A New Book
FOOL'S ERRANDS
America's Recent Encounters With Nation Building
By Gary Dampsey and Roger W. Fontaine - CATO Institute, Washington D.C.
A Critical Approach to Nation Building Failures in Kosovo, Bosnia etc
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Amb. Gelbard: "The KLA is without any questions, a terrorist group, and we condemn very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo.
Sen. J. Lieberman (D-Conn): "The United States of America and the Kosovo Liberation Army stand for the same human values and principles...Fighting for the KLA is fighting for human rights and American values

An extract from the book referring to the situation in post-war Kosovo

Copyright, 2001,CATO Institute, Washington D.C.
This text is reproduced without permission for non-commercial purposes and is "for fair use only".

A False Peace

The Kosovo mission is a success.
We are building modern democratic society,
Bernard Kouchner - Independent June 13, 2000

Traveling through the Balkans shortly after NATO ended its air campaign. President Clinton declared: now that the war is over, "we must win the peace."61 Obscuring the distinction between the physical presence of American peacekeepers in Kosovo and what specific policy aims they were being ordered to pursue, Clinton told U.S. soldiers that the United States must not walk away from Kosovo. In similar fashion. Secretary Albright proclaimed, "Having prevailed in war, our challenge is to secure the peace. This is proving, as expected, costly and hard.... But the cost and risks of quitting far exceed those of maintaining a peaceful Kosovo."62 Albright, like Clinton, blurred the issue, equating quitting the administration's specific policy with quitting the peace. In reality, the peace Albright recommended maintaining in Kosovo was, and still is, a false peace. Indeed, unlike Bosnia, where the warring sides had been exhausted by three and a half years of civil war and three failed attempts at peace plans, Belgrade and the KLA had not yet fought each other to a similar standstill in Kosovo. As a result, the KLA saw NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia not as a necessary means to end a brutal civil war, but as a means to advance its wartime agenda. "Without a doubt," concedes NATO's first commander in Kosovo, Gen. Michael Jackson, "the KLA had seen NATO and the air campaign as all part of what they were doing, which was creating an independent state."

There is substantial evidence showing that the KLA and its sup­porters have not given up that objective. After a major NATO seizure of KLA weapons in June 2000, for instance, there were multiday demonstrations by ethnic Albanians calling for the withdrawal of NATO peacekeepers from Kosovo.64 The protests were the first out­right anti-NATO demonstrations held by Kosovo's Albanians since the arrival of peacekeepers 12 months earlier. Most of Kosovo's Albanians had viewed NATO as their savior, and such protests were previously unthinkable. But when NATO started tightening its leash on the KLA, the ubiquity of that support began to slip. In fact, NATO's Civilian-Military Cooperation team released a summer 2000 report stating that the alliance was concerned its forces "had lost substantial credibility" in the eyes of the local communities and was becoming viewed as an obstacle to ethnic Albanian aspirations for independence. Many ethnic Albanians, moreover, are today tiring of the foreign-run government in Kosovo. They have nearly every­where adopted the double-headed eagle flag of neighboring Albania as their own, and popular music now directs open threats at KFOR peacekeepers and UNMIK police. One song, sung in English to maximize the effect, warns NATO and UN personnel, "The future's gonna be the same as the past if you don't change your ways very fast / cause there is no bullet-proof vest to protect when I strike and blast."65

There were, however, earlier indications that the KLA and Wash­ington's nation builders might not see eye to eye. In February 2000, NATO peacekeepers and ethnic Albanians openly clashed in the streets of the divided city of Kosovska Mitrovica. Ethnic Albanian militants, wanting to bring the entire city into their vision of what an independent Kosovo should look like, shot and wounded two French peacekeepers who were maintaining the city's line of separa­tion. The French responded by killing one rooftop sniper and wound­ing at least four others. NATO soldiers subsequently arrested more than 40 people suspected of involvement in the bloodletting and released a joint statement with the United Nations that read; "What is clear ... is that two young French soldiers, who came here as peacekeepers, are lying in hospital beds suffering from gunshot wounds inflicted on them by the very people that they came here to protect."66

On the political front, things were not going as smoothly as Wash­ington's nation builders had hoped either. In June 2000, the KLA's former political leader, Hashim Thaci, began a boycott of the Interim Administrative Council, the centerpiece of the unelected structure set up by Special Representative Kouchner to involve Kosovo's local leaders in decisionmaking. Thaci said his new political party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, had suspended formal cooperation with the Interim Administrative Council. That move followed the signing the week before of a memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and leaders of the Serb minority promis­ing them better security and access to local public services in their enclaves. Members of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority expressed anger at the deal, which they said allowed the Serbs to have their own institutions. Specifically, the United Nations promised to "take special measures" to protect Serbs/ including creating a neighbor­hood-watch system and a special committee to oversee protection of Serbian Orthodox religious sites. A senior member of Thaci's party said they found the agreement unacceptable because the arrangement could be a first step toward dividing Kosovo into ethnic regions, which threatens ethnic Albanian aspirations to rule all of Kosovo.67 Outside observers, moreover, speculated that the memo­randum of understanding was a handy excuse and that Thaci's decision was a sign of his growing impatience with the United Nations and NATO's interference with his efforts to consolidate power and create an independent state.68

Kosovo's “Declining” Murder Rate

Another early indication that Kosovo's peace is false and that the KLA and its supporters have not given up on their wartime objective was the widespread violence perpetrated against Serbs and other non-Albanians early on in the NATO deployment. In the first four months after NATO arrived, there were 348 murders, 116 kidnappings, 1,070 lootings, and 1,106 arsons aimed largely at Serbs and other non-Albanians.69 The wave of ethnic violence was not without dramatic effect. As early as August 1999, Human Rights Watch estimated that more than 164,000 Serbs and Gypsies had been driven from or had left Kosovo because of the violence aimed at them.70

By April 2000, however. Secretary of State Albright approvingly reported, "The murder rate in Kosovo is now lower than in many American cities."71 Similarly, in June 2000, National Security Adviser Berger touted, "The murder rate has declined by 90 percent in the past year."72 Albright and Berger, however, failed to point out that the murder rate had fallen in Kosovo precisely because the province had been virtually cleansed of non-Albanian murder targets. Indeed, reports at the time estimated that as many as 240,000 non-Albanians, including Goranies, Croats, Turks, and Jews/ had fled the province since NATO arrived.73 In Kosovo's capital, Pristina, only 400 Serbs, of a prewar population of 40/000, were said to have remained.74 Notwithstanding their dwindling presence, however, more than 25 murders, 45 aggravated assaults, and 100 incidents of arson were reported between February and June in which the victims were non-Albanian.75 Reports also circulated that hundreds of Serbs and other non-Albanians had mysteriously disappeared or had been kid­napped.76 The president of Medecins sans Frontieres, a leading inter­national emergency medical aid organization, complained that there "is no true environment of security [in Kosovo], there exists a climate of impunity."77 The Belgian branch of that humanitarian group ceased operations in Kosovo in August 2000 because it said its doc­tors were "eyewitnesses to the daily harassment and terror against the Serb minority," and it "can no longer tolerate the serious and continuous deterioration of living conditions of the ethnic minorities in Kosovo."78 Unfortunately for Albright and Berger, who were still trying to sell the idea that NATO's presence—rather than Kosovo's shrinking non-Albanian population—was responsible for the slow­down in ethnic violence, newspapers such as the London Independent were reporting:

Trouble in Pristina comes fast, and almost always involves automatic weapons, organized crime, or ethnic hatred. Last Tuesday, two Serbian women in their twenties were strolling through the bustle of Mother Teresa Avenue, the city's central thoroughfare. It was 9:30 p.m.. . . Two gunmen opened fire on both women, hitting one in the chest and one in the legs. Totally ignored by Kosovo Albanians crowding down the street, they staggered bleeding into the arms of a British soldier. Their crime: being Serbs.79

Meanwhile, informed observers inside and outside Kosovo began to raise questions about the KLA's role in the ongoing violence and intimidation. Time magazine's Tony Karon, for example, concluded that members of the "Kosovo Liberation Army ... appear to be animated by instincts every bit as violently racist and intolerant as their enemies in Belgrade, and simply started their own ethnic cleansing campaign as soon as they had the opportunity."80

Kosovo's Next Masters?

The Kosovo Liberation Army was founded in December 1993 on the radical fringe of Kosovo's political scene.81 Just over two years later, the KLA made its violent debut, bombing several refugee camps housing Serbs displaced by the wars in Bosnia and Croatia.82

According to journalist Chris Hedges, who spent more than a year investigating the organization for the New York Times, the KLA

splits down a bizarre ideological divide, with hints of fascism on one side and whiffs of communism on the other. The former faction is led by the sons and grandsons of rightist Albanian fighters—either the heirs of those who fought in the World War II fascist militias and the Skanderbeg volunteer SS division raised by the Nazis, or the descendants of the rightist Albanian kacak rebels who rose up against the Serbs 80 years ago.... The second KLA faction, comprising most of the KLA leaders in exile, are old Stalinists who were once bank­rolled by the xenophobic Enver Hoxha, the dictator of Alba­nia who died in 1985. This group led a militant separatist movement that was really about integration with Hoxha's Albania.... The two KLA factions have little sympathy with or understanding of democratic institutions.83

Throughout 1996 and 1997, the KLA expanded its militant opera­tions in Kosovo, with numerous hit-and-run attacks on Serbian police and ethnic Albanians accused of collaborating with the Bel­grade regime.84 The KLA also received an unexpected boost in 1997 when the central government in neighboring Albania collapsed. In the ensuing chaos, Albania's army dissolved, the police abandoned their posts, and the government's arms depots were thrown open. Between 650/000 and 1 million light weapons and 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition were stolen.85 An estimated 3.5 million hand gre­nades, 1 million anti-personnel mines, 840,000 mortar shells, and 3,600 tons of explosives also went missing.86 Many of the plundered weapons headed straight into the hands of the KLA.87

There are also strong indications the KLA subsidized its activities with funding from organized crime and an Albanian drug-traffick­ing network that stretches across Europe.88 In fact, as early as June 1994, the Paris-based Geopolitical Drug Watch issued a bulletin that concluded narcotics smuggling had become a prime source of financing for civil wars already under way—or rapidly brewing— in southeastern Europe.89 The GDW, which compiles research from 80 countries, is regarded as Europe's most authoritative monitor of the international drug trade and its efforts are conducted in partner­ship with several national police agencies and underwritten by grants from the European Union in Brussels.90 The GDW bulletin identified Albanian nationalists in Kosovo and Macedonia as key players in the region's accelerating drugs-for-arms traffic and noted that they were transporting up to $2 billion worth of heroin annually into Central and Western Europe "in order to finance large purchases of weapons" from black-market arms dealers in Switzerland.91 At the time the report was written, more than 500 Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia were in prison in Switzerland for drug- or arms-trafficking offenses, and more than 1,000 others were under indictment."

Over the next few years, police forces in at least three European countries discovered evidence that drug money was funding the KLA.93 In the Czech Republic, police tracked down a drug dealer from Kosovo who had escaped from a Norwegian prison where he was serving a 12-year sentence for heroin trading. A raid on the dealer's apartment turned up documents linking him with arms purchases for the KLA.94 In Italy, a criminal court convicted an Albanian drug trafficker who admitted obtaining weapons from the Italian Mafia in exchange for illegal drugs.95 In Germany, federal police agents froze two bank accounts of the United Kosovo organi­zation when they uncovered deposits totaling several hundred thou­sand dollars from a convicted drug trafficker from Kosovo.96 By 1999, Western intelligence sources estimated that more than $250 million in illegal drug money had been furmeled into the KLA,97 and an internal NATO report conceded:

Some funds from the drug trade, in which the Albanians traditionally acted as couriers and more lately as suppliers, reportedly are being used to purchase weapons for the Kosovo insurgents. . .. The profitability of the drug trade and the Kosovo Albanians' extensive involvement in it sug­gests this activity is a significant source of income for the insurgency and other Albanian causes.^

 

From "Terrorists" to Partners

On January 7, 1998, the KLA for the first time took responsibility for attacks outside Yugoslavia, admitting that it had bombed two police stations in Macedonia three days earlier. In a faxed statement, the group said its armed forces complied with orders issued by its chief of staff to begin attacks in "operational zone number 2."99 Over the next several weeks the KLA began a killing spree, gunning down unarmed people, including a physical education teacher, a bar manager, and a forest ranger.100 It also conducted armed attacks on buildings housing the families of Serbian police in Kosovo.101 By February 23, U.S. special envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard had little difficulty in denouncing the KLA in the strongest possible terms. The KLA, he said, "is, without any questions, a terrorist group," and "we condemn very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo."102

Gelbard's remarks came just five days before a KLA attack on Serbian police left two policemen and five KLA members dead.103 A few days later, Serbian police began a massive security sweep through central Kosovo that resulted in at least 20 deaths, including several civilians and four policemen.104 Concerned that Gelbard's earlier remarks about the KLA were interpreted by the Milosevic regime as a "green light" to crack down on the KLA, the House Committee on International Relations asked him to clarify his views. Although the KLA has committed "terrorist acts," Gelbard told the committee, it has "not been classified legally by the U.S. government as a terrorist organization."105 By the time Gelbard made that clarifi­cation, however, the situation in Kosovo had already been trans­formed. Indeed, what was once a matter of sporadic KLA attacks and indiscriminate Serbian responses had become a full-scale counterinsurgency, and by the end of March, more than 80 people, includ­ing many civilians, had died in clashes between Serbian authorities and the KLA.106

Over the course of the ensuing 12 months, Washington decided to embrace the KLA as a partner, and demanded that the Serbs meet in Rambouillet, France, to accept a peace plan with Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. Three former U.S. State Department officials—Morton Abramowitz, Marshall Harris, and Paul Williams—advised the eth­nic Albanian delegation in Rambouillet, and Secretary Albright told the KLA that it would be made the official police force of Kosovo under Washington's proposed peace plan and be given training in the United States.107 "We want to develop closer and better ties with this organization," explained deputy State Department spokesper­son James Foley.108 On Capitol Hill, Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) even managed to claim that the "United States of America and the Kosovo Liberation Army stand for the same human values and principles. . . . Fighting for the KLA is fighting for human rights and American values."109

The KLA Settles In

The KLA, however, had ideas of its own. When the Milosevic regime refused to sign the agreement produced at Rambouillet, NATO carried out its threat to bomb Yugoslavia. After Milosevic finally withdrew his forces from Kosovo in June, following 11 weeks of NATO bombing, the KLA swept across the province, organized its own provisional government, and set up a "Ministry of Public Order."110 As quickly as NATO began deploying peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, the KLA began driving out the province's Serbs and other non-Albanians, seizing property and businesses, extorting money, and intimidating moderate ethnic Albanians.111 Human Rights Watch, which for years had catalogued abuses committed by Serbian authorities in Kosovo, acknowledged the new reality in August 1999, noting "the most serious incidents of violence . .. have been carried out by the KLA." "The frequency and severity of the abuses," added the rights group, "make it incumbent upon the KLA leadership to take swift and decisive action to prevent them."112

KLA officials did no such thing. In fact, the abuses and killings continued, often committed by the "secret police" connected with the KLA's so-called Ministry of Public Order.113 By December 1999, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe published a damning report that cataloged the human rights violations commit­ted in Kosovo since NATO peacekeepers had arrived five months earlier. Serbs and other non-Albanians, said the report, were the targets of "executions, abductions, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary arrests ... house burnings, blockades restricting freedom of movement, discriminatory treatment in schools, hospitals, humanitarian aid distribution and other public services ... and forced evictions from housing." In many of the cases, the report added, "there are serious indications that the perpe­trators of [these] human rights violations are either members of the former KLA, people passing themselves off as members of the former KLA or members of other armed Albanian groups."114

The KLA was also implicated in efforts aimed at silencing moder­ate ethnic Albanians with a terror campaign of intimidation, kidnappings, beatings, bombings, and killings.115 In October 1999, Kosovapress, a news agency tied to the KLA, issued a veiled death threat to Veton Surroi, editor of the popular Albanian-language newspaper Koha Ditore, when he criticized the widespread violence directed at Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo.116 Surroi was singled out for expressing the following view in an editorial:

Today's violence ... is more than simply an emotional reac­tion. It is the organized and systematic intimidation of all Serbs simply because they are Serbs.... Such an attitude is fascist. It will dishonor us and our own recent suffering which, only a few months ago, was broadcast on television screens throughout the world. And it will dishonor the mem­ory of Kosovo's Albanian victims, those women, children and elderly who were killed simply because of their ethnic origins- . .. [From] having been victims of Europe's worst end-of-century persecution, we are ourselves becoming per­secutors and have allowed the specter of fascism to reappear. Anybody who thinks that the violence will end once the last Serb has been driven out is living an illusion. The violence will simply be directed against other Albanians.117

Kosovapress's response to Surroi's editorial was immediate. In a strongly worded column, it warned that he risked "eventual and very understandable revenge," claimed that "such criminals and enslaved minds should not have a place in the free Kosovo," and accused him of having a "Slav stink" about him."118

As worrisome, the KLA was linked to attacks across Kosovo target­ing offices and members of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), a political party whose leader, Ibrahim Rugova, was Kosovo's most popular politician before the war. LDK party activists who have survived severe hearings have said their attackers claimed to be from the "true KLA" or the "Ministry of Order."119 One victim who did not survive his attack was Haki Imeri, a schoolteacher who had recently been appointed a member of a local board of the LDK. He was abducted and killed on November 2, 1999. He was last seen entering a car licensed to an intelligence officer with the KLA.120 In another incident, Ismet Veliqi, a local LDK activist and schoolteacher, was abducted, beaten, shot, and left for dead on February 23, 2000. Veliqi said his assailants were ethnic Albanians who asked him during their attack, "Why do you still support Rugova?"121 At the time of his abduction, there were five "unofficial" KLA Ministry of Order police stations still operating in Pristina alone.122 On June 15, 2000, a moderate LDK politician, Halil Dreshaj, was shot and killed when two attackers forced their way into his home in the western Kosovo village of Nabrdje. The victim's wife was quoted as saying the attackers wore uniforms with the red-and-black emblem of the Kosovo Liberation Army.123 Special Representative Kouchner, how­ever, blamed the murder on nonspecific "extremists" who "do not want us to succeed."124

The KLA "Demilitarizes"

According to Secretary of State Albright, Washington's peace plan for Kosovo had three main elements: "the KLA would disarm, the Serbs would pull their forces out, and there would be an international force that would go in there to help implement it."125 The idea that the KLA would disarm was reiterated by the administration before and during NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia. Testifying before the House International Relations Committee on April 21, 1999, for example. Secretary Albright claimed, "At Rambouillet, Bel­grade rejected a plan for peace that had been accepted by the Kosovo Albanians, and that included provisions for disarming the KLA."126 In the weeks before NATO's bombing ended. State Department spokesperson James Rubin said Washington was working with Mos­cow on two aspects of peace for Kosovo: "one, getting the refugees home; and two, the disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army."127

But after Belgrade indicated it was willing to pull its forces out of Kosovo, Washington decided that disarmament was not what it really meant. Indeed, after Belgrade said it would capitulate, a reporter asked State Department spokesperson Rubin if the United States would "press for a complete disarmament of the KLA." Rubin's response: "The proper word here is 'demilitarization.' I'll get you a copy of the Rambouillet accords, which describes demilitar­ization as envisaged in those accords. That remains the principle under which we're operating."128

Under the demilitarization terms reached between NATO and the KLA, the KLA agreed officially to disband but would form the core of the new Kosovo Protection Corps, which would consist of 5,000 full-time and reserve personnel. According to the agreement, the KLA would turn in an unspecified number of weapons and fully demobilize by September 20,1999. The new KPC would then limit its activities to providing disaster relief, performing search and rescue, delivering humanitarian aid, assisting in demining the countryside, and contributing to the rebuilding of Kosovo's infrastructure. "We believe the Kosovo Protection Corps will make a useful contribution to the restoration of peace and security for all the communities of Kosovo and its progress towards democracy," said Secretary Albright in a prepared statement.129

After the KLA turned in roughly 10,000 guns, many of them broken or antiquated, NATO declared the demilitarization a success and claimed the KLA no longer existed.130 "The Kosovo Liberation Army has demilitarized and has been transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps," claimed NATO's supreme allied commander, Gen. Wesley Clark, before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Commit­tee.131 What Gen. Clark did not mention was that a few days before the KLA was supposed to finish demilitarizing, German KFOR sol­diers stumbled on a secret cache of 10 tons of ammunition.

When UNMIK held a ceremony to swear in some of the first members of the new Kosovo Protection Corps in early 2000, the event was opened with an address by an UNMIK official. In keeping with UNMIK's claim that the KPC would be an organization of a multiethnic character, the official's remarks were being translated into both Serbian and Albanian. In the middle of the UNMIK offi­cial's speech, however, the new members of the KPC—all of whom were ethnic Albanian—disrupted the ceremony by walking out of the room in protest of the Serbian translation. KPC family members and other ethnic Albanians present at the ceremony greeted the action with applause. The KPC members returned to the ceremony only after they were assured the event would continue exclusively in Albanian. Gen. Agim Ceku, the former KLA chief turned KPC commander, later took the stage amid sustained applause. "Today you are becoming professional officers," he told the KPC members in attendance. "Just as you knew how to triumph over all the obsta­cles and difficulties of war . . . this time too, you will emerge victorious."132

Shortly after the KPC was outfitted and organized throughout Kosovo, Special Representative Kouchner invited journalists to inspect a KPC work group removing ice from the roads in Pristina. The intended message was clear—the militant KLA had been suc­cessfully reinvented as a force for public service.133 Outside the Clin­ton White House, however, few people bought that message, and by March 2000, analysts at the otherwise pro-nation building Interna­tional Crisis Group were reporting that, notwithstanding Washing­ton's claim that the KLA had demilitarized, the KLA "in its various manifestations ... remains a powerful and active element in almost every element of Kosovo life.... Some parts of the old KLA operate openly and essentially as before; others have been transformed; some new elements have been added; and much remains underground."134 Just two weeks earlier, UN authorities had warned that the KLA's official successor, the KPC, was engaged in illegal activities and human rights abuses. More specifically, the UN human rights unit in Kosovo said in an internal report that several members of the KPC tortured or killed local citizens and illegally detained others, illegally attempted to conduct law enforcement activities, illegally forced local businesses to pay "liberation taxes," and threatened UN police who attempted to intervene and stop the wrongdoing.135 UN officials also expressed concern about the fact that the KPC distrib­uted 15,000 uniforms despite being limited to a maximum strength of 5,000 members.136 Moreover, UN police and NATO soldiers voiced worries about seizing hundreds of forged and counterfeit KPC iden­tity cards from people claiming to be members of the organization.137 To date. Western taxpayers have contributed more than $10 million to the creation and maintenance of the KPC.138

Still, advocates of nation building refused to admit that the KLA was responsible for any of the instability in Kosovo, and instead habitually blamed Belgrade for Kosovo's postwar troubles. Writing in the Los Angeles Times in the summer of 2000, for example. Interna­tional Crisis Group consultant Susan Blaustein did not once mention the KLA and asserted that "allied nations have tolerated a porous border with Serbia ... enabling Yugoslav President Slobodan Milo­sevic to pursue his destabilizing agenda in Kosovo."139 The harsh reality, however, was and still is that NATO and UN officials find themselves not with a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, but with a KLA management operation. Indeed, the popular Koha Ditore news­paper warns that KLA elements run "illegal businesses," exploit "their position and the might of arms" for personal gain, "intrude on the privacy of certain individuals," and are directly and indirectly "implicated in political developments."140

Spreading Disorder

Although the Clinton administration insisted that the KLA met its requirements to demilitarize in 1999, the rebel organization never­theless has been able to foment an insurgency across the provincial border of Kosovo in Serbia's predominantly ethnic Albanian Presevo Valley—which Albanian nationalists call "Eastern Kosovo."141 In a disturbing replay of the strategy the KLA used from early 1998 until NATO commenced its bombing, ethnic Albanian guerrillas are attacking Serbian policemen and civilians—and ethnic Albanians loyal to Belgrade—in the hope of provoking Yugoslav authorities into a response that will incite the United States and NATO to resume their war with Yugoslavia. As a UN official in Kosovo explained, the guerrillas hope "that the Serbs will retaliate with excessive force against civilian populations and create a wave of outrage and pres­sure on KFOR to respond."142

In March 2000, the guerrillas promised U.S. diplomats that they would end their insurgency. "We're happy they did it," said one U.S. official. "We gave them a tough message, and they believed it."143 The head of the U.S. negotiating team welcomed the promise, saying it was "an important first step."144 The rebel group, however, took no steps to live up to its pledge and announced the next day that it "has not ceased its activities" and that it will not stop until "Eastern Kosovo is liberated."145 The guerrillas, moreover, continued to wear KLA-like uniforms, to conduct training exercises, and to cross back and forth across the neutral zone between U.S. forces in Kosovo and Yugoslav forces in Serbia proper.146 Though the leaders of the supposedly disbanded KLA insist they are not tied to the rebels, those killed in the Presevo Valley are buried in cemeteries reserved for KLA martyrs.147 Moreover, the "Homeland Calling Fund," which was set up to raise money from the Albanian diaspora to fund the KLA, has been resurrected to fund the Presevo insurgents.148

Notwithstanding those facts, Clinton administration officials downplayed KLA involvement in the violence. In fact. Secretary Albright praised the KLA for "having met its commitment to demo­bilize" and she stressed that a "spirit of tolerance and inter-ethnic cooperation" will take root in Kosovo as the province's "democratic forces" come to power.149 America's chief diplomat should have had a better grasp of Kosovo's realities. The KLA and its supporters are committed to taking power in Kosovo and expanding its dominion, not to practicing multiethnic democracy.

Not all foreign officials were as gullible as the Clinton administra­tion's, however. Jiri Dienstbier, former Czech foreign minister turned UN special envoy for human rights, submitted a 53-page report to the UN Human Rights Commission in March 2000 in which he sharply criticized the KLA. In particular, he accused the leaders of the organization of destabilizing the Presevo Valley with a view to creating a Greater Albania.150 Voicing similar concerns. Gen. Reinhardt, the former commander of KFOR/ warned that tensions between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in the Presevo Valley could result in a new war. Like Dienstbier, Reinhardt also expressed skepti­cism that the rebels were dedicated to peace. "Frankly, when we see them training with mortars ... I do not believe them."151 Reinhardt's concerns were underscored by same-day reports of a grenade attack on a Serbian police checkpoint on the other side of the Kosovo boundary.152 Other attacks followed, and by July 2000 fighting between the ethnic Albanian separatists and Yugoslav security forces intensified to the point that NATO forces could hear automatic gunfire and explosions coming from over the administrative border in Serbia proper.153 By the fall of 2000, the security situation in the Presevo Valley deteriorated even further as the number of ethnic Albanian guerrillas operating in the area reportedly tripled and the number of attacks on Serb policemen increased.154 In December, the rebels fired upon a joint American-Russian patrol, and in January 2001, a British patrol was attacked.155

As troubling, ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Albania, includ­ing KLA elements, are also involved in attempts to infiltrate and destabilize Macedonia. News reports, which began appearing as early as June 2000, highlighted the connection among organized smuggling rings, the KLA, and the political leadership in the ethnic Albanian area of western Macedonia. On June 20, 2000, two Macedo­nian border guards were shot near a crossing into Kosovo. The attack was attributed to ethnic Albanians who, beyond smuggling, were said to be forming the nucleus of a KLA-linked armed movement in Macedonia.15" In a subsequent incident, four Macedonian border guards were kidnapped, allegedly to be exchanged for KLA activists who were being held in Macedonian prisons. Even though the guards were released a short time later, the Macedonian public was outraged.157 By August 2000, NATO was relaying worrisome reports of paramilitary activity in western Macedonia, including a report that nearly 100 ethnic Albanians were conducting military exercises in the Sar Mountains, which straddle the border of Macedonia and Kosovo.158 On January 25, 2001, ethnic Albanian guerrillas attacked a Macedonian police station with automatic rifles and rocket launch­ers.159 A month later, they attacked a Macedonian police patrol near the border with Kosovo, drawing Macedonian army units into a firefight and forcing hundreds of civilians to flee.160 Fighting also broke out near Macedonia's second largest city, Tetevo, when rebels entered border villages from Kosovo. Should the situation get out of hand, observers fear, it could lead to more tragedy in the Balkans.

Just a "Coincidence"

Belatedly awakening to the danger posed by the KLA's cross-border activities, U.S. forces on March 16, 2000, raided arms caches and other logistical infrastructure used by the rebels to sustain its operations in the Presevo Valley.161 In mid-April peacekeeping troops in Kosovo arrested 12 ethnic Albanians on charges of illegal posses­sion of arms and other military materiel after the driver of a truck failed to stop when flagged down at a checkpoint. In the truck, peacekeepers found 80 anti-tank mines, 40 hand grenades, and large quantities of guns and ammunition.162 In May, American peacekeep­ers seized rifles, explosives, hand grenades, and other weapons in a search operation in the eastern village of Ugljare.163

On June 17, 2000, NATO peacekeepers discovered the largest cache of illegal weapons in Kosovo to date. In two 30-foot by 10-foot concrete bunkers dug into a hillside in a forested area of central Kosovo, British troops found 67 tons of weapons and explosives, including 20/000 grenades, thousands of mines, and half a million bullets.164 A KFOR spokesperson said the weapons were enough to "to eliminate the entire population of Pristina or destroy 900 to 1,000 tanks."165 Brig. Gen. Richard Shirreff, commander of the British KFOR forces leading the operation, told reporters at the scene: "This represents a major weapons haul. It is almost certainly, entirely Albanian, all evidence we got here suggests that it is former KLA material" and the fact they did not divulge any information reflects "a degree of non-compliance" with NATO.166

The former military head of the KLA, Agim Ceku, denied any link between the officially disbanded organization and the massive weapons stash. "With full confidence I can say the KLA did not possess these weapons during the war," said Ceku, who now heads the Kosovo Protection Corps.167 The statement came as NATO troops announced the discovery of more bunkers containing arms. Ceku claimed the fact that the weapons were found just a half mile from his wartime headquarters was a "coincidence."168 The KLA has "handed in all its weapons as required of them" he added. "There is no reason for it to take responsibility for weapons that might be found."169 NATO officials, however, announced that documents found at the sites indicated the weapons had, in fact, belonged to the KLA.170

In another worrisome incident, KFOR soldiers discovered a com­plex of bunkers and fighting positions only 12 miles from the Kosovo-Macedonia border. Without mentioning the KLA by name, a KFOR spokesperson speculated that the site was a training area "used by extremist elements," adding that fresh tire tracks and footprints suggested that it was in recent use.171 KFOR units have since discovered several weapons stockpiles scattered throughout Kosovo.172 One included sniper rifles, machine guns, more man 80 mines, 100 pounds of TNT, and paraphernalia to detonate bombs remotely—"clear indications of a terrorist capability," explained a prepared KFOR statement on me find.173

Notwithstanding such high-profile discoveries, NATO has been less than exhaustive in its efforts to root out illegal arms and end the cross-border activity. To do so would mean directly confronting the KLA and its supporters. That was something the Clinton admin­istration was loathe to do because it would have exposed the main flaw m its Kosovo policy. Indeed, had NATO personnel started dying at the hands of the very people the administration said the United States was out to help—a la Mogadishu—then it would have been forced to admit that its de facto partners had not actually given up on their wartime objective and that the peacekeeping operation was a sham. Rather than risk that, the Clinton administration pre­ferred to do as little as possible. Unfortunately, the KLA understood that priority as early as June 1999, and carried out its intolerant and militant activities without fear of serious resistance from the Clinton White House.

Corruption and Criminality

The legacy of the KLA has caused a multitude of problems inside Kosovo. For example, in March of 2000, Special Representative Kouchner announced that "private enterprise has restarted very well" in Kosovo.174 Yet almost everywhere business has restarted, violence and criminality have followed. Gerard Fischer, a senior UN mission economic official, notes that "extortion is a big problem" and he suspects that former KLA members are behind it.175 Similarly, the Boston Globe reports,

Extortion is Kosovo's most robust industry. Nearly every cafe, restaurant, and shop pays tribute. Most business owners simply shrug and pay the mobsters, some of them former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army who have morphed from freedom fighters into shakedown artists.... "There is no law here," said John Foreman, an Englishman who runs a bar in Pristina. Foreman said he has been threatened repeat­edly by former Kosovo Liberation Army members who are demanding that he pay them about $3,000 a month for the privilege of doing business. They have followed him home, telling him he is a dead man. They have stolen his generators four times. Foreman says his bar has been targeted because it is multiethnic. His staff and clientele are Albanian and Serb.... "This is the only multiethnic bar in Kosovo, and they can't stand the fact that we're open," he said.176

Former KLA members have also been implicated in efforts to collect illegal taxes and fees to fund their postwar activities. On the Kosovo-Macedonia border, for example, they reportedly forced 1,300 or so trucks passing each day to pay a "customs duty" of $20.177 The leaders of the former KLA deny that any such taxes have been collected. But documents seized by UNMIK police show that Kosovo businessmen have been ordered to pay similar fees and that elements of the former KLA have established an elaborate sliding scale of illegal taxes for cigarettes, alcohol, juices, coffee, and gasoline.178

Even more disturbing, many former KLA members are reportedly involved in protection rackets, prostitution, corruption, and bribery. On January 6, 2000, UNMIK police raided the home of Gani Thaci, a brother of former KLA political leader Hashim Thaci. The police seized weapons and a suitcase containing $791,000 in cash. Hashim Thaci demanded—and quickly received—an apology from UNMIK. His brother was released without charge, and his money and weap­ons were returned.179 Part of the money was from a Canadian con­struction company working in Kosovo that had paid Gani Thaci for what the company euphemistically called his "intermediary ser­vices" in securing lucrative reconstruction contracts after the war.180

In another incident, police specialists attached to KFOR's multina­tional peacekeeping force raided more than 10 premises in and around the town of Djeneral Jankovic on Kosovo's southern border with Macedonia, arresting 10 men and seizing cash and weapons. Among those arrested was Refki Sumen, a former KLA commander and a senior figure in the guerrilla force's civilian successor, the Kosovo Protection Corps. "The arrests were carried out as part of an ongoing investigation into an organized crime gang operating in the border area," explained a special police spokesperson. "We suspect the group to be involved in at least three homicides, extor­tion, and smuggling."181

International law enforcement authorities and drug experts also worry that former KLA members have not severed their ties with the narcotics underworld. Instead, they are now paying their patrons back with political favors and using their new profits to rebuild. "The new buildings, the better roads," explains Michel Koutouzis of the Geopolitical Drug Watch, "these have been bought by drugs."182 There are also indications that former senior KLA figures have pro­vided immunity for the criminal gangs or are directly involved in the postwar drug trade itself. Some analysts have warned that it could become difficult for international organizations to find former KLA members who "are not so tainted with criminality or other serious misbehavior as to be completely unacceptable." One senior UN official has even lamented that the West might be creating "a narco-mafia style society" in Kosovo.183

KLA Infighting

In addition to daily incidents of ethnic violence and criminality in Kosovo, many people have been left dead as a result of political rivalries between former KLA figures and their ongoing turf battles over lucrative racketeering rings and the economic spoils of war. Indeed, in the first weeks following the end of NATO's air campaign, the New York Times reported,

The senior commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army . . . carried out assassinations, arrests, and purges within their ranks to thwart potential rivals, say current and former com­manders in the rebel army and some Western diplomats. The campaign, in which as many as half a dozen top rebel commanders were shot dead, was directed by Hashim Thaci and two of his lieutenants, Azem Syla and Xhavit Haliti, these officials said.... The charges of assassinations and purges were made in interviews with about a dozen former and current Kosovo Liberation Army officials, two of whom said they had witnessed executions of Mr. Thaci's rivals; a former senior diplomat for the Albanian Government; a for­mer police official in the Albanian Government who worked with the rebel group, and several Western diplomats.184

On April 18, 2000, former KLA military leader turned KPC com­mander, Besim Mala, was shot in the head by a .357 Magnum and bled to death on the pavement outside a Pristina restaurant.185 Mala was killed in an internal gangland struggle over protection rackets.186 Three weeks later, former KLA commander Ekrem Rexha was gunned down outside his home in the southern Kosovo town of Prizren.187 A known moderate, Rexha was a Thaci opponent. "This could be the first of a series of political murders" as Kosovo gears up for October's municipal elections, explained one UN official, adding that Rexha would have been voted Prizren's mayor "for sure" if he ran for the office.188 In September, Skender Gashi, a KPC district commander and former KLA officer, was found murdered with both hands cut off.189 Gashi's death brought to 24 the number of ex-KLA killed in infighting since the war ended.190

Elections and Intimidation

One of the KLA's more insidious legacies has been its direct and indirect intimidation or rival politicians. Special Representative Kouchner worried early on that political violence would increase during the run up to Kosovo's October 2000 municipal elections. A prominent nongovernmental organization similarly cautioned that "one of the most serious potential areas for abuse of the elections ... is intimidation of political parties and candidates, especially at local level."191 The report specifically cited the area of Srbica in central Kosovo, where the moderate Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) party encountered "a climate of intimidation and harassment."192 In the months preceding the election, a Srbica-area LDK official was kidnapped from in front of his house and later found dead, and two aspiring LDK politicians were shot and wounded in separate attacks.193 On September 11,2000, journalist Shefki Popova was shot dead seven miles from Srbica. Popova was a correspondent with the Albanian-language daily newspaper Rilindja and a contributor to the paper's subsidiary radio station. Both media outlets are closely associated with the LDK.194

In the area of Prizren, former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj was wounded in a shootout before the election. According to eyewit­nesses, Haradinaj and a group of KPC members initiated the incident by attacking a home about 1:00 a.m. with automatic weapons.™ Residents of the village said they suspected the attack was launched because many of them do not support Haradinaj's party, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, but support the more moderate LDK. "He wants to win the election in Kosovo by force, by killing his rivals," explained one villager.196 The following day, UNMIK police arrested two members of the KPC, two miles south of the shootout site. In protest of the arrests, several ethnic Albanians set up roadblocks in the area. The arrested men were later released after members of the KPC surrounded the UN police station where the two were being held and KPC chief Ceku intervened to negotiate their release.197

British military personnel, who actually worked with Haradinaj before and during NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia, reported that he was a highly questionable figure. One British soldier even described him as "a psychopath" and said he terrorized his own men and the local population into unquestioning loyalty to him. "Someone would pass him some information and he would disappear for two hours. The end result would be several bodies in a ditch."19" In contrast, Clinton administration officials, who were determined to keep up the appearance that their Kosovo policy was working, portrayed Haradinaj as a burgeoning democrat. U.S. military personnel removed forensic evidence front the scene of the Haradinaj gunfight—including bullets—even though the incident took place well outside the U.S. Army's area of responsibility in Kosovo.199 In addition, Haradinaj was flown to Germany to be treated in a U.S. Army hospital for the wounds he received from the gun-fight. During that time UN investigators were denied access to him.200

In the end, the two political parties spawned by the KLA—Haradinaj's Alliance for the Future and Thaci's Democratic Party of Kosovo—managed to gain only 35 percent of the vote during Kosovo's October 2000 municipal elections, compared to 58 percent received by Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo.201 Western offi­cials claimed that the relative success of Rugova's party was a victory for political moderation. But the more likely explanation was that Haradinaj's and Thaci's parties were unorganized and suffered from a predictable backlash against their violent attacks on other ethnic Albanian politicians. Indeed, in a postelection analysis, Koha Ditore suggested that the two parties "paid the price of [campaign] inexpe­rience" and for the "arrogant and violent behavior of part of their memberships."202 The success of Rugova's parly, moreover, probably had something to do with the fact that Rugova himself turned up his nationalist rhetoric during the campaign. In fact, he repeatedly affirmed his nationalist credentials by calling on the West to recog­nize the independence of Kosovo after the election.203

Competing Fears

Reinforcing Kosovo's false peace—and the destabilizing role of the KLA and its legacy—is the fact that, as in Bosnia, there is an unresolved "security dilemma" among the province's inhabitants. Indeed, even though 40,000 heavily armed peacekeepers are deployed throughout Kosovo, neither ethnic Albanians nor Serbs consider themselves secure. Kosovo's Albanians fear they may even­tually be reincorporated into Yugoslavia. Kosovo's Serbs, mean­while, fear they may eventually be left to suffer under an oppressive ethnic Albanian regime. Neither fear is unreasonable. Belgrade's new democratic government has given no indication that it has abandoned its territorial claim to the province. In fact, a senior figure in the new government says that 1,200 Yugoslav troops should soon return to Kosovo to patrol Yugoslavia's external borders with Mace­donia and Albania.204 Meanwhile, ethnic Albanians have done little to allay Serb fears about life in an independent Kosovo. Indeed, following a September 2000 political rally, Kosovo Albanians took to stoning Serb homes.205 On February 16, 2001, Kosovo militants blew up a bus carrying Serb families on a pilgrimage to the graves of their ancestors, killing seven people, injuring 43, and leaving behind a tangle of charred metal, scraps of clothing, and scattered notebook pages covered with children's doodles.206 Hashim Thaci, moreover, says the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic by the democratic opposition in Belgrade does not change anything in Kosovo. "Kosovo [will] never be a part of Serbia... whether it [is] a dictatorial or democratic Serbia," he declares.207

Unfortunately, the Clinton administration's policy postponing any decision on Kosovo's final status only fed the competing fears of Kosovo's Albanians and Serbs and perpetuated their security dilemma. Indeed, Kosovo's Albanians have spent the last two years trying to make sure their independence is a fait accompli, while Serbs inside and outside Kosovo have concentrated their efforts on making sure that it is not. The result is that nothing resembling the multiethnic democracy the Clinton administration said was neces­sary before U.S. troops could return home has emerged in Kosovo. In fact, ethnic Albanians, fearing Belgrade's future designs, have intentionally depopulated Kosovo of most of its non-Albanian popu­lations and are overtly and covertly resisting the UN's effort to create a multiethnic democracy. What is more, most of Kosovo's Albanians say they are still willing to fight for the province's independence from Yugoslavia.208 On the other hand, most of the Serbs who have fled Kosovo are not returning, and those who never left have refused to register to vote and worry that their participation in UN-organized institutions and elections will legitimize Kosovo's permanent separa­tion from Yugoslavia. Belgrade, meanwhile, insists that Kosovo is still Serbia and that it will respond with "all possible means" if attacked by ethnic Albanian rebels.™

What actually exists in Kosovo, in other words, is not peace, but a NATO-enforced absence of a clear victor—two very different things that yield two very different results for the would-be nation builder. Nevertheless, many in Washington continue to insist that running Kosovo this way will eventually succeed. Believing that, the United States and several European countries have moved ahead with the so-called Balkan Stability Pact, a multilateral effort to help rebuild Kosovo specifically and the Balkans generally. The first post­war meeting to sketch a working framework for the pact was held in July 1999. European donors promised $2.1 billion for Kosovo's reconstruction, and $403 million in economic aid to Yugoslavia's neighbors Romania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia.210 A few days later, the Clinton administration pledged $700 million to the effort.211 Unfortunately, such well-meaning foreign charity will probably make Kosovo even more dependent on the West than it already is. At present, explains the Wall Street Journal,

The locals [in Kosovo] have little independent purchasing power. Most of the cash comes from two sources: the Kosovar diaspora and the 40,000-strong international military and civilian presence, which rents the best houses and buildings, hires drivers and interpreters, and buys everything for sale.212

Moreover, if Bosnia is any indication of what will become of the aid package, it will simply beget corruption and requests for even more aid money down the road.

Illusory Goals

Though some analysts may claim the "Clinton administration deserves credit for having done several things right" in Kosovo, highlighting the obvious—that not everything has gone wrong—is not a compelling defense; it is a rhetorical diversion.213 The uncom­fortable truth is that Washington's nation-building effort in Kosovo rests on a false peace; the KLA has not given up its wartime agenda and Kosovo's limbo status perpetuates the competing fears of both ethnic Albanians and Serbs. There is not, in other words, a shared reason of state among Kosovo's inhabitants. That fact virtually ensures that the nation-building effort will eventually fail. Indeed, nearly a year into the effort, the U.S. General Accounting Office released a 90-page report that lamented: "The continuing hostilities and lack of political and social reconciliation between Kosovar Alba­nians and non-Albanians have overshadowed positive develop­ments that have occurred since the end of NATO's bombing cam­paign."214 Though full-scale military hostilities between Belgrade and KLA forces have ceased, the report added, the security situation in the Balkans is still "volatile" and "local political leaders and people of their respective ethnic groups have failed to embrace the political and social reconciliation considered necessary to build multiethnic, democratic societies and institutions."215 In other words, like Bosnia, the conditions the Clinton administration and others said would be required for U.S. troops to one day leave Kosovo are not, in fact, being created.

As it turns out, where there is peace in Kosovo is where it is most unlike the Clinton administration's intended vision for the province. And those ethnic Albanians who tend to be the most content with Kosovo's current political limbo are those who are most certain that independence is just a question of time. For advocates of Clinton's policy to then characterize such people and places as evidence of "progress" or a vindication of the previous administration's efforts is intellectually dishonest.

In an extreme display of the basic incoherence of the Clinton administration's Kosovo policy, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson warned ethnic Albanian leaders that continuing attacks against Serbs could lead the West to divide the province into sepa­rately administered sections. "Don't underestimate our determina­tion," Robertson said. "We are going to protect a multiethnic society here and we'll do it if necessary by making sure the individual groups are protected in their homes and communities.... If it involves building walls round them, barbed wire round them, giving them the protection they need, then we will do it."216 But separating pockets of non-Albanians with walls and barbed wire is not multiethnicity, it is ghettoization.

Like the situation in Bosnia, only after the contending sides have control over their political fate will their extremism lose its urgency and a reasonable politics be able to emerge. Thus, without a reworking of the Clinton administration's Kosovo policy to reflect that fact and its implications, another political and economic invalid will be created in the Balkans and NATO troops will find themselves ministering to the province indefinitely.

end text

 

FOOTNOTES:

 

61. Quoted in Jim Hoagland, "Kosovos to Come," Washington Post, June 27, 1999, p.B7.

62. Albright, "Our Stake in Kosovo."

63. Quoted in Gary Dempsey, "Theater of the Absurd Now Playing in Kosovo," Anchorage Daily News, August 28, 1999, p. Ell.

64. "Now Kosovo Albanians Want K-FOR Out," BBC News, June 28,2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_810000 / 810550.stm  [accessed July 6, 2000].

65. Quoted in Paul Watson, "Rapper in Kosovo Vents Anger at UN," Los Angeles Times, August 6, 2000, p. Al.

66. Quoted in Gary Dempsey, "Kosovo Anniversary without Celebration," Wash­ington Times, March 24, 2000, p. A18.

67. Fisnik Abrashi, "Albanian Leader Bolts UN Council," Associated Press, July 4, 2000; and "Kosovo Party Freezes Relations with UN," Reuters, July 4, 2000.

68- Ljiljana Staletovic, "Why Did Thaci Withdraw from the PAVK? Agreement Is an Excuse," Glas javnosti (Belgrade), July 5, 2000,

69. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, UNHCR/OSCE Overview of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (Vienna, November 3, 1999), http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/ ethnic _rninorities/rninorities3.htm [accessed July 6, 2000].

70. See Human Rights Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo (New York, N.Y., August 9,1999), http://www.hrw.org/ reports /1999 /kosov2 [accessed July 6, 2000].

71. Albright, "Our Stake in Kosovo."

72. Berger.

73. Lulzim Cota, "Serbs Ask EU Support for Refugees Return in Kosovo," United Press International, March 31, 2000; and Claire Snegaroff, "Multi-Ethnic Kosovo Still a Distant Dream One Year after War," Agence France Presse, March 21, 2000.

74. Robert Fisk, "Serbs Murdered by the Hundred Since 'Liberation,'" Independent (London), November 24, 1999, p. 15.

75. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, UNHCR/OSCE Update on the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo: Period Covering February Through May 2000 (Vienna, May 31, 2000), http:// www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/ethnic-minorities/minorities5.PDF [accessed July 6, 2000].

76. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, UNHCR/OSCE Overview of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo (Vienna, November 3,1999), http://www.osceprag.cz/kosovo/reports/ minorities_1103.htm [accessed November 4, 1999]; and Raska-Prizren Diocese of Serbian Orthodox Church, The List of Serbs Kidnapped in Kosovo and Metohia (13 June-31 August 1999), Gracanica, Yugoslavia, /destinies/lk-kidnapped.html [accessed December 15, 1999].

77. Quoted in Christian Jennings, "UN 'Has Failed Kosovo Minorities,'" Indepen­dent (London), August 17, 2000, p. 11.

78. Quoted in "Belgian Doctors Leave Kosovo," Associated Press, August 7, 2000.

79. Christian Jennings, "City Life: Pristma—The Only Thing That's Organised Here Is the Crime," Independent (London), June 27, 2000, p. 18.

80. Tony Karon, "There's More to Life than Democracy, Madeleine," Time.corn, June 2000, http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/look/0%2C2633%2C48979%2COO.html [accessed August 15, 2000].

81. TimJudah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 115.

82. "Liberation Army of Kosovo Gives Itself a Bad Profile," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1, 1996, p. 436.

83. Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999): 27-8. See also Chris Hedges, "Fog of War—Coping with the Truth about Friend and Foe, Victims Not: Quite Innocent," New York Times, March 28,1999, p. WK1.

84. See Kusovac; Donald Forbes, "Kosovo Could Be the New Threat to Balkan Stability," Prague Post, December 23,1997; Julius Strauss, "Funeral Gunmen Demand Home Rule for Kosovo," Daily Telegraph (London), December 1,1997, p. 10; "Albanian Terrorist Group Claims Kosovo Attacks," Deutsche Fresse-Agentur, September 17, 1997; "Yugoslavia—Kosovo Underground Group Takes Responsibility for More Vio­lence" Associated Press, March 29, 1997; Philip Smucker, "Serbs Wield Terror to Keep Ethnic Region in Line; Kosovo's Albanian Majority Live in a Serb 'Holy Land,"' Washington Times, February 2, 1997, p. A6,

85. Chris Smith, "Light Weapons Proliferation: A Globai Survey," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1, 1999.

86. Briseida Mema, "Trading Firepower for a Better Future," Washington Times, January 31, 1999. p. A8.

87. Ibid; Chris Smith; and Judah, pp. 128-9.

88. See Peter Klebnikov, "Heroin Heroes: The United States Propped up the KLA in the Kosovo Conflict," Mother Jones. January 1,2000, p. 64; Alex Roslin, "The Kosovo Connection: The Shooting Has Stopped, But the Kosovo Liberation Army Isn't Resting. It Is Still a Major Player in the International Heroin Trade," Gazette (Montreal), November 27, 1999, p. Bl; Roger Boyes and Eske Wright, "Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels," Times (London), March 24,1999; Tim Ripley, "Life in the Balkan Tinderbox' Remains as Dangerous as Ever," fane's Intelligence Review, March 1, 1999, p. 10; Neil Mackay, "Police Alert as KLA Heroin Floods Britain," Sunday Herald (Glasgow), June 27, 1999, p. 1; Jerry Seper, "KLA Buys Arms with Illicit Funds," Washington Times, June 4, 1999, p. Al; Frank Viviano, "KLA Linked to Enormous Heroin Trade; Police Suspect Drugs Helped Finance Revolt," San Francisco Chronicle. May 5, 1999, p. Al; "The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties?" United States Republican Policy Committee, March 31,1999, http://www.senate.gov/rpc/releases/1999/fr033199,htm; Roberta Ruscica, "Albanian Mafia, This Is How It Helps the Kosovo Guerrilla Fighters," Corners delta Sera (Milan), October 15, 1998; "Major Italian Drug Bust Breaks Kosovo Arms Trafficking," Agence France Presse, June 9, 1998; "Speculation Plentiful, Facts Few about Kosovo Separatist Group," Baltimore Sun, March 6,1998, p, 20A; Zoran Kusovac, "Another Balkans Bloodbath?" fane's Intelligence Review, February 1, 1998, p. 13;

Marko Miiivojevic, "The 'Balkan Medellin,'" fane's Intelligence Review, February 1, 1995, p, 68; and Frank Viviano "Drugs Paying for Conflict in Europe: Separatists Supporting Themselves with Traffic in Narcotics," San Francisco Chronicle, June 10, 1994, p. A14.

89. Viviano, "Drugs Paying for Conflict in Europe."

90. Ibid.

91. Quoted in ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Boyes and Wright.

94. Ibid.

95. Klebnikov.

96. Ibid,

97. Boyes and Wright.

98. Quoted in Seper.

99. "Terrorist Group Claims Responsibility for Attacks in Neighboring Macedo­nia," Associated Press, January 07,1998. See also Tom Walker, "Rebuke by U.S. Adds to Woes of Milosevic," Times (London), January 16, 1998.

100. "Kosovo Militants Claim Three Murders," Agence France Presse, February 28,1998; "Ethnic Albanian Killed in Armed Attack in Kosovo," Agence France Presse, February 20,1998; "Ethnic Albanian Killed in Kosovo," Agence France Presse, Febru­ary 13, 1998; "Serb Found Shot Dead in Troubled Kosovo Province," Agence France Presse, January 23,1998; "Kosovo Serbs in Belgrade for Talks with Yugoslav President on Recent Killings," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 13, 1998; "Gunmen Kill One in Serbia's Kosovo Province," Agence France Presse, January 12,1998; and "Serb Killed in Tense Serbian Province," Associated Press, January 10, 1998.

101. "Kosovo Serbs in Belgrade for Talks with Yugoslav President on Recent Killings."

102. Quoted in "Washington Ready to Reward Belgrade for 'Good Will/ Envoy," Agence France Presse, February 23, 1998.

103. "Two Serbian Police, Five Ethnic Albanians Killed in Kosovo," Agence France Presse, February 28, 1998.

104. Ibrahim Osmani, "In Serbia's Kosovo, Police Clampdown Leaves at Least 20 Dead," Agence France Presse, March 01, 1998.

105. Quoted in Philip Shenon, "U.S. Says It Might Consider Attacking Serbs," New York Times, March 13, 1998, p. A10.

106. Chris Hedges, "Serbs Renew Crackdown on Albanian Villages in Kosovo," New York Times, March 25, 1998, p. Al.

107. Jonathan Landay, "Inside the Kosovo Peace Talks," Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1999, p. 5; and Jane Perlez, "Kosovo Albanians, in Reversal, Say They Will Sign Peace Pact," New York Times, February 24, 1999, p. Al.

108. Deputy State Department Spokesperson James Foley, U.S. State Department Daily Briefing, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., March 18, 1999.

109. Quoted in Linda Wheeler, "Marchers Strut Support for Independence for Kosovo," Washington Post. April 28, 1999, p. B3.

110. Steven Erianger, "After Slow Start, UN Asserts Role in Running Kosovo," Financial Times (London), August 4, 1999.

111. See Paul Watson, "Reports Detail Cycle of Violence iri Kosovo," Los Angeles Times, December 7, 1999, p. 9; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Kosovo Rebels Make Own Laws;

UN Accuses Group of Illegal Evictions, Tax Collections," Washington Post, November 24, 1999, p. Al; and "Hatred Flares As Serb Homes Are Torched," Los Angeles Times, August 10,1999, p.10.

112. See Human Rights Watch, federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Abuses against Serbs and Roma in the New Kosovo (New York, N.Y., August 9,1999), http://www.hrw.org/ reports /1999/kosov2 [accessed July 6, 2000].

113. Judah, p.290.

114. Organization for Security and Cooperation iri Europe, "Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told, Part II, June to October 1999" (Vienna, December 6, 1999), http:// www.osce.org/indexe-se.htm [accessed July 6, 20001.

115. "Moderate Kosovo Albanian Politician Killed," Glas Javnosti (Belgrade), June. 16, 2000; Paul Watson, "Extremist Albanians Target Moderates in Kosovo Strife," Los Angeles Times, November 20, 1999, p. Al.

116. David Rohde, "Kosovo Seething," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May-June 2000): 72-73.

117. Veton Surroi, "Kosovo Fascism, Albanian's Shame," Koha Ditore (Pristina), August 25, 1999; English translation at http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl57archive/ bcr/bcr-19990825-l-eng.txt [accessed July 6, 2000],

118. Quoted in Judah, p. 294.

119. Quoted in Watson, "Extremist Albanians Target Moderates in Kosovo Strife."

120. International Crisis Group, "What Happened to the KLA?" (Pristina/Wash-ington/Brussels, March 3, 2000), pp. 1-2, http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/ showreport.cfm?reportid = 24 [accessed August 1, 2000],

121. Quoted in ibid.

122. Julius Strauss, "Legacy of War: The Terror Is over But Peace Brings Its Own Problems," Telegraph (London), February 10, 2000, p. 20.

123. "Masked Gunmen Kill Moderate Albanian Politician," Associated Press, June 16, 2000.

124. Quoted in ibid.

125. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Interview by Larry King, CNN Lorry King Live, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1999.

126. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "U.S. and NATO Policy Towards the Crisis in Kosovo," Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., April 21, 1999.

127. State Department Spokesperson James Rubin, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1999, http:// secretary. state.gov/www/briefmgs/9905/990507db.html [accessed July 6, 2000].

128. State Department Spokesperson James Rubin, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., June 3, 1999, http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9906/ 990603db.html [accessed July 6, 2000].

129. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom Statement on the Kosovo Protection Corps, New York, September 21, 1999, http://secretary.state,gov/www/statements/1999/ 990921-html [accessed July 14, 2000].

130. According to one UN official, "The KLA was supposed to disarm after the war. They turned in 10,000 weapons, but they were mostly junk. There are still a lot of weapons out there." Quoted in Jeffrey Fleishman, "Once the Oppressors, Serbs Now the Victims; NATO, UN Unable to Keep the Peace," Knight Ridder News Service, November 18, 1999. See also "An Agonized 'Peace,'" Los Angeles Times, August 9, 1999, p. B4.

131. "Prepared Statement of General WesleyK, Clark before the Senate Committee on Armed Services," Federal News Service, February 2, 2000.

132. Quoted in Jeremy Scahill, "Washington's Men in Kosovo: A Year after the NATO Occupation, Terror Reigns," Common Dreams News Center, July 19, 2000, http://www.commondreams.org/views/071900-107.htm [accessed July 20, 2000]. Scahill is a reporter for Pacifica Radio's Democracy Now! He reported daily from Yugoslavia during and after the 78-day NATO bombing, and was on the ground in Kosovo during the first months of NATO's occupation.

133. Strauss.

134. International Crisis Group, "What Happened to the KLA?" pp. 1-2.

135. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Kosovo Albanian Unit Is Accused of Abuses; UN Report Says Former KLA Rebels Threatened, Tortured, Killed Civilians," Washington Post, March 15, 2000, p. A24; and John Sweeney and Jens Holsoe, "Revealed: UN Corps' Reign of Terror in Kosovo; 'Disaster Response Service' Stands Accused of Murder and Torture," Observer (London), March 12, 2000, p. 23.

136. Tom Walker, "Serbian Doctor Dies in Albanian 'Cleansing,'" Times (London), March 5, 2000.

137. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Kosovo Rebels Make Own Laws."

138. "Top UN Official in Kosovo Pleads for More Funds," Los Angeles Times, December 17,1999, p. A4.

139. Susan Blaustein, "Independence May Be Only Way to Save the Mission," Los Angeles Times, August 6, 2000, p. M2.

140. "Kosovo Protection Corps and Its Involvement in Incidents in Kosovo," Kolw Ditore (Pristiria), July 11, 2000, p. 3.

141. International Crisis Group, "What Happened to the KLA?"

142. Quoted in Steven Erianger, "Kosovo Rebels Regrouping Nearby in Serbia," New York Times, March 1, 2000, p Al. Lt. Col. James Shufelt, who commands the U.S. Army outpost on the border between Kosovo and Serbia in the affected region, reached the same conclusion: "The concern here isn't that the" Serbian police will come across, but that Albanian attacks on Serb police and army will inspire a response great enough to cause public clamor for a KFOR response." Quoted in ibid. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, "Kosovo Rebels' Serbian Designs Concern NATO," Washington Post, February 28, 2000, p. A9.

143. Quoted in Peter Finn, "Kosovo Rebel Group Issues Peace Pledge," Washington Post, March 24, 2000, p. A20.

144. Quoted in ibid.

145. John Shindler, "Presevo: The Next Kosovo?" Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1, 2000.

146. Peter Finn, "Kosovo Militia Fails to Honor Vow to Disarm; Group of Ethnic Albanians May Press Attacks in Serbia," Washington Post, March 28, 2000, p. A16.

147. Shindler.

148. Ibid. See also Steven Erianger, "Multiplying Albanian Insurgents in Yugoslavia Threaten Belgrade's New Democracy," New York Times, January 21, 2001, p. 10.

149. Madeleine K. Albright, "Building a Europe Whole and Free," Remarks at event sponsored by the Bohemia Foundation, Prague, Czech Republic, March 7, 2000, http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000307.html [accessed July 6, 2000].

150. See "Dienstbier Criticizing NATO Raids, Missions in Kosovo Again," Czech News Agency, March 29, 2000.

151. Quoted in Allison Mutler, "Kosovo Instability Warned," Associated Press, April 17, 2000.

152. Ibid.

153. Fredrik Dahl, "KPOR Steps up Security along Serbia Boundary," Reuters, July 30,2000; "Increased Fighting between Rebels and Yugoslavian Forces: KFOR," Agence France Presse, July 28,2000; "Mortars Fired at Serb Police Checkpoint near Kosovo," Reuters, July 11, 2000; "Bomb Blasts Rock Southern Serbia near Kosovo," Reuters, June 21,2000; "Bomb Injures Five Serbian Police Officers near Kosovo Border," Agence France Presse, June 9,2000; and "Police Checkpoint Attacked," Donas (Belgrade), May 25, 2000.

154. Aleksander Vasovic, "Yugoslav Army, Serb Police Shot At," Associated Press, December 5, 2000; Aleksander Vasovic, "Mortars Fired at Serb Police," Associated Press, December 4, 2000; "NATO Troops Seize Kosovo Arms Headed for Rebels in Serbia," Agence France Presse, November 30,2000; "Yugo Army Says Kosovo Bound­ary Situation Worsening," Reuters, November 15, 2000; "Serbian Policeman Killed in Mine Blast near Kosovo," Agence France Presse, November 10,2000; Nick Wood, "Champagne of Revolution Quick to Go Flat in Valley of Fear," Guardian (London), October 21,2000, p. 18; "Two Yugoslav Police Officers Killed in Blast," Agence France Presse, October 13,2000; Christian Jennings, "Clashes Increasing in Kosovo," Scotsman (Edinbourgh), October 9, 2000, p. 9; and "Three Ethnic Albanian Rebels Killed in Serbia," Agence France Presse, September 20, 2000.

155. Fisnik Abrashi, "Albanian Rebels Shoot at NATO Peacekeepers," Washington Times, December 18, 2000, p. A15; and Nicholas Wood, "British K-For Troops under Fire," BBC News, January 25, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/ europe/newsid_1137000/1137189.stm [accessed January 26, 2001].

156. Louis Economopoulos, "Macedonia Destabilization Threat Causes Concern," CNS News, June 21, 2000; and Mirka Velinovska, "New Paramilitary Army Is Ready in Macedonia!" Start (Skopje), June 2, 2000.

157. "Constitution Watch," East European Constitutional Review 9, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 25.

158. KFOR Press Update, KFOR Online (Pristina, August 1, 2000), http://kforon-line.com/news/updates/nu-0'iaugOO.htm [accessed August 2, 2000].

159. "Ethnic Albanian Kosovo Rebels Claim Macedonia Attack," Agence France Presse, January 25, 2001.

160. Konstantin Testorides, "Insurgents, Macedonian Police Clash," Associated Press, February 26, 2001.

161. Philip Shenon, "U.S. Troops Seize Weapons from Albanians in Kosovo," New York Times, March 16, 2000, p. Al; and Robert Suro, "GIs Raid Militias in Kosovo," Washington Post, March 16, 2000, p. Al.

162. See Stefan Racin, "KFOR Arrest 12 Albanians on Different Charges," United Press International, April 15, 2000.

163. "U.S. Soldiers Seize Weapons in Kosovo," New York Times, May 20,2000, p, A8.

164. "Kosovo Arsenal Triggers New Hunt," Times (London), June 20, 2000; George Jahn, "Commander of Former KLA Denies Links to Huge Weapons Find," Associated Press, June 18, 2000; and Shaban Buza, "Kosovo NATO Force Makes Biggest Illegal Arms Seizure," Reuters, June 17, 2000.

165. Quoted in "Kosovo Arsenal Triggers New Hunt."

166. Quoted in Buza.

167. Quoted in "Ex-KLA Head Denies Kosovo Arms Link as Peacekeepers Find More Bunkers," Agence France Presse, June 19, 2000.

168. Quoted in ibid.

169. Quoted in ibid.

170. George Jahn, "NATO Links Weapons Cache to KLA," Associated Press, June 23, 2000.

171. "Kosovo Peacekeepers Discover, Destroy Bunker Network," Reuters, July 21, 2000.

172. KFOR Press Update, KFOR Online (Pristina, November 8, 2000), http:// kforonline.com/news/updates/nu_08nov00.htm [accessed, November 8, 2000]; and KFOR Press Update, KFOR Online (Pristina, July 31, 2000), http://kforonline.com/ news/updates/nu_31jul00.htm [accessed August 2, 2000].

173. Quoted in KFOR Press Update, July 31, 2000.

174. Quoted in Wagstyl.

175. Quoted in ibid.

176. Kevin Cullen, "A Year after Kosovo War, UN Is Facing a Quagmire," Boston Globe. March 19, 2000, p. Al.

177. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Kosovo Rebels Make Own Laws."

178. Ibid.

179. Paul Watson, "A Serb, and Ethnic Albanian. Torn apart by Kosovo's War, They Manage to Remain Best Friends," Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2000, p. Al.

180. Lutz Kleveman, "The Patriots of Kosovo Fight over the Spoils in Pristina," Daily Telegraph (London), June 12, 2000, p. 10.

181. Quoted in "Kosovo Guerrilla Chief Arrested in Mafia Probe," Agence France Presse, August 24, 2000.

182. Klebnikov.

183. International Crisis Group, "What Happened to the KLA?" pp. 1-2.

184. Chris Hedges, "Leaders of Kosovo Rebels Tied to Deadly Power Play," New York Times, June 25, 1999, p. Al. See also "KLA Secret Service Persecuted Albanian Politicians," Bota Sot (Pristina), July 11, 2000.

185. Christian Jennings, "Kosovo's Local Heroes on UN's Wanted List," Scotland on Sunday (Edinburgh) June 11, 2000, p. 22; Paul Harris, "Kosovo Suffers Law and Disorder," Jane's Intelligence Review, June I, 2000.

186. Jennings, "Kosovo's Local Heroes on UN's Wanted List."

187. Carlotta Gall, "Kosovo Towns Mourn a Slain Guerrilla Army Commander," New York Times, May 12, 2000, p. A4.

188. "Slain Former Kosovo Rebel Leader Buried near Town He Fought For," Agence France Presse, May 11, 2000.

189. "Kosovo Protection Force Commander Murdered," Reuters, September, 21, 2000.

190. Gall and ibid.

191. "Kosovo Politician Kidnapped," Agence France Presse, July 27, 2000.

192. Quoted in ibid.

193. Ibid; "Missing Kosovo Politician Found Dead," Agence France Presse, August 7, 2000; Shaban Buza, "Kosovo Albanian Officials Wounded in Shooting," Reuters, August 3, 2000; and KFOR Press Update, KJFOR Online (Pristina, August, 3 2000), http://kforonline.com/news/updates/nu--03aug00.htm [accessed August 3, 2000].

194. "Kosovo Journalist Gunned Down," BBC News, September 11, 2000, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid-920000/920046.stm [accessed September 12, 2000].

195. See "Musaj Family: We Were Attacked," Zen (Pristina), July 11, 2000.

196. Robert H. Reid, "UN Police Investigating Shootout Involving Prominent Eth­nic Albanian," Associated Press, July 8, 2000.

197. "Ex-Guerrilla Chief Attacked Us: Kosovo Albanians," Agence France Presse, July 9, 2000.

198. Quoted in Nick Wood, "U.S. 'Covered Up' for Kosovo Ally," Observer (Lon­don), September 10, 2000.

199. Ibid.

200. Ibid.

201. "Rugova's LDK Wins Historic Kosovo Poll, Thaci Cries Foul," Agence France Fresse, October 31, 2000.

202. Merita Dhimgjoka, "Violence Cost KLA Kosovo Election," Washington Times, October 31, 2000, p. A13.

203. See, for example, "Rugova's LDK Wins Historic Kosovo Poll, Thaci Cries Foul"; see also Anatoly Verbin, "Rugova Wants Quick Independence after Poll," Reuters, October 29, 2000.

204. "Yugoslav Troops Will Return to Kosovo by Year's End: Djindjic," Agence France Presse, October 11, 2000.

205. "Thaci Supporters Stone Serb Homes," Agence France Presse," September 22, 2000.

206. Merita Dhimgjoka, "Kosovo Bus Blast Kills 7 Serbs," Associated Press, Febru­ary 16, 2001.

207. Quoted in "Albanian Leader Says Kosovo Will Not Be Part of Serbia," United Press International, September 20, 2000; and David R. Sands, "Kosovo Mission End Not in Sight; UN Official: U.S. Exit 'Years' Away," Washington Times, September 30, 2000, p. Al, Elsewhere Thaci stated: "The changes in Belgrade can certainly have a positive reflection on democratic developments in the region. [But] Kosovo's fate does not depend on Kostunica. Kosovo's fate depends on the Kosovars and the international community." See "Interview: Ex-KLA Chief Wants Proof Kostunica Is Democrat," Reuters, October 10, 2000.

208. USAID poll cited in Balkans Security. Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability, p. 25.

209. Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic quoted in "Kostunica Gives up on KFOR, Seeks New Solution to Border Violence," Agence France Presse, Decem­ber 20, 2000.

210. Peter James Spielmann, "Donors Pledge $2B to Help Kosovo," Associated Press, July 28, 1999; and Ann Compton, "Rebuilding the Balkans," ABC News, July 30, 1999.

211. Arshad Mohammed, "Clinton Offers $700m Package to Help Balkans," Reu­ters, July 30, 1999.

212. Therese Raphael, "Where's the End of the Road in Kosovo?" Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2000, p, A26.

213. Brzezinski. See also George Robertson, "What's Going Right in Kosovo," Washington Post, December 7, 1999, p. A31.

214. Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability, p. 27.

215. Ibid., p. 4.

216. Quoted in "NATO's Robertson Warns of Ethnic Cantons in Kosovo," Reuters, July 19,2000; and "NATO Warning over Kosovo Violence," BBC News, July 18,2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid-840000/840308.stm [accessed July 18, 2000].

 

Copyright, 2001,CATO Institute, Washington D.C.