May 10, 2006

KiM Info Newsletter 10-05-06

Botched Kosovo intervention dims hopes for peace

By Christopher Deliso

THE BALTIMORE SUN (USA)
OPINION

May 10, 2006

SKOPJE, MACEDONIA -- Averting a humanitarian catastrophe was NATO's stated justification for bombing Serbia and its Kosovo province in 1999. But initial successes quickly succumbed to the reverse ethnic cleansing of more than 200,000 Serbs and other minorities by Albanian militants.

Now, despite seven years of U.N. policing and donor largess, Kosovo's remaining minorities still live in fear, and the economy and infrastructure remain in shambles.

Behind their façade of optimism, Western leaders negotiating Kosovo's future status are panicking. Realizing that Albanians will violently contest any continued affiliation with Serbia, they believe independence alone can ensure peace. Yet Kosovo is a classic quagmire, one with ominous repercussions for peace.

Deciding Kosovo's rightful ownership is difficult. It pits two peoples, and two hallowed principles, against each another. Albanians - 90 percent of the population - invoke self-determination to justify independence. Yet Serbian cultural legacy goes back seven centuries in Kosovo, which was only independent when Adolf Hitler's Albanian allies briefly enjoyed their Nazi puppet state. Further, U.N. Resolution 1244 in 1999 affirmed Yugoslav sovereignty.

Kosovo's independence will be conditional, promises the West, on its treatment of minorities. Yet nothing can realistically enforce compliance.

If the Albanians continue intimidating Serbs, penalizing them by delaying NATO or European Union accession will have little impact; an advanced Balkan candidate, Macedonia, won't enter NATO before 2008, or the EU before 2013.

A well-informed international official predicts remaining Serbs will flee within 10 years of Kosovo's independence. So by the time Kosovo gets anywhere near NATO or EU accession, the minority issue will be moot.

Albanian attacks against Serbs still occur amid an atmosphere of a siege mentality. If the last Serbs are expelled, Belgrade's remaining argument for possession will vanish. Its first argument, for cultural heritage, no longer applies because since 1999, over 100 Orthodox churches, some 700 years old, have been damaged or destroyed by Albanians - thus eliminating Kosovo's most lucrative tourist attractions.

Further, the United Nations dismayed Kosovo's minorities by making a man who once terrorized them prime minister. Albanian war veteran Agim Ceku, whose name was removed from Interpol's wanted list after fierce U.N. lobbying, is accused of widespread atrocities while serving in Croatia's military and while leading the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1999.

Mr. Ceku's close associate and another veteran, Ramush Haradinaj, was indicted by the Hague Tribunal. Nevertheless, Mr. Haradinaj is now free to participate in Kosovo politics though he's technically an indicted war criminal awaiting trial.

Such privileged treatment reveals the fatal flaw of the U.N. mission.

Canadian police Detective Stu Kellock, who headed the U.N. Regional Serious Crimes Unit in 2000 and 2001, says investigations implicating Albanian politicians or their associates were routinely blocked. The orders came directly from Washington, London and Brussels. Mr. Ceku and Mr. Haradinaj control Kosovo's militant factions and are considered heroes by Albanians.

An anxious United Nations continually has sought to stay on their good side through appeasement.

Independence is a mere panacea for Kosovo's Albanians. They will remain poor. Erstwhile Albanian refugee workers - Kosovo's real breadwinners - will be sent home by European governments sensitive to popular anti-immigrant sentiments. Minorities will flee as nationalist militants remobilize to purge Serbs and annex Albanian-inhabited areas of Macedonia and Montenegro.

Bosnian Serbs, as well as Bosnian Muslims in Serbia's Sandjak region, also could demand self-determination.

Alarmingly, the West has no Plan B for ensuring Balkan peace. Plan A - open borders through eventual NATO and EU membership for all - is far off and ignores the anti-expansion sentiment among EU electorates. Membership may never arrive. The Balkans might well drift aimlessly.

In early 1999, Kosovo was a brutal but contained local conflict, relegated to villages. Botched Western intervention has made it a potential precedent for multiregional warfare.

Christopher Deliso is an American freelance journalist in Macedonia and director of an independent Balkan-interest Web site. His e-mail is cdeliso@balkanalysis.com.

Letters to the editor letters@baltsun.com

Belgrade against hasty solutions for Kosovo status

BELGRADE/BEIJING, May 10, 2006 (BETA) - The chairwoman of the Coordinating Center for Kosovo and Metohija, Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, told the deputy foreign minister of China, Jang Yesui, on May 9, that the authorities in Belgrade were against hasty decisions about the status of Kosovo.


She also criticized Albania's position regarding the future status of the province, saying that it did not help the good neighborly and inter-state relations.

Jang Yesui said Beijing respected the "sovereignty of Serbia-Montenegro" and understood very well the state union's situation regarding Kosovo.

An advisor to the Serbian premier, Aleksandar Simic, said at the meeting that the recognition of Kosovo's independence would mean, among other things, the annulling of conclusions of the Badinter Commission, the conclusions of which were the basis for the break up of the former SFR Yugoslavia along the borders of its republics at that time.

Officials from Belgrade told the Chinese diplomats that the authorities in Serbia and in the state union had no intention of deploying their police in Kosovo and of determining how the Albanians would live there, and that they would provide them with almost all rights that they already enjoy. "However, the Albanians cannot have the prerogatives of a state," Raskovic-Ivic and Simic said at the meeting held in the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Status to be decided in November with or without Serbs

(Koha Ditore, from the UNMIK Media Report, May 9)

Koha Ditore reports in its lead story that the key international mediator Martti Ahtisaari is convinced that the issue of Kosovo will be concluded this year.

Quoting a ‘reliable’ source from Vienna, Koha Ditore reports that the negotiations on Kosovo status will be concluded at the end of November and the solution that will be decided will be applied even if Belgrade does not accept it.

“Ahtisaari is convinced to conclude the work by the end of November,” said the senior European official, says the paper.

The unnamed official said in an informal meeting where Koha Ditore was present that Serbs should sober up and face the messages related to Kosovo status that the internationals have been sending for months now, because the prevailing opinion in Ahtisaari’s team and also among other key international factors is that Belgrade will not accept the solution and that the international community is preparing to move forward even without Serbian consent.

According to the same source some Kosovo Serb representatives have told Ahtisaari that they are ‘fed up’ with the current situation and that they just ask for ‘guarantees for security and autonomy’ and they would accept the solution agreed in Vienna.

The source further said that it is essential that Russia has changed its stance and that it no longer supports the division of Kosovo. “Until recently Russia supported the option of dividing Kosovo in two parts, but now they have changed their position and are no longer an obstacle,” it said. Furthermore, the Russians have made it clear to Kostunica, but he pretends not to hear, says the source.

In a separate box within the article Koha Ditore says that, according to a senior diplomatic source, Serbs complained to Ahtisaari that Kosovo shouldn’t be taken away from them because of Milosevic as it would be unfair. “You cannot punish us for something Milosevic did,” they told him. “But we cannot reward you, either,” Ahtisaari is quoted as replying.

Busek: Washington may rule on Kosovo future

BELGRADE, Serbia-Montenegro, May 9 (UPI) -- A South Eastern Europe Stability Pact official has said the United States may decide on Kosovo province's future if U.N.-led talks fail.

Stability Pact coordinator Erhard Busek told Germany's Der Spiegel he could not exclude a possibility that Washington, in case a solution to the Kosovo status is not reached in the talks, may ask the European Union to accept an independent Kosovo and Serbia as EU members.

"In case U.N. envoy Marti Ahtisaari fails to find a fast solution, I am afraid that the situation will be solved by the United States," Busek said.

He said that threats coming to Balkan states from the United States are more effective than those from Brussels, Belgrade's B92 radio reported.

U.N.-mediated talks between Serbs and ethnic-Albanians are to decide who will govern Serbia's southern Kosovo province once the U.N. civilian mission and NATO leave.

Kosovo, whose population is 90 percent ethnic-Albanian, has been governed by U.N. administration since 1999, when NATO air attacks stopped reported Serbian campaign against ethnic-Albanian separatists.

U.S. Wants a Swift and Peaceful Solution for Kosovo

By Zivorad Kovacevic, President of the European Movement in Serbia and a former Yugoslav ambassador to the U.S.

source: kosovakosovo.com

Zivorad Kovacevic
During his Balkan tour, Frank Wisner echoed some of the general views of the U.S. administration, after which he added the specifics for his hosts in Pristina, Skopje, and Belgrade. For understandable reasons, everybody here is paying close attention to every message coming from Washington and statements made in various contexts and to various individuals, along with variations in tone and language, are used to infer that there have been major or minor changes in U.S. policy. However, there are two things that are common to every U.S. administration: the first is that despite subtle internal differences, an existing policy is never changed prior to a consensus on the issue, and, secondly, U.S. policy is often easy to read, meaning that one does not have to dig for hidden reasons or intentions. Naturally, this does not apply to statements from senators or members of the House of Representatives, political analysts, or media commentaries and forecasts.

In regard to the ongoing Kosovo negotiations, the U.S. view can succinctly be summed up as follows: the U.S. wants a quick and peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem. Regional stability, negotiations, and finally a solution that cannot harm this stability are the priorities. The U.S. will leave Kosovo (as well as Bosnia- Herzegovina, and relations between Serbia and Montenegro) to the EU, although it will maintain its presence (both political and military) as well as an active interest in regional events. It will also actively cooperate with the Contact Group. It will attempt to ensure that the issue is put to rest by the year's end. The U.S. also believes that speaking of the final status of Kosovo (irrespective of its actual opinion on the issue) at this point would not be good and it wants to maintain the illusion that the final status of the province will be the product of the Belgrade-Pristina talks. However, as the two sides have irreconcilable differences in that respect, the solution will be an imposed one. At the same time, the U.S. will try to get the negotiating sides to resolve "status-neutral" issues and pave the way to something that is termed "creative ambiguity," much like U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which would in the non- zero sum game that would follow, at least create the appearance of a win-win situation, which would feature something for every side and make the solution easier to swallow by helping officials present it to the public if not as a victory, then at least as a defeat that has been averted. Easier said than done. The negotiating teams are expected to be cooperative in achieving that end and use "expectation management" to prepare public opinion for a solution that might not satisfy either of the categorical views. This is what Wisner has called "the best possible solution." Pristina is being asked to first ensure safe, secure, and peaceful living conditions for members of all national communities (as said by Ambassador Polt), whereas Belgrade is required to encourage Serbs to participate in Kosovo's government institutions. These are seen as confidence-building measures that would facilitate the negotiating process.

Frank Wisner also had a special message for Kosovo (that also applies mutatis mutandis to Pristina): "These negotiations are of vital importance to future relations between the U.S. and Serbia and Montenegro." Although never expressed directly in the past, this view is hardly surprising. In other words, the arrest of Ratko Mladic has been followed up by another important condition for U.S. support to Serbia (Montenegro being mentioned only for proper form): a cooperative attitude toward the negotiations, particularly those on decentralization, and other issues that need to be resolved before the status decision is made. That does not include abandoning legitimate calls for guarantees for the position and rights of Serbs in the future decentralized Kosovo, but it hardly means direct links between majority Serb municipalities and Belgrade in combination with circumventing Kosovo's authorities and a boycott of the government institutions. Neither of the sides will find it easy to abandon its position and they will have to avoid pledging that no concessions will be made, because that will probably cost them dearly in the future. Without compromise, agreement is impossible. The only question is whether the U.S. is sincere when it says it does not plan on forcing a solution and whether it in fact wants the international community to cut the Kosovo Knot (much like the case of the Hague tribunal) and create some kind of alibi (might makes right) for the upcoming election contest.
 
source: kosovakosovo.com
 
 
 
The Future Status of Kosovo and Metohija
By Dusan Prorokovic, chairman of the Serbian Legislature Committee on Kosovo and Metohija
 
source: kosovakosovo.com


Dusan Prorokovic
After a meeting with Eduard Kokoiti, his counterpart from South Osetia, Valeri Kotov, chief administrator of the Russian federal unit of Kabardino-Balkaria, said that "Abkhazia, too, desires to become first an associate member, and then a full member of the Russian Federation." He used the word "too" because the meeting had been organized so that Southern Osetia could inform a Russian official of its intentions. The Abkhazians had previously voted in a referendum whose results were fully expected. Both Southern Osetia and Abkhazia are parts of the state of Georgia. This situation is the same in Transnistria (also known as Pridniestria or Transdniestria) which is a part of the Republic of Moldova. Igor Smirnov, the president of Transdniestria, does not recognize the central government in Chisinau. Even the currencies in use are different.

Although the causes of each of these problems are different, they are very similar in respect to status. Consequently, that makes them similar to a fourth case, Kosovo and Metohija.

This is why the future of Kosovo and Metohija requires careful consideration, since it could affect the future status of Southern Osetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. It could also affect the stability of Moldova or the entire Caucasus area. Kosovo and Metohija must not, therefore, be an exception. The same provisions of international law that were used to resolve similar problems elsewhere in the world should be used in the case of legal status of Kosovo and Metohija. And, legally speaking, Kosovo and Metohija cannot become independent having in view decisions made by various U.N. bodies in the past. The most recent of these, Security Council Resolution 1244, calls for "substantial autonomy" for the population of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The phrase "meaningful autonomy" appears three times, as does "sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Conversely, "independence" is not mentioned even once. The same goes for "self-determination." From a legal standpoint, in the breakup of the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the principle of inviolability of the borders of federal units was honored. If this applied to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, or Uzbekistan, then it should also apply to Serbia-Montenegro.

Many will be quick to point out that law is just one side of the coin. Reality, they will say, is the other. And the reality of the situation is that there are 1.5 million Albanians living in Kosovo and Metohija. They are hostile to Serbs, Serbia has had zero influence over events in its province for six years now, and why would Serbia want control over a part of its territory that essentially will not be subject to its sovereignty?

To these questions of political realism the following answers can be given. There are almost one million Serbs in Republika Srpska and they are certainly not thrilled with the idea of being citizens of Bosnia- Herzegovina. Officials in Tbilisi have had little or no authority over events in parts of that country for 12 years, yet Georgia has not been split up into several independent states. Why, then, would one create an independent state of Kosovo when that state would not be able to exercise its sovereignty over that part of its territory that is populated by non-Albanians? It is difficult to expect Serbs living in northern Kosovo, the Morava basin region, or Gracanica to agree to live in a country called Kosovo.

Allowing political realism to dictate one's actions is dangerous and bad because the everyday political situation is subject to change. How, then, should the status of Kosovo and Metohija be defined given these legal and realistic arguments? There are three possibilities. The first is direct dialog between Belgrade and Pristina, coupled with assistance from the international community. A compromise solution would also be an original one. It would mean broad autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija, along with a certain degree of international guarantees. This broad autonomy would give Pristina the opportunity for Albanians to deal with their lives on their own, through their own institutions, which would be able to pass and enforce most types of laws independently of Belgrade. Since this autonomy would be vouched for by the international community, Belgrade would not be able to violate it. In some areas, Pristina would be entirely independent, such as in the realm of sport.

This possibility would be supported by most neighboring countries, from Bulgaria and Greece, to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, because everybody wants regional stability and to maintain existing relations. The second solution is a forced one, with something taken away both from Belgrade and Pristina. Serbia would lose Kosovo and Metohija, while the Kosovo Albanians would lose certain powers. This also happens to be the most succinct definition of "conditional independence." One can often hear people saying that since the Serbs lost the war, they have to be punished, and that the Albanians are not mature enough to run their own state. This would only create new problems in the region.

The Serbs' frustration over losing Kosovo and Metohija and the Albanians' frustration over having to depend on somebody else instead of on themselves would be a prelude into a new era of regional instability. There is no concession that could be made to Serbia that could make up for the loss of Kosovo and Metohija, the origin of Serbian statehood, spirituality, and culture. In addition, there is no way to prevent the radicalization of Kosovo politics once the Kosovo Albanians realize that Kosovo will be run not by its Parliament, government, or president, but by an international administration. Frustrated Serbs and radical Kosovo Albanians would pose a threat to Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The third solution, and also the least probable, is organizing a new status conference on the Western Balkan based on the principle of equal standards for all of the former Yugoslav republics. If criteria established in the early 1990s, primarily by the Badinter Commission, are changed for Kosovo, then they have to change in all other cases where there was ethnic conflict.

There must not be any winners and losers in the process of determining the final status of Kosovo and Metohija. The integration of the Balkan nations with the EU must not be based on the principle of giving one nation happiness at the expense of another, neighboring, nation. Hopefully, we learned this in the painful events of the 1990s. Otherwise, we will all be losers.

UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTRE

Kosovo, Serb sides differ in UN-sponsored talks on decentralization

5 May 2006 - Delegations from Kosovo and Serbia today showed some agreement but also significant differences on decentralizing the Albanian-majority Serbian province, which the United Nations has administered ever since the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) drove out Yugoslav troops in 1999 amid grave rights abuses in ethnic fighting.

The fourth round of direct talks between the two sides, held in Vienna under the auspices of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Special Envoy for the future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, centred on the creation of new municipalities, particularly those with a Kosovo-Serb majority, and their boundaries.

"I am an optimist by nature; it doesn't mean that I am naďve," Mr. Ahtisaari's

deputy Albert Rohan, who chaired the talks, told a news briefing when asked how he felt the negotiations were progressing. "I think we have to be optimistic. We don't only believe in the intelligence of people but also in the wisdom of people and therefore I am realistically optimistic."

Decentralization is only one of many issues in the talks. Independence and autonomy are among options that have been mentioned for the province, where Albanians outnumber Serbs and others by 9 to 1. Serbia rejects independence and Kosovo's Serbs have been boycotting the province's provisional institutions.

Mr. Rohan said the delegations found "some range of agreement" on the issue of municipalities, but while the Kosovo side proposed three new municipalities and the extension of an existing one, the Serbians wanted 14 new ones and the extension of five existing municipalities.

"We have to continue to work with the two sides on these two proposals," Mr.

Rohan said, noting that the issue would no longer be discussed at the Vienna talks. "There are many open questions and we are going to resume the work directly with each side separately and try to get compromise solutions."

To that purpose he will lead a delegation to Belgrade, the Serbian capital, on 16 May, and then go on to the Kosovo capital of Pristina on 18 May. The next direct talks in Vienna scheduled 23 May will focus on the protection of cultural and religious sites.

One of the complicating factors on decentralization is how to include possible return of scores of thousands of Serbian who fled earlier violence but have not yet come back. "On the one hand nobody wants to create 'ghost municipalities' in the hope that somebody may come," Mr. Rohan said. "On the other hand, there is a very real possibility - and it is the hope of the international community - that the maximum of people will indeed return."

They changed their religion but they still celebrate St. George's Day

Serbian original at http://www.blic.co.yu/danas/broj/strane/srbija.htm#3

Blic daily, Belgrade, May 8, 2006

For 150 years the Goranis have gathered for a celebration in Dragas

In the village of Dragas in the extreme south of Kosovo and Metohija Goranis began to celebrate their traditional five-day long St. George's Day festivities. From every corner of the world, from Norway, Australia, Canada, Turkey, Belgrade, Ljubljana and Pula... some 7,000 Gorani emigrant workers, well-known for their cheese pies and sweet shops, have gathered.

The tradition under the slogan of "Do not forget your origin and traditions"

has lasted, according to the oldest Goranis, since their origin 150 years ago, when a group of Serbs living in the hinterlands of Mt. Koritnik changed their religion but kept Serb customs and traditions.

"St. George's Day is an opportunity for young people to learn about the traditions of our ancestors, lest they forget and adopt the ideas of some individuals to proclaim us Bosniacs, something we have never been nor will be," said teacher Ajdar Milajili. He expressed regret that since 1999 the number of Goranis at the St. George's Day celebration has been decreasing.

Milajili says that the large numbers of the population have left, that pupils in schools have been reduced by one-third, and that in Kosovo they must work as physical laborers because their children can only complete the nine years of primary school. They have no opportunity to attend a secondary school, emphasized Milajili, that is not in the Albanian language.

"We live completely surrounded. The border with Albania and Macedonia is completely open. Criminals freely cross and use the territory of Dragas and Gora as a sanctuary on their way to Prizren and Djakovica," said Zurapi. He adds that since 1999 eleven Goranis have been killed and extremists have carried out 46 bomb attacks, most of them against the houses of eminent families.

The five day-long St. George's Day festivities, and gatherings of young men and women ready to wed, which are fancied by at least half of future brides, at least temporarily stave off forebodings that the remaining 8,000 Goranis out of 30,000 who lived in the south of Kosovo and Metohija until 1999 will preserve their traditions, even though horse races, wrestling matches, stone throwing contests and rope pulls have once again been cancelled this year because the participants have cancelled with the explanation that they are afraid to come. What remains is the promise that next year in the hinterlands of Mt. Koritnik the goc [traditional drum] and zurle [type of woodwind instrument] will once again be heard, announcing the return of the Gorani wrestlers, and with the continuation of customs and traditions.

By N. Zejak

Translated by sib, May 9, 2006
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