An unidentified shooter fired through the window the Maksimovic family home and wounded Dejan Maksimovicâs leg. The attacker fled from the scene and no one else was injured. Attacker disappeared into the ethically mixed neighborhood at the northern bank of the Ibar River, which separates the town into the Serb-dominated north and Albanian south.
In the second incident, Branislav Antovic was shot several times while working the overnight security shift at the Vodovod Ibar public parking grounds, and was taken to the Kosovska Mitrovica Hospital where doctors operated on him last night. Maksimovic is receiving treatment at the hospital as well.
Two ethnic Serbs were wounded early Monday in separate attacks in U.N.-run Kosovo, police officials and doctors said.
The incidents happened around 0100 GMT in the Serb-held part of Kosovska Mitrovica, an ethnically divided town in the north of the province.
Police said that one person was seriously injured and the other lightly. Spokesman Sami Mehmeti gave no other details, but said there was no immediate indication that the attacks were ethnically motivated.
According to Serb sources in Kosovska Mitrovica, unknown assailants first shot at 35-year-old Branislav Antovic, a guard for the local authorities.
Local doctor Milan Ivanovic said Antovic was in life-threatening condition following four hours of surgery.
Dejan Maksimovic, 24, was shot in the leg while at his home in the ethnically mixed Bosnjacka Mahala part of town. Maksimovic told Belgrade-based Beta news agency that the attacker climbed to his balcony and fired at him.
Ivanovic said Maksimovic also underwent surgery but was in stable condition.
Kosovo remains tense years after a Serb-Albanian war over the region. There are fears that tensions could soar in the run-up to U.N.-brokered talks next year on the province's future status.
Goran Bogdanovic, member of Belgradeâs Kosovo status discussion team, has condemned the attacks and said that they represent a message that Serbs are not wanted in this Kosovo city.
âI am not going to prejudge who could be responsible for the attacks while the police and institutions have yet to make any official statements, but there are many indications as to where the attacks could be coming from. We know who has pointed fingers at Kosovska Mitrovica thus far. We know who has, on several occasions, tried to cross into northern Kosovska Mitrovica from the southern region, and last nightâs attack is just another attempt to try and destabilize the only larger city in Kosovo where there are still Serbs living and has remained multi-ethnic.â Bogdanovic said, keeping his statement ambiguous.
He said that last nightâs attacks, other more recent attacks on Serbs in Strpac, the turning off of electricity going to Serbian villages in Kosovo, all have one goal in mind; to demoralize the Serbian community and get them thinking about leaving, coincidentally, at the same time that discussions for the future status of Kosovo are set to begin.
Belgrade, 26 Dec. (Radio SCG)
Serbian Minister of Police Dragan Jocic stated that in the second half of 2005, 31 terrorist attacks on Kosovo Serbs were committed, in which two people were killed and 10 wounded. In the same period 27 provocations were reported, most of them setting on fire of Serbian property, stealing it and stoning of Serbian convoys, stated Jocic at the session of Serbian Assembly Security Committee, on presentation of achievements of Serbian police in past six months. He estimated that current situation in Kosovo is very hard and noted that UNMIK and KFOR members, regardless of their presence, have not showed any efficiency in providing protection of Serbian population and other non-Albanian minorities in the Province. Having in mind start of negotiations of talks of future status of Kosovo, and security risks for Serbian people in the south Serbia, highest degree of mobility was declared to security forces, Jocic said.
Protest Of Kosovo Serbs Tomorrow
Kosovska Mitrovica, 26 Dec. (Tanjug)
Serbs in Kosovska Mitrovica will hold a protest meeting against terror and violence over them, announced Vice-President of Serbian National Council of northern Kosmet (SNV) Milan Ivanovic.
Ivanovic said to Tanjug, that peaceful protest, ignited by last attack on two Serbs, will begin tomorrow at noon on Sumadija square, organized by SNV.
Oliver Ivanovic: Independence Only By War
26 Dec (Lajmet.net, Pristina)
One of the Kosovo Serb leaders, Oliver Ivanovic, stated that compromise about the status of Kosovo means renouncing from the idea for independence. According to Ivanovic, âIf this does not happen, then there will be war in Kosovo.â
âWe are expecting this to be a solution of compromise. A solution that would leave one side directly dissatisfied would influence the existence of Serbs in Kosovo. I did not say what this solution would be. If both sides do not achieve a mutual compromise then they would make solution of this issue impossible. This would mean that if we have a biased solution of the status for one side, then we would have a resistance from the other side. I hope that Europe, Contact Group and all those involved will seriously think about this. A very small number of people in Kosovo are capable of understanding this.
Solutions that do not satisfy all the people that live here, including Serbiaâs legitimate demands, cannot be sustainable. A compromise would be renouncing from maximal extremist demands, which is independence. Simply, this is not possible without having the consent of Serbs and approval of Serbia. I do not know any of Kosovo Serbs or authorities in Serbia that would accept a part of their territory to break away,â Ivanovic said.
Tadic and Thaci express conflicting stances
Beta News Agency, Belgrade
December 26, 2005
PRISTINA -- Monday - Contradictory statements on Kosovo's future status came once again from Belgrade and Pristina senior officials.
Serbian President Boris Tadic said that by forming a Serbian entity in Kosovo, the multi-ethnicity of the region could be preserved, and that creating two entities does not call for territorial separations. Tadic told Serbian language Kosovo weekly Jedinstvo that this is the best way of maintaining the multi-ethnic character of the region and creating conditions for an acceptable form of coexistence.
Kosovo Democratic Party leader Hasim Thaci said, however, that he expects the international community to, in 2006, after listening to the stances of Belgrade and Pristina, reach the correct decision and grant Kosovo its independence.
"I believe that the international community understands more and more that the only solutions that can secure peace, stability, economic development and the integration of Kosovo into the Euro-Atlantic structure and European Union, is independence." Thaci said.
He added that Pristina is united in this stance, which was confirmed by the adoption of the Kosovo Parliament's resolution for independence and a sovereign nation. Thaci warned that any alternative solution would facilitate the continuation of problems in Kosovo and the entire region.
Tadic said that conditional independence for Kosovo is not a solution that can better the lives of all the region's citizens nor solve the problems that have piled up.
"That is not an option that we are not even considering, because it is simply unacceptable for Belgrade, and without Belgrade, there are no long-term solutions." Tadic said.
Commenting on the Albanian population's goal in the Balkans to create a "Great Albania," Tadic said that "the Great Albania, which many apparently fear, already exists."
"There are no borders between Kosovo and Albania. The transfer of people and products is not being controlled, while the administrative line with Serbia is well-guarded and subjected to all types of checks. Great Albania, therefore, already exists; it simply has not been legally formalized." President Tadic said.
UNMIK Boss Gives Up on Human Rights for Kosovo
ANTIWAR BLOG (USA)
Fri Dec 23, 2005
Marek Antoni Nowicki, ombudsmen for Kosovo, is notable for being one of the very few international officials to have remained in the UN mission there from the very beginning. But now he's on the way out, reports ADN Kronos.
He's also remarkable for being one a very few officials who consistently has stood up for the rights of the people of Kosovo, reminding a disinterested outside world of the chronic problems faced by the province's minorities.
And Nowicki has not been afraid to criticize the UN administration for its failings, either.
During his tenure, Nowicki was one of the few UNMIK officials to win the respect and trust of all of Kosovo's ethnic communities because he did a rare thing: he listened to their problems. He was impartial. He tried to help the voiceless common people when the state or other groups treated them unfairly. Most fundamentally, he was respected because he was an international, and not from one of the rival ethnic groups.
You can read his interview with Balkanalysis.com here.
This is why, without being self-aggrandizing, Nowicki wisely noted that "the situation is likely to get worse unless the international community appoints a new human rights watchdog," according to the ADN Kronos report.
However, UNMIK boss Soren Jessen-Petersen - an avowed friend of the murderous war criminal Ramush Haradinaj - has decided to replace Nowicki by granting "human rights supervision to local ethnic Albanian authorities, a move that Novicky considers premature."
At the same time Jessen-Petersen, who has "wide arbitrary powers in the province," has decided, contrary to the UN's mandate and Kosovo's legal status, that he will create "Kosovo justice and police ministries, under majority ethnic Albanians' control."
Anyone who thinks that granting human rights protection responsibilities to a partisan ethnic group widely feared (for good reason) by another has got to be smoking something very potent indeed.
And anyone who thinks that the same people who helped mastermind the March
2004 anti-Serb pograms can be trusted to exercise their duties responsibly and fairly is either deluded or a delighted supporter of full ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
To sum up, it is all too clear that the UNMIK is looking to save its own hide from local Albanians who perceive it as an obstacle to independence. By placing the courts, the cops and the human rights observers in the latter's hands, they are paving the way for a fait accompli- the removal of all minorities from Kosovo, which will render moot the idea of a "negotiated solution," leaving Belgrade with nothing to protect save a heritage without a remaining population. And the UNMIK staff is making sure there will be no one left to call them on it, while they can move on to another high-paying job with a similar institutional protection from accountability somewhere else in the world. These people are truly reprehensible.
Kosovoâs Moment of Truth
By Tim Judah
(Survival vol. 47 no. 4 Winter 2005â06 pp. 73â84)
For the last six years Kosovo has been run as protectorate of the United Nations. That chapter of its history is now coming to an end. Very soon â probably at least by December 2005 â talks should begin on the future status of this territory bitterly disputed between Serbs and Albanians. It is widely expected that, against the wishes of the government in Belgrade, Kosovo will be granted some form of âconditional independenceâ. Exactly what this means remains to be seen.
The roots of the Kosovo conflict lie in the fact that more than 90% of its two million people are ethnic Albanians.1 That Kosovo, within anyoneâs living memory, has always had a high preponderance of Albanians made it a particular political problem within Yugoslavia. Since 1999, however, the link with Serbia has, in all but de jure terms, been severed. The likelihood that it can be restored seems fanciful to say the least.
In 1989 Serbia, under Slobodan Milosevic, abolished Kosovoâs autonomy. During the major Yugoslav wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo stayed quiet. In 1998, however, a guerrilla war broke out. Events escalated until NATOâs 78-day bombing campaign over what was then still known as Yugoslavia. After a period of frantic diplomacy Milosevic surrendered, Serbia pulled its forces out of Kosovo and much of the local administration collapsed. They were replaced by the UN and a NATO-led force called KFOR. This arrangement was blessed by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided the legal basis for the current situation in Kosovo. The resolution recognised the territorial integrity of what was then called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and instructed what was to become the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to promote, âpending a final settlement ⌠substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo taking into full account ⌠the Rambouillet Accordsâ.
The ill-fated Rambouillet meeting outside Paris preceded NATOâs bombardment of 1999. The Serbian side did not agree to the text it was asked to sign, one reason being that this document had foreseen that Kosovoâs future would, after three years, be decided âon the basis of the will of the peopleâ. The Serbs argued that since the Albanians were in favour of indeÂŹpendence, this phrase could only mean that they would lose their southern province, which they regard as the cradle of their civilisation. Thus, at its very heart, Resolution 1244 contained a contradiction â pitting the Kosovo majorityâs right to self-determination against the equally valid legal prinÂŹciple of the territorial integrity of states. Up to now it has been possible to avoid resolving this contradiction. Today, however, in the words of UNMIK head Søren Jessen-Petersen, Kosovo is facing âits moment of truthâ.
Since 1999 Kosovo has changed beyond recognition. The first and most obvious change is that there are no longer any Serbs in any of Kosovoâs major urban settlements, bar north Mitrovica, which is a divided city. The end of Serbian rule culminated in the flight and ethnic cleansing of large numbers of Serbs (and Roma), very few of whom have returned. Today one-third of the estimated 100,000 Serbs who remain in Kosovo live in Mitrovica and the overwhelmingly Serbian-inhabited north of Kosovo, which is contiguous with Serbia. The rest live in enclaves scattered throughout the rest of the province. Some of these need 24-hour military protection, as do Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries. Economically, Kosovo remains extremely weak and unemployment high, though reliable figures are hard to come by. Average wages are now around âŹ200 a month and many families depend on remittances from the large Kosovo diaspora living and working abroad, especially in Western Europe.
Since 1999, the UN has set up a government structure in Kosovo. Powers are gradually being devolved to elected bodies and their ministries. Most Serbs boycott these institutions, either at the behest of the authorities in Belgrade or because they believe that on those occasions when they did participate, they were simply used in an Albanian effort to deceive the outside world into believing that a real multi-ethnic society was being built in Kosovo. The boycott is controversial, however. Some Serb leaders believe they have lost more than they have gained by staying outside of Kosovoâs structures.
In December 2003 UNMIK, together with the government of Kosovo, promulgated a list of so-called âStandardsâ against which Kosovoâs progress could be measured, covering everything from rule of law to minority rights. At the same time the UN and other diplomats â adopting the slogan âStandards before Statusâ â made clear that the issue of Kosovoâs final status was not on the agenda for the immediate future. In November 2003, however, the âContact Groupâ of main outside powers announced that if all went well, by the middle of 2005 a comprehensive review of standards would open the way for talks on the future status of the province. The irony is that talks may soon begin not because things went well, but because they went disastrously wrong. In March 2004 riots broke out in which some 4,000 Serbs and Roma were driven from their homes and 19 killed. It became starkly clear that the status quo was untenable and, if there was a new upsurge in violence, UNMIK might even collapse. Immediately after the riots UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called in a diplomat with considerable Balkan experience to lead an inquiry into what had caused them. The insights of this diplomat, Norwegian ambassador to NATO Kai Eide, helped convince Annan and many others that dangerous stagnation had set in; the only way to avoid a new conflagration was to give the impression that Kosovo was somehow moving forward and was not doomed to remain forever a forgotten, poverty-stricken corner of Europe.
Kosovoâs Albanian leaders either quickly understood, or were made to understand by diplomats and the foreign leaders that they met, that the riots had been disastrous for their international image. In December 2004, following elections, a new government came to power headed by former Kosovo Liberation Army commander Ramush Haradinaj. With much force and skill, Haradinaj moved to get Kosovo to live up to the Standards and even to reach out to the Serbs. Being a skilful premier was not enough, however, to stop allegations about his past catching up with him. In March 2005 he was indicted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague for war crimes dating back to 1998. With much dignity he resigned and departed but, contrary to expectations, Kosovo remained calm. In part this was because Albanian leaders understood that, if angry Kosovars began rampaging once again, the prospect of the comprehensive review would clearly diminish. This time they played their cards well and in June Kofi Annan invited Kai Eide back to begin the review.
Eide delivered his report on 4 October. Annan passed it on to the Security Council three days later, saying he accepted its recommendations. âThe time has comeâ, said Annan, âto move to the next phase of the political process.â He added that he now intended to âinitiate preparationsâ for the appointment of âa Special Envoy to lead the future status process.â At the time of writing it was widely expected that he would choose Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president who played a key role in securing Milosevicâs agreement to the terms which ended NATOâs bombardment of Yugoslavia in 1999.
Eideâs most important point was that talks on the future status of Kosovo should begin. He was not asked to say what he thought the final status of Kosovo should be and, significantly, he uses the words âfuture statusâ rather than âfinal statusâ. This implies, and indeed Eide in places explicitly says, that international involvement in the contested province will continue for many years. âThe international community must do the utmost to ensure that whatever the status becomes it does not become a âfailedâ statusâ, he writes. âEntering the future status process does not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage in the process.â
Progress in meeting the Standards as a whole has been uneven, Eide says: âregrettably, little has been achieved to create a foundation for a multi-ethnic societyâ. Talks should nevertheless begin, he says, because the momentum and expectations have built up; âhaving moved from stagnation to expectaÂŹtion, stagnation cannot be allowed to take holdâ.
Some of Eideâs recommendations may be carried out whatever the result of status talks. The EU, he argues, should play a prominent role, especially in police and judicial matters. NATO, too, will have to stay, with at least some contribution from the US âin order to provide a visible expression of [Americaâs] continued engagementâ. Certain elements of the international presence in Bosnia should be copied for Kosovo. These include the role of the âhigh representativeâ, currently Britainâs Paddy Ashdown, who exerÂŹcises huge powers and can fire any elected official in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, Ashdown holds a kind of hybrid position â both âhigh representativeâ of the intervening powers and international community, vaguely defined, but also the EUâs special representative to Bosnia. Eide suggests a similar arrangement for the post-UNMIK era in Kosovo: a high represenative with extraordinary powers in the field of inter-ethnic relations, but who is also âfirmly anchoredâ in the EU.
Regarding Kosovoâs Serbian minority, Eide argues in favour of an âambiÂŹtious decentralisation planâ which would give Kosovo Serbs competences âin areas such as police, justice, education, culture, media and the economyâ. He also recommends that what he terms âprotective spaceâ should be created around Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions and that ways should be found to place them âunder a form of international protectionâ. He adds: âit is important not only to protect individual sites as cultural and religious monuments, but also living communitiesâ.
Albanian and Serb reactions to the Eide report were mixed. Albanian leaders reacted exuberantly to the fact that it had recommended that talks begin, but initially said little about the content of the report. Although giving praise where praise was due, the report was largely damning about corruption and the majorityâs treatment of the Serb minority. Reactions in Serbia were on the whole positive, although not without criticisms. If the Standards had not been met, asked some, then why was Eide recommending that talks begin? To a great extent this was empty rhetoric, since by the time the report was issued Belgrade and Pristina were already readying themselves for talks, or at least were supposed to be.
As late as June 2005, on the Serb side a degree of denial still prevailed. Officials in Belgrade described Serbiaâs policy as anticipating that Kosovo could have âmore than autonomy, but less than independenceâ. What this meant was unclear. Some officials, such as Aleksandar Simic, an adviser to Premier Vojislav Kostunica, said that this meant that although being autonomous, the future Kosovo would send back deputies to the parliament in Belgrade and play a full role in running the whole country.13 Serbia has a population of 7.5 million, as against some 2m for Kosovo. The forcible reincorporation of such a large number of implacably hostile Albanians into the Serbian body politic seemed so far from reality or in the interests of a stable Serbia that one could only wonder: had Serbian strategists, unable in the past six years to visit Kosovo at will, simply lost any grasp of the reality there?
By autumn 2005, however, a more realistic concept of what was possible was emerging. Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, the head of the Serbian governmentâs Coordination Centre for Kosovo, was saying that she envisaged the province having full autonomy in the judicial, executive and legislative fields but that defence, foreign affairs and sovereignty would remain in the hands of Serbia. Dusan Batakovic, a historian and diplomat with a deep knowledge of Kosovo, and now advisor to Serbian President Boris Tadic, elaborated on this: he did not expect that the Albanians would want to return to parliament in Belgrade, though this option remained. He also said that, in preparing for talks, he was gaming various scenarios of what might happen.
It seems unlikely that the Serbian idea of âmore than autonomy but less than independenceâ will gain support amongst the big powers who will help arbitrate Kosovoâs fate. However, the new position, despite the occasional nationalistic outburst, is expressed in the mild language of compromise; the Serbs claim they are trying to find a happy median between the Albanian desire for self-rule and their desire to defend Serbiaâs territorial integrity. In private, some senior Serbian leaders say they believe that âconditional independenceâ for Kosovo is inevitable, but they will nonetheless put up a fierce rearguard struggle to prevent it. No Serbian leader wants to go down in history as the one who lost Kosovo, so if this rearguard action succeeds in staving off independence during their watch â which is conceivable, if unlikely â they will regard the talks as a success.
In Pristina, preparations for talks lag far behind those of Belgrade. Publicly, everyone from President Ibrahim Rugova to Premier Bajram Kosumi says that they are willing to talk with the Serbs about everything except independence, which is non-negotiable. Pristinaâs position, in other words, is the mirror image of Belgradeâs. This position is understandable from their point of view, but what seems alarming is the lack of preparaÂŹtion for any succession issues, in light of the experience of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Since 1999, for example, Serbia has not paid pensions to Albanian workers who had paid their contributions like other Yugoslav citizens. When Kosovo Albanian negotiators demand this money, the Serbs will retort that they have paid the interest on Kosovoâs internaÂŹtional debt for the last six years.
Indeed, diplomats in Pristina fret that the main Kosovan leaders are simply unprepared for talks and have been lulled, by talk of âconditional independenceâ, into a false sense of security. They do not seem to appreciate the threat, from their point of view, of the preparations being made by the Serbs.15 Indeed, Albanians recently were outraged when the International Telecommunications Union failed to quickly accede to a request from UNMIK to allot Kosovo an international direct-dialling code separate from Serbiaâs. This was thanks to deft diplomacy on the part of Serbia, although the issue has not yet been finally settled.
Some skilled people will be at the coming talks, as part of a team already selected by Rugova. But the question is whether there are enough of them. The two best men on the team, not being major political figures, have the least clout. One is Blerim Shala, the editor of the daily Zeri, who has been asked to coordinate the teamâs working groups; the other is Veton Surroi, the publisher and now leader of the small opposition party Ora. The rest of the team leave room for concern, quite apart from personal antipathies within the group. Nexhat Daci, the speaker of parliament, is widely regarded by diplomats who deal with Kosovo as an old-style, inflexible demagogue and by opposition leaders as unacceptably authoritarian. Next is Bajram Kosumi, the likeable but weak premier who succeeded Ramush Haradinaj. A whiff of scandal hangs over his premiership following allegations of corruption which appeared in the press. President Ibrahim Rugova is the best-known international symbol of Kosovo and his authority is unmatched. However, he has lung cancer and nobody knows how his health will hold up over the next few months. If he dies or is incapacitated soon this will provoke a major political upheaval as rival camps, which are already emerging, fight for the leadership of his Democratic League of Kosovo, the largest single party in Kosovo. His demise could also fatally weaken the Kosovo Albanian negotiÂŹating team, as the others fight for a leadership role. Finally there is Hashim Thaci, the leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo, who used to be the political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army. All these men, bar Daci, participated in the Rambouillet negotiations.
At the time of writing the Eide report was awaiting examination by the Security Council. According to diplomatic sources, once this stage has been passed and Ahtisaari or someone else has been selected to lead the talks, three deputies â from the US, EU and Russia -- will be chosen. A period of shuttle diplomacy will begin, perhaps in December, and at some point in early 2006 the team could retire to write a draft agreement. While working groups of Serbs and Albanians may go over certain individual questions, the main negotiators will not yet meet. Indeed, a proposal which had been floated behind the scenes in late summer for a formal opening of talks was quashed on the grounds that both sides would then be obliged to state positions publicly, which would later reduce their room for manoeuvre and flexibility. According to Veton Surroi, a realistic scenario foresees the Serb and Albanian main negotiating teams summoned to meet around May 2006 âin a castle in Austriaâ. In January Austria takes over the presidency of the EU.
What happens next is impossible to predict. One scenario outlined by a senior diplomatic source foresees that the Serbian team will fight hard to make sure that the agreement contains all possible safeguards for the Kosovo Serbs, acknowledging its own interests and in institutionalising international protection for Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches.18 Having achieved this, the Serbs could then refuse to endorse the plan because it also points the way to Kosovoâs independence. Reluctantly, perhaps, the Albanians would then be compelled to accept more in terms of Serbian rights in Kosovo than they would have done otherwise, but under international pressure they might see such concessions as the price of independence.
At the same time Serbiaâs leaders, none of whom want to take responsibility for losing Kosovo, could claim that, at this point and having fought as hard as possible, Kosovo was taken away from Serbia. Since Serbia did not give its consent, it will not recognise the emerging state and hence, as far as it is concerned, its status could (theoretically,) be reversed at a later date. If this is in fact how the situÂŹation develops, this Serb position will, sooner or later, have to be modified, if only as the price of EU membership â as recent quarrels over Turkey and the question of its recognition of Cyprus have demonstrated.
It is impossible to know in advance what the UN-led negotiating team might propose. But since the widespread assumption is that it will be some form of âconditional independenceâ, it is worth examining what this could mean. In broad terms it would certainly mean adopting some of the recomÂŹmendations discussed by Eide, but more specifically it may well be that the negotiators are guided by the blueprint of the International Commission on the Balkans. This independent group, which issued its report in April 2005, was chaired by former Italian Premier Giuliano Amato, and for the most part included people either from or with a deep knowledge and experience of the Balkans. They proposed that Kosovo should move towards independence in four stages. The first, âde facto separation of Kosovo from Serbiaâ, seems to describe the current situation. The second is called âindependence without full sovereigntyâ, which is described as meaning that Kosovo is an independent entity but not yet a sovereign state and one in which the international community âreserves powers in the fields of human rights and minoritiesâ â a theme which was echoed by Eide. The third stage is called âguided sovereigntyâ, and would âcoincide with Kosovoâs recognition as a candidate for EU membershipâ and in which the international community would lose its reserve powers which would be replaced by âinfluence through the negotiation processâ. The fourth and final stage is called âfull and final sovereigntyâ, and is marked by the âabsorption of Kosovo into the EU and its adoption of the shared soverÂŹeignty to which all members are subjectâ.
The Serbs hope that it will not come to this, and with skilful diplomacy they might stand a slim chance of at least making the technical status of Kosovo somewhat vaguer and more drawn out than that described above. For this they would probably need vigorous support from Russia, however, and according to diplomatic sources the Russians have already decided to betray the Serbs.20 For the benefit of the Serbian press, Russian diplomats say that they will not accept any solution for Kosovo which is not endorsed by Belgrade, but to Western diplomats they are saying precisely the oppoÂŹsite. It has always been widely assumed that Russia, citing the precedent of Chechnya, would oppose Kosovoâs independence. Now, however, three things seem to have happened. In 2003 Russian troops were withdrawn from the Balkans. This has dramatically lowered Russiaâs diplomatic leverage in the region. Secondly, Russian diplomats have concluded that there is no realistic way to reconnect Kosovo and its hostile population to Belgrade. Thirdly, they have concluded, and indeed told visiting foreign ministers, that as far as they are concerned the question of precedent could be used to their advantage. That is to say, they are noting that if Kosovo can secede from a sovereign state, then the same argument can potentially be applied in areas of the former Soviet Union where they have interests, specifically Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Trans-Dniester in Moldova.
China is unlikely to resist the independence of Kosovo if Russia does not, although this cannot be taken for granted. While China has never taken an active role or even interest in the Balkans, it did veto the continuation of a UN peacekeeping force in Macedonia in 1999. The Serbs might succeed in persuading China that independence for Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent for Taiwan or even Tibet. Whatever the repercussions for Tibet, Serbian politicians argue that if Kosovo is granted some form of independence this would destabilise the region in a way they could not control. They argue, for example, that if they cannot prevent the loss of Kosovo, Serbia might succumb to a renewed wave of angry nationalism and the Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj, now on trial in The Hague on war-crimes charges, might come to power. This is conceivable. The Radicals are already the largest party in parliaÂŹment, although they are not in government. Outside of Serbiaâs borders, the Serbian argument runs, Kosovoâs independence would embolden Albanian nationalists in Macedonia, thus perhaps prompting the disintegration of that state, with its large Albanian minority. The Serb part of Bosnia would again raise its wartime demand to secede and join Serbia.
Diplomats who follow the region are of course well acquainted with this line of argument, which played a decisive role in the EUâs decision in October to begin talks with Serbia on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Diplomats openly said that they decided not to let the outstanding issue of Ratko Mladic, the fugitive Bosnian Serb wartime commander wanted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, stand in the way of the opening of negotiations. They are hoping that the good news of the conclusion of an agreement next year may help counteract the simultaneous bad news of the loss of Kosovo and likely secession of Montenegro from the loose federation which currently links it to Serbia.
Albanians counter these arguments about radicalisation in Serbia with the argument that, unless they get independence, it is certain that hardliners will again resort to arms; in the ensuing uprising KFOR and representaÂŹtives of the international community present in Kosovo will be targeted. UN vehicles are already targets of the occasional bomb.
In the shorter term there is another threat. Over the last few months, Albin Kurti, a 30-year-old former student leader and political prisoner, has been organising young people across Kosovo. Studying the techniques used by those who organised the overthrow of former regimes in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, Kurti wants to ready his people to come out in protest against the talks on Kosovoâs future status.
Kurti says that talks, by their very nature, aim at compromise and there can be no compromise on Kosovoâs independence. He fears that what he calls Kosovoâs âcorruptâ politicians might yet buckle on this if put under presÂŹsure. He argues that talks with Serbia should only take place when Kosovo is already independent and thus can sit at the table as an equal. His slogan â âNo negotiations! Self Determination!â â already decorates walls across Kosovo but his strength is, as yet, untested. If, however, at some point in the near future or during talks one of the Albanian leaders, for example Hashim Thaci, decided to âplay the Kurti cardâ and swing his support behind him then the outcome would be not only unpredictable but in such an unstable and highly charged situation a fresh wave of anti-Serbian ethnic cleansing similar to that of March 2004 might break out.
Diplomats who deal with Kosovo all repeat the mantra that they have no preconceived agenda, beyond wanting to prohibit the physical partition of Kosovo or a possible future union with Albania, and that they want Serbs and Albanians to reach agreement on the territoryâs future among themselves. All of them know, however, and admit in private, that the likelihood of this happening is nil. This is why âconditional independenceâ is their aim. As to the fear of violence and instability, the most honest of them will admit that their fear of radicalisation in Serbia is simply less than their fear of an Albanian uprising. As to the question of the probable eventual recogÂŹnition of the new state, they argue that while it would be preferable for this to be done via the Security Council, especially in light of the fact that Kosovo is now under UN jurisdiction, if Russia or China prevented this another route would have to be found. After all, the UN Security Council played no role in the recognition of the other states which emerged from the former Yugoslavia. According to Richard Caplan, in the likely case of Serbia opposing Kosovoâs recognition, âthere will be ample opportunities for lawyers on both sides to exploit what is a rather ambiguous caseâ. Realities on the ground will be decisive. âHere, I think, politics will trump law.â
Secret Kosovo status talks begin
As both formal and informal behind-the-scenes talks about Kosovo's future status begin, the member countries of the powerful Contact Group seem to have reached a consensus that Kosovo should be granted "conditional independence".
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY NETWORK (SWITZERLAND)
By Tim Judah in London and Paris for ISN Security Watch (24/12/05)
Though UN officials have recently announced that talks concerning the status of Serbia's UN-administered province of Kosovo would begin in earnest in January, ISN Security Watch has learned that much of the real work is already being done behind the scenes, with intense discussions between key countries involved in the region and Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders.
Over the past few weeks, a series of meetings, both formal and informal, have taken place in key capitals - including the Serbian capital, Belgrade, and the Kosovo capital, Pristina - as diplomats attempt to shape a deal for Kosovo, bolstering the work being done by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who has been chosen to head the UN-led status negotiations.
Since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the province of some two million people has been under the jurisdiction of the UN, though it legally remains a part of Serbia. Its population is over 90 per cent ethnic Albanian. They have made it clear they want nothing less than full independence for Kosovo.
Serbia's official position is that Kosovo can have "more than autonomy but less than independence".
Members of the Serbian negotiation team, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and President Boris Tadic, had proposed earlier this month that Kosovo be divided into Albanian and Serbian areas.
According to the Serbian plan, the Albanian areas would be self-governing and independent in all but name, while the Serbian ones would remain linked to Belgrade and the Serbian flag would fly once again on Kosovo's frontiers.
In parallel to this, the Serbian leadership has also decided that it would be most advantageous to argue their Kosovo case along legal lines - that is to say that Kosovo is de jure part of Serbia and thus its international frontiers cannot be changed without Serbia's consent.
However, Kosovo's Albanian leaders are demanding that the province be given full independence in recognition of their right to self-determination.
Over the last few weeks, there have been several meetings - including one between the Contact Group, which was set up to coordinate policy during the Balkan wars in the early 1990s, and Ahtisaari - which have yielded significant results. While Ahtisaari is now the official Kosovo mediator, real power lies with the countries of the Contact Group.
There appears to be a considerable unity of purpose among the Contact Group members. France and the US, for example, so often at loggerheads over the past few years, have no major disagreement over Kosovo. Russia, too, has been described by diplomats as extremely cooperative over Kosovo. If Serbian leaders were hoping to find backing from the traditionally friendly Russians there is no evidence thus far that they will get it.
Representatives of the Contact Group countries have decided that the best solution for Kosovo is that it be given so called "conditional independence".
This means that the sovereign link with Serbia will be broken but that restrictions on Kosovo's independence will remain for a transitional period.
These could include, for example, no army and awarding reserve powers to a representative of the international community. The result would be a slimmed down and more focused version of the model that exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is effectively governed by the international community's High Representative, who has sweeping powers.
Diplomats who have talked to ISN Security Watch, on condition of anonymity, say the only disagreement among the Contact Group members is over speed and tactics.
"We all know, more or less, where we are going but we just have to be careful of the language used in public," one source said.
At the moment, officials from Contact Group countries say publicly that what they want is an agreement made between and mutually acceptable to Serbs and Albanians. Yet, privately, everyone knows that Serbs and Albanians will never be able to agree on the status of Kosovo.
France is less willing to openly say that the Contact Group countries are in favor of conditional independence because it fears that to do so might prompt the Serbs to withdraw from talks before they have even properly started.
By contrast, the British believe that the sooner the "I" word (for
independence) is pronounced, the more flexible the Albanians will become.
The British theory, according to informed sources, is that given a guarantee that independence (conditional or otherwise) is coming, the Albanians will be more amenable to granting the Kosovo Serbs concessions such as extensive decentralization.
As to whether moving Kosovo towards independence might provoke a nationalist radicalization of Serbia, one source in favor of moving faster rather than slower, simply sums up the Serbian dilemma as one of "Belarus or Brussels".
That is to say that Serbia has a choice between renewed isolation or continuing along its current path towards European integration.
It is clear to Serbian leaders that US policymakers have little sympathy for the Serbian efforts to keep Kosovo. However, what is unclear is that there appears to be no compelling reason (other than realpolitik,) as to why the US should favor independence for the Kosovo Albanians but oppose it for Iraqi Kurds, for instance.
Serbs have looked for support in meetings in Moscow and with the French. The Russians, while promising Serbian leaders that they would oppose anything Belgrade does not agree with, say in private talks with their western counterparts that they will not oppose conditional independence for Kosovo.
France then was perhaps the last best hope for the Serbian leadership, but here too, in a series of meetings this month, the Serbs have been disappointed. According to ISN Security Watch sources, the Serbs were told that France would support Serbian interests but that those interests had to be realistic. Holding on to Kosovo, in any form, was not considered realistic.
In public and private, the Serbs are now pursuing different lines of attack.
Predrag Simic, Serbia and Montenegro's ambassador to France and a member of the Serbian Kosovo negotiating team, evokes the situation leading up to the Second World War to argue against independence for Kosovo.
"In 1938," he says, the Western powers, fearful of Hitler, accepted his demand to annex the Sudetenland, the predominantly German inhabited area of Czechoslovakia. But this appeasement "brought neither peace nor security to Europe".
However, in private, according to western diplomatic sources, Serbian President Tadic is exploring a more flexible agenda. He wants any settlement to secure the future of the Kosovo Serbs and wants to try and steer proponents of conditional independence into making sure that if this cannot be avoided then, at least for the foreseeable future, Kosovo will have no army or highly symbolic seat at the UN.
But Western diplomats are fearful of what they call the "disaster scenario", which foresees the talks failing to gain traction and hardliners on either side opting for violence.
The disaster scenario sees either Serbian or Albanian hardliners provoking an exodus from the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo. There are some100,000 Serbs in Kosovo, of which 30,000 live in the solidly Serbian north, while the rest are scattered in enclaves in central and southern Kosovo.
Albanian hardliners could decide to attack the enclaves and provoke the flight of the Serbs there, so as to prevent the areas from becoming autonomous regions that would remain, in their view, like Serbian claws in a future independent Kosovo.
By contrast Serbian hardliners could seek to provoke a Serbian exodus from the enclaves in a bid to solidify the Serbian population of the north. Their hope would be that many years down the line the de facto partition that already exists along the Ibar river would one day be recognized as the international frontier between the part of Kosovo that Serbia managed to save and the Albanian part, which would be independent.
It is precisely because they want to avert such a disaster scenario that the diplomats are now talking intensively to the Serbs and Albanians and among themselves.
Indeed, the message diplomats are now delivering to the Kosovo Albanians might come as a surprise to some. According to one source, the Albanians have been warned not to let hardliners provoke violence, but they have also been told that since conditional independence is the aim, "The talks are not about the status of Kosovo. What they are really about then, is negotiating the status of the Serbs in Kosovo," the source said.
Tim Judah is the author of Kosovo: War and Revenge and The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, both published by Yale University Press.
In northern Kosovska Mitrovica last night two armed attacks were carried out against Serbs. The first attack took place at about 2:00 a.m. in John Kennedy Street in front of the Vodovod water utility company. Unknown attackers fired multiple bullets at Branimir Antovic, a security guard for the company. Thirty-five year-old Antovic was shot four times in the chest and according to physicians is in critical condition. 
Dejan Maksimovic and Branislav Antovic where injured in two armed attacks in Kosovska Mitrovica late last night. 
Maksimovic told Beta that the attacker shot at him from the terrace of his own apartment. He said that he was watching television in the room in which his parents were sleeping. 