"Kosovo: Current and Future Status", Testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations

Testimony of Honorable

Alexander G. Rondos
 
Former Ambassador of Greece & Member of the International Commission
on the Balkans,  May 18, 2005
 
House International Committee on Foreign Relations

One particular area that merits attention and support concerns the protection of the Orthodox Churches. This should not be treated as an exercise in monument preservation, but rather as an acknowledgement of a living Orthodox Christian Church with its community.    Alex Rondos

 

Mr. Chairman, 
Honorable Members of the International Relations Committee of the House of
Representatives.
 
My name is Alex Rondos. I served as Ambassador of Greece and Adviser to the Foreign
Minister of Greece until March 2004. In the last six years, I have been intimately
involved in the diplomacy concerning the Balkan region. In the course of the last year, I
have been privileged to be a member of the International Commission on the Balkans,
whose report was recently published.
 
This hearing is timely and I am grateful for the opportunity you have given me to testify.  

Amb. Alex Rondos, Vuk Jeremic and Fr. Irinej Dobrijevic
at the Congressional Testimony on the Capitol Hill, Washington D.C., May 18, 2005

 
The situation throughout the Western Balkans is fraught with both danger and
opportunity. Along with my follow members of the International Commission on the
Balkans, I subscribe fully to the view that the status quo in the region is not sustainable.
We have countries and entities that live in a constitutional limbo. This has stunted
economic growth, leading to alarmingly high levels of unemployment and to the
penetration of the region by organized crime. The result is that the democracy we seek for
the Balkans is still fragile.
 
Our view, if I may loosely and more forcefully paraphrase my fellow Commissioners, is
that the time has come for the political leadership of the region and of the European
Union to rise to their historic responsibilities. Together, they must consolidate that grand
vision of peace and prosperity that is the European Union. When all the peoples of all the
Balkans cease to be mere inhabitants of geographical Europe and become fully fledged
citizens of the European Union, we will have placed a vital block into the edifice of
global peace and stability.  

This is not easy, but it is certainly possible. Hard, politically costly reforms are necessary
to attain membership in the European Union. The EU is a club to which entry is only
achieved by total conformity with its rules and practices. To achieve this, therefore,
requires the highest level of political will and political skill. This applies to both the
region’s politicians and to those of Europe.
 
For us to fall short now on the European destiny of the Balkans would be to trip over the
last hurdles of a long and well-run race. I believe that we in the region must move beyond
the politics of the “winner takes all” and ask, instead, how all can be winners. In the
European Union, we must find it in ourselves to gaze less at our navels and more into the
future. It is not possible to imagine and believe in the security of Europe and of a
constructive European role in global security, as I do, if we have not taken the essential
steps to resolve the status and fate of an entire region that is part of our continent. 
 
This brings us to the question of Kosovo’s status. It is a challenge too often addressed as
a short-term policy issue, in the absence of a regional and a global strategic context. 
 
The fixation on the final outcome, before a political process has been engaged, has
sucked many into a debate that is almost theologically absolute, precluding room for
flexibility, negotiation, and compromise. Moreover, the more extreme the positions
taken, the less the attention that is paid to the regional implications of any solution. 
 
The present impasse is shaped by a deeply felt dispute over independence and
sovereignty. One side argues that until there is substantial evidence of a sovereign
capacity to exercise the rule of law democratically, the very notion of independence
cannot be contemplated. The other argues that only when independence is granted can
sovereign attributes be developed and implemented. In very practical political terms, this
means that both sides have retreated into a corner from which they will only extricate
themselves at considerable political cost. Thus, the temptation for some, in and out of the region, to argue that the Gordian Knot of Kosovo needs to be sliced by an imposed
decision.
 
I would argue that such approach would be a denial of both diplomacy and democracy. It
would have dangerous consequences in a region that in fact urgently needs a concentrated dose of diplomacy and democracy. Furthermore, this type of approach will not address overnight what has not been achieved in the six years since Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo and the area came under the control of the United Nations.
 
Allow me to paint a picture of the conditions that pertain in the region. The youth of
Kosovo, who represent a very high proportion of the population, are unemployed. A
significant proportion of the revenue that flows in Kosovo is illegal, controlled by highly
organized groups that frighten their co-citizens into compliance and that are very well
connected beyond Kosovo’s frontiers. Kosovo cannot even borrow money to invest in its
economic growth. Administration has shifted gradually into Kosovar hands, but major
decisions ultimately remain with the international authorities. Respect for the law, the
judiciary, and the police is tenuous. I cannot feel anything but the deepest sympathy for
the average citizen of Kosovo. Who, after having had a war fought on their behalf by the
West, would believe that they still had to live in circumstances that would be
unacceptable in any of our societies and political systems?
 
Special sympathy and concern should be reserved for minority populations in Kosovo.
The Roma, who suffer from lack of representation internationally, are isolated and
ignored. But the treatment meted out to those Serbs who have remained in Kosovo defies
logic, imagination, and any political apology. Apart from Mitrovica in the north of
Kosovo, the Serbs live in village communities, few of them contiguous. But these are not
really villages, since that would imply a semblance of normal life. These are ghettoes.
Survival within them depends on supplies brought from outside. Movement beyond these
ghettoes requires armed escorts. The desecration of churches reached a tragic apogee in
March 2004. Serbs have been excluded from employment in key public-sector
corporations. Under these circumstances, there is no future for these populations. On the contrary, for those of us who know the history of our region, one can detect the
symptoms of a calculated effort to separate, swamp, and asphyxiate a community into
disappearance. 
 
These, regrettably, are the primary characteristics of Kosovo today. It should come as no
surprise, then, that some might wonder whether this entity would be a welcome
independent neighbor. But this merits further elaboration. The fate of Kosovo is
inextricably intertwined with the future stability of the region and its immediate
neighbors. It is not enough to argue that Kosovo is emblematic of what is least desirable
in the region—that is an injustice to much of the population which, if led responsibly,
would aspire to all those good things in life that any one of us seek for ourselves and our
children. 
 
The problem for us lies elsewhere. Kosovo, to use a biological analogy, is host to more
than one virus that the region has struggled to contain and eliminate. Nationalism,
organized crime, and abused democracy, when not contained, mutate into irredentism,
terror, and oppression. The region has paid a high price for the last three and it does not
want more.
 
The proverbial elephant in the room of southern Balkan politics is Albanian nationalism.
Of all the peoples of the Balkans, the Albanian populations are the only ones that have
not yet had their crack at national unification. In the last 80 years or so, with a hiatus for
communism, all of the rest have had their chance, invariably with tragic consequences.
Can this very natural force among Albanians, and especially those of Kosovo, be steered
away from the trap of irredentism and violence? Can it be steered towards a natural place
in the European order, where it is possible to celebrate one’s identity and freedom with
less care for independence and all the attendant trappings? The journey from where we
are now to that special place will be long and filled with opportunities to be tempted by
the less savory aspects of nationalism.  

Central to the management of Kosovo’s status will be the establishment of secure
frontiers. Until a mere 15 years ago, the people of Kosovo were one with the Albanian
communities in the Tetovo region of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Now,
however, a trip between  neighboring villages that once took minutes has been
transformed into an odyssey that consumes hours. The cost is great, the economic
isolation is crippling. The survival of FYROM has occupied the attention of many a
policymaker in recent years. It should continue to do so. But let us not allow desire to
blind us to reality. The country’s majority populations are busy un-mixing themselves.
The non-Albanians, looking warily at the demographic expansion of the Albanian
population, wonder who will be the majority and who the minority within a generation or
two. Kosovo’s eventual status cannot be considered absent a parallel concern for the fate
of the unity of FYROM. Indeed, the process that will eventually determine the status of
Kosovo should involve Skopje as much as it will do Belgrade. Anything less than total
commitment from the international community—and especially from the European
Union—for the integrity of FYROM as it is today would be profoundly and irresponsibly
destabilizing. 
 
Meanwhile, violence has occurred in Albanian villages of south Serbia in the last few
years. There is a significant Albanian population in Montenegro. It is a worrying feature
of the current electoral campaign in Albania that the Kosovo independence issue has
become a prominent part of the rhetoric. This is relatively new. The government in Tirana
has behaved, in recent years, very responsibly with regard to this issue. In the current
climate, however, the candidates will have to spend the coming weeks carefully avoiding
campaign promises that lock them into commitments with dangerous consequences for
regional stability. Greece, for instance, has been subjected to claims by a group
representing those Albanians in northern Greece forced to leave after World War II
because of their active collaboration with the Nazi occupation of my country. 
 
One waits, so far in vain, for an unequivocal and unanimous commitment—from all
Albanian leaders of all entities—that there will be no destabilization of existing boundaries, as one proceeds along the path to Kosovo’s final status. Likewise, one awaits from the international community an equal commitment to a process that incorporates
guarantees for the entire region in the status talks on Kosovo. Anything less, on current
experience, should suggest to any seasoned participant in the region’s politics that the
option of violence or irredentism cannot be excluded.
 
There are different types of nationalists in our region. There are genuine patriots, for
instance, who draw on the traditions of their nations to build something new and vibrant.
But there is another, more nefarious category: It features gangsters who cloak themselves
in patriotism. They are the ones who use nationalism to promote their own greed or their
own narrow institutional or partisan interests. 
 
We have in the Balkans an alarming rise in the penetration of organized crime into the
economy and into politics. To make matters worse, international organized crime has
now made links with the Balkan mafias. In one sense, parts of the economies of the
Balkans have become part of an international criminal franchise. In another sense,
international organized crime seems to want to turn the Balkans into a beachhead for the
penetration of the lucrative markets of Europe. It has become a daily battle among honest policemen, judges, politicians, and businessmen to hold at bay the encroachment of the
black market, the illegal trader, the money launderer. Numerous international officials are
deeply involved in this fight. It is central to the security of Europe. 
 
Kosovo is no exception to the plague of organized crime. In fact, it seems to be an
aggressive example of the disease —which is all the more embarrassing given that
Kosovo is an international protectorate. This is not the work of the majority of citizens,
but rather of a very few who manage to coerce others into collaborating or silently
complying. These criminal networks already cross frontiers. So far, they have managed to
operate with relative impunity. Curtailing the liberties taken by these groups is a key to
the future role that Kosovo will play in the region.  

Ultimately, though, we are confronted by the paradox of democratic politics in the region.
Throughout the last decade, much blood has been spilt to create democratic governments.
The quality of democracy might need a good deal of improvement. But constituency
politics, lobbies, interest groups, and media all now play their full role in the politics of
the region. It should be no surprise, then, that when confronted by an issue as
commanding as the fate of Kosovo, politicians are cornered by their own electoral
politics and instincts. This is true in any democratic system. Courage, vision, skill, and
careful timing are required to break out of the accepted truths of a society in order to
forge a strategic change of direction. In short, sacrifices are ultimately necessary—and
sacrifices do not win votes. Yet the solution to Kosovo will require sacrifices. Such
visceral issues as acknowledging killing, deciding on returns of refugees, attacking
corruption, and settling financial debts are just some of the ingredients of a solution that
will one day have to win public backing. 
 
To avoid the task of negotiation and persuasion is to diminish the potential for democracy
and to arouse deep and lasting resentment. Both in Kosovo and in Serbia, an honest and
protracted public debate will be necessary. It is surprising how such an effort can
gradually bring change. One has to acknowledge the recent efforts of the government of
Serbia and its President to introduce some flexibility into the discussion on Kosovo.
When Serbian officials now talk of “something more than autonomy and something less
than independence,” I see a creative effort to introduce an ambiguity that offers room for
discussion. Likewise, impressive moves were being made by the recent Prime Minister of
Kosovo—now indicted—to find ways to build confidence for flexibility in talks with
Serbia.
 
These efforts should not be viewed through the prism of a foreign diplomat, but rather
through that of a local democrat who is trying to build a constituency. It may seem more
complicated and time consuming, but at least it is democracy creaking into gear. To short
circuit this process would be to restrict democracy and create tensions in the neighboring
democracies that are affected by Kosovo’s fate. Imposing a solution too rapidly in
Kosovo will prevent the very debate that is necessary to help it acquire the attributes of sovereignty. Likewise, in Serbia, it will be the fodder for those who wish to play the
politics of resentment and victimhood.  
 
What does the future hold? The body politic of the Balkans does not need another trauma.
It needs therapy. Kosovo can provide this. It is an issue in which so many have a vested
interest in an outcome that is successful for all. This means that the political leadership of
Kosovo, Serbia, the region, Europe, members of the Security Council, and the Contact
Group are all involved in a process that does not preclude any outcome but that is
rigorous, disciplined, and comprehensive. 
 
The issues of rule of law and democracy are fundamental to the European Union and
have been core criteria for Union membership. These are the very values and practices
that are now needed in Kosovo and must be secured in the region. I believe that the
European Union is presented with an historic opportunity to assume leadership for the
resolution of the Kosovo status question and to guide the process from negotiation to
eventual accession of the region into the European Union.
 
This political process will begin soon. By autumn, the review of the standards process
will have occurred. Thereafter, negotiations are expected to begin under the aegis of an
internationally organized negotiator. 
 
There are some rules of the game that might help frame the process and guide it to a
successful conclusion. 
 
a.  It is a matter of urgency that the current impasse is broken and that efforts be
made to find those few areas of common ground that exist between Belgrade and
Pristina. There is no reason why this should wait until the start of formal
negotiations at the end of this year. Small breakthroughs can alter the atmosphere and dynamics of the larger process. It is in the interests of Kosovo Albanians to
pursue such breakthroughs because they must demonstrate progress on the issue
of standards. It is also in the interests of Belgrade, assuming that the Serbian
government wishes to show it wants a palpable improvement in the living
conditions of Kosovo Serbs.

One particular area that merits attention and support concerns the protection of the Orthodox Churches. This should not be treated as an exercise in monument preservation, but rather as an acknowledgement of a living Orthodox Christian Church with its community. 
 
b.  The framework for the negotiations should ideally be the European Union, with
the full cooperation of other states that have a vital interest in the issue. It is
anomalous to be asking Europe to take the lead on the issue and not to expect it to
assume full responsibility. The EU is the eventual destination of all the peoples of
the region, and the EU should be authorized to proceed now by providing its lead
forcefully. This should be done in cooperation with those members of the Contact
Group that are not members of the EU, namely the USA and Russia. 
 
 c.  The negotiations and the negotiator should be endowed with sufficient authority
and means to address all the regional implications of the status talks. A budget,
with a quick disbursing mechanism, should be made available to carry out
activities and projects that will serve as incentives to the successful outcome of
the status talks. The purpose is to provide a tangible momentum to the
negotiations.  
 
 d.  The discussion on status must not be limited to political and constitutional
matters. The economic crisis of the region feeds discontent. It is imperative that
the negotiations address a comprehensive plan for the economic progress of all
the affected regions and countries. 
 
Mr. Chairman, Congressmen: