in their territories as decreed by the mentioned decision. After all the border towards Albania was defined by the protocol of December 1913, while the Peace Treaty between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, signed on March 14th, 1914, provides in its first article that "both high parties signing the Treaty consider the Agreement reached on May 30th, 1913 as ratified if it concerns them". The 4th article of the latter also provides that "the persons inhabiting the ceded territories become the subjects of Serbia", as well as that they, within the three years following the signing of that document, upon the approval by the authorized Serbian body, have a right to opt for the Ottoman citizenship". In the Ottoman theocratic state in the early twentieth century, the Albanian ethnic population does not stand out of from the essential division of the population into Muslims and Christians. That is why the thesis about the alleged ethnic predomination of the Albanians in Kosovo is not true – because it is not based on relevant and statistically verifiable data pertaining to the ethnic ratio there. After all, the proposed ethnic ratio is made unreliable by Mallcolm’s ignorance of mutual ethnic intermingling, assimilation, religious and political convertism, as well as by his unreliable knowledge of real proportions of the Serbs, Albanians, Turks, Tsintsars, Vlachs, Cherkesses, Romanies and minor ethnic groups in this region of the Ottoman Turkey. The London Agreement does not mention the Albanians, but only "the Muslims of the ceded areas" who are guaranteed their civil and political rights in the way they are guaranteed to other confessions. In other words, the Albanians from Kosovo enjoyed the status of the subjects of Serbia, whereas Kosovo and the areas becoming parts of the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia, in compliance with the Agreement ratified in Bucharest (1913), were integrated into Serbia in accordance with administrative measures valid for the areas annected.
Malcolm’s interpretation of the largely known "factography" based on the works of Albanian historians, particularly those penned by H. Bajrami, Rushiti, Pirraku and A. Hadri about Kosovo in the period 1918-1997, is presented within the following thematic wholes: "Kaçaks and colonists: 1918-1941"; "Occupied Kosovo in the Second World War: 1941-1945"; "Kosovo under Tito: 1945-1980"; "Kosovo after the death of Tito: 1981-1997". Leaving aside the language barrier and consequently their accessibility, Malcolm as a rule persistently sticks with Albanian authors and ignores the articles and monographs by most of Serb and Yugoslav historians. Reading the mentioned thematic wholes, the reader lacking any reliable knowledge of the matter gets the impression that there are no other sources whatsoever, as if Serb and Yugoslav historiography had nothing to say about the issues discussed. The professional and scientific circles will not fail to note that a serious discussion of those issues cannot but include a long series of precious contributions by Serbian historians, international law experts, ethnologists, political scientists, demographers, sociologists and students of literature. Malcolm painstakingly relies on all of these tracks when referring to Albanian and other foreign authors. In addition, trying to raise the level of the scholarly value of his book about Kosovo by references to the rich material of the the archival holdings and collections in Paris, Rome, the Vatican, Venice, Vienna, Washington, Oxford and Bologna, the author, discussing the period between 1918 and 1997, either by chance or intentionally, does not use a single Serb or Yugoslav archive, not even when referring to quite accessible published collections of archival material.
The fact that the mentioned material from the above archival centres was not used or quoted from, except for the material from the National Archives in Washington pertaning only to the period 1941-1944 as well as the fact that the frequently mentioned materials of the Foreign Office are not included in the archival holdings (List of Manuscripts), raise the question: didn’t the author, dealing at least with the twentieth century, rely on the "evidence" contained in the chrestomathic historiographic work by H. Bajrami which has been available on the Internet for some time? A critical observation like this, bringing out as it does the use or rather non-use of relevant research materials and sources by Yugoslav authors surely denies any scholarly legitimacy to this book, which is one in a row of instant propaganda items. It is undoubtedly not sufficient to say that, on the whole, this book is a compilation of selected materials adroitly put together and aiming to present the area of Kosovo and the presence of the Albanian population as a peculiar phenomenon which is not altogether political. Books like this one are not a result of scholarly curiosity, the need to evaluate and reevaluate some insights. They are not even a response to the provocative attractiveness of the media in recent years. They are an outcome of well calculated needs generated in NATO’s political and military-strategic laboratories. Such books certainly rely to a great extent on previous elaborations, projects and strategic plans dating from the time of the Berlin Congress in 1878.
That is why an attempt to challenge, by way of a professional analysis, pieces of the evidence given (incomplete, imprecise, vague, of uncertain authenticity, professionally ungrounded and untenable) does not imply mere unwillingness to undertake that in a way appropriate to the profession, and to Malcolm himself, who is not a historian by vocation. Malcolm’s interpretation of facts, ideas, opinions and conclusions concerning Kosovo seems to derive first of all from the Albanian historiographic discourse, which has "made its way" to the power centres of highly developed historiographies. It is evident that Malcolm suffers from easily recognizable one-sidedness and that he is pushing aside available evidence and materials of various provenance and from various creative fields. What is more, his and other similar books by authors from leading European and other countries will result in a groundless marginalization of our own scholarship, or, to be more precise, a diminished presence of our publications in college libraries, institutes, political, military and cultural centres as well as in large media establishments of the world.
In the course of this century Kosovo has been discussed in various ways and with varying success. An area attractive and challenging for various scholarly branches due to its geographical, historical, ethnic, ethnographical, economic and above all its geo-strategic situation, and, in addition, particularly interesting to the analysts of many scholarly branches, politics and diplomacy, Kosovo as a subject matter of serious scrutiny calls for much general information as well as many details. Malcolm obviously lacks such information, and in the elaboration of his "story" of Kosovo this is discernible in his conclusion which leave many dilemmas open, and in particular in his one-sided interpretation and bias for everything favouring his claim that Kosovo was "taken" and "conquered", as well as that the Albanian population in that area was not "legitimately" integrated into Serbia.
Out of a large number of topics reflecting various aspects – the state, national, political, economic and cultural interests of Serbia and Yugoslavia in this area, Malcolm selects only the aspects leading to the realization of minority interests of the Albanian population. Arguing that Kosovo did not grow into the body of Serbia after 1912 and of Yugoslavia after 1918, he stubbornly underlines the absence of a freely expressed will on the part of the Albanians and of their minority rights. Such a claim is untenable in view of the fact that the border between Serbia and Albania in 1913 remained unchanged after 1918, that after the collapse of Austro-Hungary and the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, the Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija remained the citizens of Serbia and thus enjoyed the status of the population of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (Yugoslavia).
Bringing up the issue of the emigration of the Albanians after the 1912 and 1913 Wars by way of paraphrasing exclusively the data offered by Albanian historians, Malcolm bypasses the fact that the state repression was a result of the local Albanian population’s siding with the enemies during the war. What is more, it was easy to see in this case that the defense of the lost Turkish territory was at stake as well as a profound antagonism of the Albanians towards the local Serb population. At the same time there was an obvious disloyalty of the Albanian population to the newly established state and a conviction that the only alternative for them is belonging to Albania or Turkey. Malcolm does not grasp these problems but merely emphasizes the "inalienable" right of the Albanians to decide on their own fate and on the area which they inhabit. And while politicizing the problem of emigration ignoring the circumstances generated by the rebellion of September 1913, Malcolm on the other hand over-emphasizes the intentions behind the decree of the Kingdom of Serbia of 20 February 1914 regulating the settlement in the newly acquired areas which but failed to have any effect owing to the 1914-1918 War.
Ignoring the three-year occupation of Kosovo and Metohija (1915-1918), and stressing a fact important for the Albanians – that during that time were established Albanian schools which would vanish in the new Yugoslav state, Malcolm repeatedly overlooks the political and military circumstances of that time. Since the very beginnings of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, the Albanians – dissatisfied with the outcome of the war events – used the Paris Peace Conference in 1919-1920 as the occasion to draw the attention of the diplomats and politicians meeting at Versailles through rebellions, outlaws and kaçak resistance, that Kosovo and Metohija should be annected to Albania. Though the political reality was quite contrary to the endeavour, bearing in mind the obligations of the British and French governments which, by the Secret London Treaty 1915, sacrificed the territorial integrity of Albania in order to of win Italy over into the war alliance, the Albanian delegations in Paris and the leaders of the kosovo.netmittee obstinately tried to maintain the idea of the secession of Kosovo by stirring up rebellions and writing petitions grounded on previous memoranda. The kaçak movement was organized for that purpose. It was designed to carry out permanent terrorist activities against the civil and military authorities and make impossible the implementation of the laws and regulations of a state which in this area was facing a long series of dangers owing to the uncertain outcome of the events connected with the situation in Albania and the demarcation of its borders.
Malcolm, ignorant as he is of a mass of facts, can’t understand the peculiarity of the circumstances under which during 1919-1920 the existing Serb-Albanian borderline from the Drin in Albania would be "dangling" should the allies decide to reduce Albania in size and make the area as far as the White Drim in Kosovo a mandate territory of Italy, if the resistance of the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, backed up by the Italian troops in Albania, happened to change the course of events at the Versailles Conference. In spite of that, he is aware only of one side, that is of the repression by the military and law enforcement authorities of the Yugoslav state, but not of the circumstances bringing that repression about. He is aware that the victims of the pacification are the Albanians but is blind to the fact that the victims included gendarmes, soldiers and civilians. Outlawry is for Malcolm only a result of the repression, and the kaçak movement is, consequently, a "political phenomenon" with a definitely positive connotation. According to Malcolm’s estimates, the earliest resistance on the part of the Albanian population in Kosovo was a "spontaneous reaction" to the events taking place during the "re-occupation" in October 1918. Following this way of thinking, all other later forms of resistance of the Albanians to the military and local authorities (attacks on municipal centres, murders, kidnappings, thefts, property devastation, acts of sabotage, burning of villages and estates, arsons), along with banditry through which the kaçak terrorism was permanently intensified, also represented a justified resistance to the regime.
In order to understand the complexity of the circumstances in Kosovo and Metohija during the state provisorium of 1918-1921 as well as the situation in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the adoption of the Constitution (28 June 1921), one has to carefully analyze many sources often containing quite contradictory evidence of the military and political situation in which the fates of the Serbs and Albanians had been interwoven in the events of 1912-1913, 1915-1918 and after 1918. Even without other temptations and tragic experiences in the earlier past, these three sets of circumstances would represent a sufficient subject matter calling for a careful study of evidence pertaining to both entities during a time of violent clashes, great expectations and dénouements from 1912 to 1921. As a matter of fact, all the events in those years were responsible for the Serb-Albanian and Yugoslav-Albanian relations in the twentieth century. In other words, ever since the moment the Great Albanian national idea emerged in the way of the state plan of Serbia, Montenegro and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), the Albanians in Kosovo were an ethnic wedge and an unbridled stream intended to chop up demographically the Serb national area. Malcolm’s ignorance of the essence of the political being of the Yugoslav state, which between 1918 and 1941 sought a model for a state and national unity, pushing all national and minority particularities into the background, does not tone down his partiality, which is displayed in his readiness to see, ignoring the circumstances at home and foreign-relations difficulties facing the Yugoslav society at the time, only the problem of minority rights of the Albanian ethnic population.
Malcolm mainly relies on the evidence offered by Albanian historians, who in the absence of a full-fledged schooling facilities and use of the Albanian language, see in the agrarian reform measures and colonization sufficient reason for the unenviable social, political and cultural status of the Albanian population in that period. Doing so, Malcolm overlooks the fact that the leadership of the kosovo.netmittee, aided by fascist Italy and supported politically by the Albanian governments during the entire interwar period through terrorist and propaganda activities, made Kosovo and Metohija a permanent source of misunderstandings between Belgrade and Tirana. Sponsoring the "unrealized rights" of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia, those governments through that Committee encouraged maintenance and expansion of the kaçak resistance, which was the base of the organized separatist movement of the Albanians with unabashedly secessionist plans on the eve of the Second World War. The movement advocating a territorial and ethnic Albania, backed up by Zogu’s title, the "King of the Albanians", and reaching for Yugoslavia’s Kosovo and Greek Northern Epirus (Chameria), was supported by spreading the news in the Italian press about the "new" and "ethnic" Albania. For the Italian fascist government the "New Albania", following its occupation and annexation to Italy on April 7-12th, 1939, was of major importance for the pressure on Yugoslavia, whereas the political emigration and the Albanian population in Yugoslavia were increasingly stronger as the fist of the Italian-Albanian fascism was hitting the most sensitive side of the Yugoslav state.
Convinced that fascism finally secures a complete solution of the Albanian Question, the Albanians in Yugoslavia welcomed with undisguised enthusiasm the political and military collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the annexation of Metohija and the greater part of Kosovo to the "Great Albania" protectorate. Under the new circumstances brought about the beginning of the war in 1941, when the Yugoslav state territory was divided among the occupying states, almost nowhere else in the occupied territory such radical changes were brought about by the application of political, military, ethnic, demographical and cultural models as those in Kosovo and Metohija. The involvement and motivation of the Albanian population in the administration of the new fascist regime contributed decisively to cutting off of Kosovo and Metohija from the mainstream of the Yugoslav anti-fascist movement until 1944.
By gradual elimination of the Serb, Montenegrin and other non-Albanian population from the areas of Kosovo and Metohija throughout the war period, prerequisites were created for the establishment of a "new border" of Albania. Murders, arrests, persecution and other forms of repression against the Serb and Montenegrin population, accompanied by parallel unchecked immigration of the Albanians from Albania, changed the demographical map of the area annected to the "Great Albania" protectorate. Already in the early months of the occupation, nearly all results of the agrarian reform and colonization were annulled: out of the total number of the families settled as farmers (13,538), 7,397 families were expelled. The leading protagonists of the ethnic extermination of the non-Albanian population and of the struggle against the Yugoslav anti-fascist movement were members and followers of the kosovo.netmittee, the Albanian People’s Alliance, the Albanian Fascist Party, the Second Prizren League and the Bali Kombatr. The awareness of the "New Albania" as the stronghold of Italian fascism in the Balkans had a profound impact on all Albanians in Yugoslavia. Not even the communist leaders were immune to it, particularly the Albanian party cadre from Kosovo, who continued to uphold the position of the Albanian ethnocentrism in Kosovo and Metohija as a part of Albania. Malcolm does not discuss the demographical changes carried out violently and the permanent exodus of the Serb and Montenegrin population from Kosovo during the war because he ignores the findings of Yugoslav historians. However, he does not fail to underline the "significance" of the resolution issued in the early January 1944 at Bujan and the suppression of the revolt to be followed, at the beginning of April 1945, by the institution of martial law in Kosovo. Though the former represented an attempt to separate Kosovo and Metohija from Yugoslavia through political and military means, Malcolm interprets them only as resistance to the repression undertaken by Yugoslav authorities.
The fact that the decision by the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia on March 6th 1945 banning the return of colonists to their estates and the Law on the Revision of Families, left 595 families without all their previous land-holding, 5,744 families without a part of it, and 4,829 families with their rights fully confirmed, certainly deserves an additional analysis. So does the fact that 15,786 hectares were taken from former colonists, that 1,638 colonist families did not return to Kosovo and that, from 1945 to 1946, 2,064 families moved from those areas to Vojvodina. Such evidence does not exist for Malcolm, whereas the decision of the delegates of the Regional National Liberation Committee, reached at its Assembly on July 10th 1945 in Prizren, establishing Kosovo and Metohija as a constituent part of Serbia, interests him as a political decision containing the embryo of Kosovo’s autonomy. However, though the Presidency of the People’s Assembly of Serbia on September 3rd, 1945 had passed a law constituting autonomous units, on the basis of which Kosovo and Metohija were treated as a region composed of fifteen districts, its fundamental political organ would be, the Regional People’s Committee until the SFRY’s Constitution of 1963. The definition of the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Serbia in the same year marks the beginning of the political advent of the Albanian ethnic population which, following the Party Plenum held on Brioni in 1966, the political turbulence caused by the demonstrations in Priština in 1968, the amendments to the Constitution, the crisis of the Yugoslav federation in the early 1970’s, enjoys a totally autonomous constitutional status on the basis of the 1974 Constitution. That is how the path to the designed aim – "Kosovo– Republic" was paved, but the demonstrations in 1981 showed that it was premature and difficult to reach without weakening and dismounting of the Yugoslav federation. Since then the Albanian separatist movement in Kosovo has been the occasion, cause and effect of the crisis in Yugoslavia, which in the early 1990’s got involved in war conflicts, ethnic suffering, material devastation, political changes and territorial divisions. On the basis of comparatively prosperous social-economic development of Serbia and Yugoslavia in the afore-said period, the Albanians asserted their political, economic and cultural authenticity in spite of their permanent autarchy and overall destructive conduct in relation to the Serb and Montenegrin population in Kosovo and Metohija.
Malcolm ignores many facts and consequences of the permanently changing demographical picture of Kosovo due to his preference for the Albanian ethnic population which, from 288,910 (according to the census of 1921) rocketed to 1,226,736 (according to the census of 1981). In the same period, the numbers of the Serbs and Montenegrins increased from 114,090 (1921) to 209,497 (1981). If additional drastic deterioration of the demographic picture of Kosovo to the disadvantage of the Serb and Montenegrin population during the 1980’s and 1990’s is taken into account, as well as that an absurd genocidal and chauvinistic cleansing of this area has taken place in the circumstances of an international escalation of tensions owing to the Kosovo crisis, then the aims of the Albanian ethnic project become clear in spite of the different circumstances discernible in the first, second and third Yugoslavia.
The Albanization of Kosovo and Metohija – a process of long duration – has persistently disturbed the ethnic homogeneity of the Serb and Montenegrin population, throughout the present century, undermined the meaning of the Yugoslav state objectives, impeded the application of constitutional and legal norms, encouraged the migration of non-Albanian population by systematic violation of their individual property and political safety, persistently strengthened the separatist movement and permanently sought redefinition of the Yugoslav federation.
Owing to many raised questions, analyses, conclusions and theses, Malcolm’s book Kosovo. A Short History can be attractive for readers poorly informed about the Kosovo issue, which has attracted the attention of the international public in the last decade. But the bias and intention – to serve a definite political end, makes it very defective both professionally and as scientifically. In order to demonstrate that particular weakness of the book discussing the period from 1912 to 1997, which is dealt with in this paper, we offer a list of published sources and monographs by Yugoslav historians neither used or referred to by Malcolm. Namely, in our opinion it is precisely their absence from the monograph in question that ranks it below the criteria that any historiographer has to meet.
Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903-1914, Vol. V – 1-2, Vol. VI –1-2, and Vol. VII – 1, Beograd 1980 and 1981; B. Peruničić, Svedočanstva o Kosovu 1901-1913, Beograd 1988; Gradja o stvaranju jugoslovenske države, Belgrade 1964 (ed. by B. Krizman, B. Hrabal); Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS na Konferenciji mira u Parizu 1919-1920, Belgrade 1960 (ed. by B. Krizman, B. Hrabak); Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, Vol. I (1921-1930), Vol. II (1931-1938), Zagreb 1986, and Vol. III (1939-1941), Belgrade 1988 (ed. by Ž. Avramovski); Istorija srpskog naroda VI – 1, Beograd 1983; Aprilski rat, I – II, Belgrade 1987; Zbornik dokumenata i politika o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije, Vol. I, t. 29, Beograd 1969; V. Terzić, Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije, I-II Belgrade; A. Mitrović, Srbija 1914-1918, Beograd 1984; Srbi i Albanci u XX veku (a collection of papers), Belgrade 1991; B. Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1978, Belgrade 1983; S. Milošević, Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941-1945, Belgrade 1981; Srbija 1915 (a collection of papers), Belgrade 1986; A. Jeftić, Stradanje Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji od 1941-1990, Priština 1990; B. Božović, V. Vavić, Surova vremena na Kosovu i Metohiji, Beograd 1991; S. Avramov, Genocid u Jugoslaviji u svjetlosti medjunarodnog prava, Belgrade 1992; Đ. Borozan, Velika Albanija – porijeklo, ideje, praksa, Beograd 1995; Lj. Dimić, Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941, I-III, Belgrade 1996, 1997. This selection does not include much evidence held by Yugoslav archives and many studies and articles by afore-mentioned and other authors published in periodicals and collections of articles – whose findings Malcolm does not use, though they are dealing with various aspects of the minority rights of the Albanians in Yugoslavia.
//kosovo.net / Projekat Rastko / Projekat Rastko Gracanica-Pec //