• It is an insult to accuse the Serbs of undermining multi-ethnic society in Kosovo and Metohija because they are not the ones who have been murdering, expelling, looting and torching. I had hoped that in the time he has spent in the Province, Mr. Petersen would have grasped the tragic but simple fact that it is now the non-Albanians, especially the Serbs, who are the ones being murdered and expelled, and whose property is being confiscated and torched, and that his accusations should be directed to another, more appropriate address.

• For the Serbs, the option of not voting was the only way they could draw attention to their untenable position, and show the public that institutions in Kosovo and Metohija are nothing but a pale façade of democracy and multi-ethnicity, hiding the rule of ethnic exclusion and discrimination against non-Albanians in every area. The institutions that were supposed to have been the watershed of a new society moving toward Europe in the majority of cases have become instruments of repression, especially at the local level. Serbian protests and proposals to improve the position of the non-majority population have not found expected support among the Albanians, who have rejected every Serbian proposal as a call for the division of Kosovo, even though the majority of Serbs, especially those living in southern enclaves, are asking for nothing more than functional self-administration that enables them to live free and normal lives, the return of all displaced persons, and the repair of their churches and monasteries. By insisting that they accept the new Kosovo reality without any genuine willingness to assume responsibility for a better future for their co-citizens, ethnic Albanian leaders are largely responsible for the fact that this time the Serbs stayed away from the polls.

• The tone and sharpness of the condemnations sent to our address almost in concert by individual member states of the Contact Group and Mr. Petersen are also the result of our own internal disunity on which some international factors are basing their strategy with respect to Kosovo and Metohija, unfortunately, with considerable success. Our situation has been made worse by the eight month-long systematic incapacitation of the Coordinating Center through lack of funding, which has resulted in the wholesale collapse of everything we have built in Kosovo and Metohija since mid-2001.

• The countdown to the start of talks on the status of the Province has already begun and the impatience to bring many processes to a close is glaringly obvious, despite the fact that, in essence, they have not even begun.

• Belgrade officials have already shown countless times that they are ready and open to cooperation with the International Community, and on this occasion I would like to once again reiterate that the International Community has a sincere and reliable partner in Belgrade.

• However, co-operation is a two-way process in which both sides are acknowledged and in which responsibilities accepted and promises made carry some weight; simply changing the rules of the game, failing to adhere to what was agreed upon, and an arrogant approach do not constitute cooperation but diktat.

• Nevertheless, I hope that with a unified position, unity and a well-planned strategy we will succeed in getting this process back on the right path and, together with the International Community and all national communities in Kosovo and Metohija, seeing if we can determine the causes of this tragic situation instead of just the consequences, like now.

• The elections, first of all, sent the message that the rights of Serbs should be protected, first of all, by Belgrade. Therefore, this is a unique opportunity to get things back on the right path. UNMIK has been attempting for years to create a Serbian political group that will give legitimacy to secession under guise of its participation in Kosovo and Metohija institutions. Much effort has been put in finding leaders who will finally sever the Serbs from Belgrade, and thus sideline the government. The situation that has now been created is a new opportunity for Belgrade to come forward with a unified policy based on the position that it has the legitimate right to represent the rights of its citizens. The Kosovo Serbs voted in the Serbian elections, and therefore they are legitimately represented in the institutions of Serbia. Serbia is responsible for now commencing to represent the Kosovo and Metohija Serbs, and thus making up for their absence from Kosovo, i.e. Albanian institutions.

• I consider it crucial that those who have been elected by a miniscule number of votes do not consent to serve in the parliament for several reasons. First, they do not have any legitimacy, and they cannot represent anyone except themselves. Second, Petersen must not be permitted to once again exclude Belgrade from dialogue, or reduce it to a secondary role based on the fact that he has a few Serbs in the Parliament. UNMIK and the Albanians want to reduce the role of Belgrade as much as possible and at any price, and they have now been routed in this attempt. In the negotiations that will have to resume, Belgrade should by all means engage some Kosovo Serb leaders as a part of its own delegation; and it should then proceed to represent the best interests of its citizens in the Province, who are asking for the help of their Government.

(END)

From Foreign Media:

Kosovo's status struggle

FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

Kosovo's October 23rd general election did little to change the balance of power among the big parties representing the ethnic Albanian majority, but it was notable for a highly effective boycott on the part of the Serbian minority, instigated by the government of Serbia. Belgrade cannot wrest the province back under its control but it seems able, for the moment, to block moves towards Kosovan independence.

On October 25th the OSCE released preliminary results of the parliamentary election in Kosovo, which was held two days earlier. Four parties dominated the vote in the province, which is under UN administration. While formally part of Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo is mostly populated by ethnic Albanians that are determined to secure full independence over the strong objections of the Serbian minority.

The preliminary results suggest little change in Kosovo's political landscape; the three main Albanian parties in the outgoing parliament will return in force once again. The province's largest party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) _ the party of passive resistance to Serbian rule in the 1990s _ took 45.3% of the vote, short of the majority that party leader and Kosovo president Ibrahim Rugova had hoped for.

The two main parties that grew out of the wartime insurgent movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), also performed strongly: the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), led by former UCK leader Hashim Thaci, took 28.65% of the vote, while the smaller Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led by Ramush Haradinaj, polled 8.28%.

The only other sizeable grouping in the new parliament is the party Ora ("Clock"), founded by media baron Veton Surroi. Ora criticises the established parties for simply waiting for independence, and backs a more energetic and proactive approach. However, with the three main parties once again dominating parliament there is unlikely to be much change in the conduct or direction of Kosovo's government.

The previous election, in November 2001, led to the formation of a broad-based coalition government including all of the main Kosovo Albanian parties and Serb and other minority representatives, which displayed little sense of collective responsibility. Partly this was because significant powers remained with the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), but also because the Kosovo Albanian parties were bitterly divided. The next government is unlikely to be any better disciplined.

The stay-away Serbs

By law, Serbs are guaranteed ten seats in Kosovo's parliament. On October 23rd, however, Serbian parties garnered only a tiny fraction of the vote - despite the fact that the Serbian community constitutes perhaps 5-10% of Kosovo's electorate. The Civic Initiative took 0.2% of the vote and the Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) 0.14%. The reason behind these extremely low numbers was a near-total boycott of the vote by Kosovo's Serbian population, which was inspired by some of the leading political parties in Serbia and the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The Kosovo Serb coalition, "Povratak" ("Return"), only opted to participate in the 2001 vote at the 11th hour, and did so at the instigation of the previous government in Belgrade. This time, however, the Serbian government took a different course. At the end of July it recommended that Kosovo Serbs should not participate unless there was a substantial improvement in their position along the lines proposed in the Serbian government's plan for Kosovo, adopted in April 2004. The key feature of the plan is widespread autonomy for Serbs in various regions of Kosovo, which would itself be an autonomous province of Serbia.

The Serbian government's decision, which appears to have been enforced in parts of Kosovo by means of voter intimidation, was part politics, part protest and part strategic. The political element is a result of the current balance in Belgrade, where the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) is now the largest parliamentary grouping and the pivotal party in government is now premier Vojislav Kostunica's moderately nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), rather than the more liberal Democratic Party (DS). Faced with a strong nationalist opposition and the Serbian Orthodox Church's call for a boycott, it is not surprising that Mr Kostunica decided to give the boycott official backing. Efforts by Boris Tadic, the DS leader and Serbian president, to encourage participation in the election fell flat.

The protest element concerns the poor security situation in Kosovo - an outbreak of violence in March 2004, instigated by Albanian extremists determined to force the issue of independence, left 19 people dead, more than 900 injured, and led to the displacement of hundreds of Serbs _ and UNMIK's failure to empower the province's Serb minority. In April, in the wake of the March violence, the Serbian government adopted its plan for widespread autonomy for Serbs within an autonomous Kosovo. The failure of UNMIK to embrace Belgrade's proposal was the main trigger for the Serbian government's call for a boycott of the October election by Kosovo's Serbian population.

If you can't dictate, then block

While politicking and protest helped to drive Belgrade's policy, there is also an element of strategic thinking. Within the Serbian political mainstream it is probably acknowledged that Kosovo cannot be recovered, but this does not equate to a willingness to help usher the province towards Albanian-dominated independence, wave it goodbye, or abandon the goal of partition. This tension has been exacerbated in recent months by signals from within the international community suggesting that Kosovo's final status might be addressed rather sooner than previously expected.

The UN-approved formula for Kosovo - regarded on the ethnic Albanian side as a pretext for delaying any tough decisions on independence - is to put off discussion of the province's "final status" until a number of standards have been achieved. These include functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, returns and reintegration, economy, property rights, and dialogue with Belgrade. However, in August 2004 a memo written by Kai Eide, a special envoy to the UN Secretary-General, was leaked to the press. It suggested accelerating the transfer of powers in areas such as policing from UNMIK to local authorities and the abandonment of "standards before status" in favour of a policy of prioritising key standards in parallel with addressing the province's status.

A more active approach to final status is also evident in the work of Soren Jessen-Petersen, who became head of UNMIK in August. He emphasises that it is in the interest of both Kosovo and the region for the province's future to be decided sooner rather than later. Mr Jessen-Petersen is keen to transfer further powers as soon as possible. He has also indicated that he favours an assessment of Kosovo's suitability for talks on final status soon - a stance echoed by the US, which wants to see the issue addressed in mid-2005.

In this context, and given Serbian attitudes towards Kosovo, Belgrade's call for a boycott of the ballot makes some sense. First, it underlines the dissatisfaction among the Serbian minority in Kosovo over the security situation. Second, it undermines the legitimacy of Kosovo's new parliament and government - and in effect denies legitimacy to any push for independence in the current circumstances. And third, it keeps Belgrade involved in any discussions to the greatest possible extent: while there will be ten Serb representatives in Kosovo's parliament, none of them will have been elected, and so Belgrade is by default the main representative of Kosovo's Serbian population.

It is worth noting that by the second half of 2005 a more moderate coalition may be in power in Serbia. Whether or not this is the case, Serbia has some minimum demands upon which it is likely to insist before it agrees to stop obstructing Kosovo's progress towards independence. The clearest statement of these objectives to date came in the April proposals for autonomy for, and within, Kosovo.

The current Serbian government is aware of its limited ability to shape the outcome of final status talks. However, it may calculate that the election boycott - and the negative signals it sends about Kosovo's fitness for independence - will be sufficient to encourage Russia, its long-standing ally, to oppose hasty moves to independence. While the attitude of UN officials is important in determining the timing of final status talks, the most important players are the major powers that make up the Contact Group - the US, Russia, the UK, France, Germany and Italy. Moscow has its own reasons for not wanting to sanction the independence of a breakaway territory, and the controversies surrounding the election may increase the likelihood that it will take a stand against moves to cement Kosovo's independence in 2005. In any case, it is not clear that the US, preoccupied as it is with Iraq, will be pushing for resolution of final status within the next year.

Unable to impose or shape an outcome to its liking, Belgrade is limited to blocking tactics which have, for the moment, proved successful. In the wake of the boycott it is difficult to envisage the UN giving a green light to final status talks. This, however, leaves Kosovo in a limbo that is likely to increase ethnic Albanian frustration - and with it the risk of violence.

Belgrade Media Update - Second Edition (October 27)

Serb Candidates Wonder Whether to Enter the Kosovo Assembly
The leaders of the Serb List for Kosovo, one of the two Serb tickets that ran at the October 23 Kosovo parliamentary elections, wonder whether they would join the Kosovo Assembly and state that their decision would depend on the position of the official Belgrade. Randjel Nojkic said that talks with the state leadership as well as with the international community were ongoing, and expressed the hope that a rational solution would be found, Tanjug reported. Dragisa Krstovic commented that the decision would be known after meeting with Serbian President Boris Tadic, Radio Beograd 202 reported. As for Oliver Ivanovic, the head of the List, he announced that they would not take a single step on their own and would do only what the Serbian Government recommends, Radio B92 reported. He declared the same day that the Serbs candidates did not receive an adequate support from the population, which renders their position very difficult, and that they cannot assume the responsibility for the difficult decisions ahead to protect the Serbs in the best possible way, RTS reported. Concerning the Serbia Civic Initiative, its leader Slavisa Petkovic said that, while the final results of the elections should be awaited, he would certainly enter the Kosovo Assembly if any of the mandates were adopted, Tanjug reported. He announced his readiness to form a coalition with Hashim Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) if the Serb minority is provided with guarantees for their security in the province, and claimed he believed that Thaci “could, if he wants to, guarantee security to Serbs and secure an unconditional repatriation for them,” RTS reported a Reuters item. The Serbian Premier political advisor Slobodan Samardzic considers that the provisional institutions of self government (PISG) to be formed following last Saturday elections in Kosovo, will be "illegitimate to represent the interests of the Serb community," as "no one who would represent the interests of Serbs will enter the parliament, and if someone takes the 10 deputy seats envisaged for the Serbs by the constitutional framework, they cannot be legitimate and represent the interests of the Serbs, as they are not supported by the Serbian electorate." Upon the provisional results of the elections communicated last Monday in Pristina, the Serb List for Kosovo won 0.14% of the vote and the Civic Initiative won 0.02%, Tanjug reported.

Kosovo Serb Opposed to Serbs’ Vote Claim Serb Candidates Have no Legitimacy
The president of the Serbian Resistance Movement in Kosovo (SPOT) Momcilo Trajkovic stated yesterday that the Serbs in Kosovo and those displaced have conveyed at the October 23 parliamentary elections in the province that that they do not wish to act as extras and simulate multi-ethnicity. He demanded the Serb who participated in the elections not to accept the verification of the ten guaranteed mandates in the Kosovo Assembly, and underlined that, in the opposite case, SPOT and the Power of Serbia Movement (PSS) would propose that the Kosovo Serbs organize their own elections and elect legitimate representatives, of which the first ten would participate in the work of the Kosovo Assembly, RTS reported. Urging that Belgrade should have a single strategy after the obvious Kosovo Serbs' boycott of the provincial elections, Trajkovic proposed the setting up of a governmental council for Kosovo, a ministry and a fund for economic assistance to Kosovo Serbs, Beta reported. Nebojsa Jovic, from the presidency of the Serb National Council (SNC), urged the Serbian President Boris Tadic and Premier Vojislav Kostunica not to allow the elected Serb deputies to claim their seats and so ignore the wishes of the Serb people, and assessed that UNMIK chief Sřren Jessen-Petersen should postpone their adherence to the Kosovo Assembly in agreement with the Serbian authorities, FoNet reported. As for the SNC leader for northern Kosovo Milan Ivanovic, he called on UNMIK head for dialogue with the “relevant Serb representatives supported by more than 99% of the Serb community in the province,” and warned that they would “not accept the non-legitimate Serbs whom we denied support and trust by non-voting,” while underlying that “giving parliament seats to Serbs who received less than one per cent of votes would represent a precedent, which would prove that you are not ready to seriously resolve the problems of Kosovo Serbs.” Stressing that "the boycott is an extremely poor grade for the UN mission, for you personally and your predecessors, as those most responsible for the (non)implementation of Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council," he added that “the official reports by the UNMIK Police and KPS, as well as the statements by the OSCE Head Pascal Fieschi that everything passed by in the best democratic order” denied Jessen-Petersen’s claim that the non-Albanians’ failure to cast their ballot was due to pressures and intimidation of voters. Ivanovic concluded that “by refraining from voting, we refused to participate in the legalization of ethnic cleansing and the creation of an independent Albanian state and institutions that would work on implementing that independence,” RTS reported.

Serbian Orthodox Church Says UNMIK Head Aggravates Ethnic Tensions 
In reaction to the claim of UNMIK head Sřren Jessen-Petersen that members of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) were blocking progress in Kosovo, the Raska and Prizren Eparchy yesterday appealed on the international community officials in Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) to warn the UNMIK chief about the fact that he is contributing to the aggravation of relations between ethnic and religious communities in Kosovo. It further claimed that “the UNMIK chief Sřren Jessen-Petersen pursued his attacks against the Serbian Orthodox Church because of its stance that the conditions are unfavorable for Serbs to take part in the elections…. Such unfounded and tendentious assaults demonstrate not only the unreadiness of the UNMIK chief to recognize the democratic right of those who chose not to cast their ballots but also his readiness to blame them for his own failure to organize free multi-ethnic elections,” Tanjug reported.