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January 03-04, 2004
ERP KiM Newsletter
03-01-04
(Weekend edition)
War against the
Church continues in Christmas season!
Attempted usurpation of the
Church property in Pristina on the initiative of the University and
Ministry of Education
Serbian Orthodox Church
strongly condemned the
decision by the Municipal Assembly of Pristina dated December 30, 2003
to abolish its legitimate property rights over the land parcel in the
center of the city on which the Serbian Orthodox Cathedral of Christ the
Savior is built. The illegal decision of the Municipal Assembly of
Pristina was brought on the innitiative of the Pristina University and
the Ministry of Education which hold the banner of anti-Christian
campaign in Kosovo by promotion of falsified history and anti-Serbian
sentiments among Albanian youth. The Church welcomed the decisive
response of UNMIK authorities who immediately suspended the municipal
decision and expects the UNMIK chief to abrogate the suspended decision
by his executive order. The Serbian Orthodox Church plans to lodge
official complaints to the international organizations for human and
religious rights and the Governments of the leading countries
contributing to the Kosovo peace mission.
War against the church like in Communist days
Silhouette of the Christ Savior Serbian Orthodox Cathedral in
the downtown Pristina skyline.
The church stubbornly remains one of few surviving traces of the Serbian
presence in the provincial capital and is targeted again by Kosovo
Albanian institutions who intend to demolish it or to turn into a
secular building. The still unfinished Cathedral has remained a living
symbol of resistance to the rule of ethno-religious discrimination and
terror of Kosovo Albanian nationalists directed against the Serbian
Orthodox Church and its people in Kosovo.
CONTENTS:
 Attempted usurpation of the Church property in
Pristina
This latest "Christmas present" from the provisional Kosovo
institutions, which seriously violates the basic religious and land
ownership rights of the Serbian Orthodox Church, provoked a very sharp
response on the part of Bishop Artemije of Raska and Prizren who, prior
to yesterday's session of the municipal assembly, sent protest letters
to the president of the Municipal Assembly of Pristina, Mr. Ismet
Beqiri, and the head of UNMIK, Mr. Harri Holkeri. Bishop Artemije asked
UNMIK for an urgent response to the aforementioned initiative of the
Municipal Assembly of Pristina and to put a stop to the institutional
terror that is being carried out in a completely shameless and callous
manner to the detriment of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian
people in the Province.
Coordinating Center requests protection for
Serbian Orthodox property
The Coordinating
Center for Kosovo and Metohija requested that UNMIK chief Harri Holkeri
block the initiative of the Municipality of Pristina to take away the
land parcel which is the location of the Serbian Orthodox Church of
Christ the Savior.
UN transfers final government responsibilities to
Kosovo institutions (2 reports)
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has completed the
transfer of specific responsibilities to local provisional institutions
as part of its commitment to gradually introduce self-government to
Kosovo.
Oliver
Ivanovic: Fears of pressure after the transfer of responsibilities
Kosovo parliament
presidency member Oliver Ivanovic assessed this evening that UNMIK's
announcement that it will appoint advisors from Kosovo institutions in
areas reserved fro Harri Holkeri "is actually a transitional phase"
toward the complete assumption of those responsibilities by the Kosovo
government.
Coordinating Center protests transfer of
responsibilities - Covic addresses a severe protest to Holkeri for
promising consultative role to Kosovo institutions in UNMIK reserved
competencies
The Coordinating Center of Kosovo and Metohija has lodged a sharp
protest following the decision of Harri Holkeri to complete the transfer
of remaining responsibilities defined by section five of the
Constitutional Framework to provisional Kosovo institutions of
self-administration.
Bissett: War on terrorism skipped KLA
As early as 1998, the U.S. State Department listed the KLA
as a terrorist organization financing its operations with money from the
international heroin trade and funds supplied from Islamic countries and
individuals, including Osama bin Laden. This did not stop the United
States from arming and training KLA members in Albania and in the summer
of 1998 sending them back into Kosovo to assassinate Serbian mayors,
ambush Serbian policemen and intimidate hesitant Kosovo Albanians. The
aim was to destabilize Kosovo and overthrow Serbian strongman Slobodan
Milosevic.
Macedonia: Year in Review - Macedonia 2004: Our
predictions
The removal of Serbian security forces opened the floodgates,
and now (with the West coming under increasing threats and violent
attacks from the "friendly" Albanians) only their return could close
them. Serbia's return to the province (as envisioned in Resolution 1244)
would of course mean a bloodbath. Yet should Kosovo become independent,
and ethnic cleansing of minorities accelerate, would anyone stop them?
And, if Kosovo were to be independent, would the Albanian secessionist
movement in Macedonia not increase? Indeed, while no one wants a war,
there is a residual fear and feeling from all sides that things are not
over yet. As one Skopje man told us the other day, "I kept my gun just
in case."
War when we were not attacked - comparing Serbia
with Iraq
By contrast, Serbia was never a threat to other countries.
Whatever Serbia did to the people living in Kosovo, Kosovo was and
remains, under American and international law, part of Serbia. Serbia
had never attacked the United States or our allies, or any of its
neighbors. Serbia never even retaliated when the United States was
bombing its capital city, Belgrade.
More News Available on our:
Kosovo Daily News
list (KDN)
KDN
Archive
This newsletter is available on our ERP
KIM Web-site:
http://www.kosovo.net/erpkiminfo.html
Attempted usurpation of Church property in Pristina
Serbian Orthodox Church
strongly condemned the
decision by the Municipal Assembly of Pristina dated December 30, 2003
to abolish its legitimate property rights over the land parcel in the
center of the city on which the Serbian Orthodox Cathedral of Christ the
Savior is built. The illegal decision of the Municipal Assembly of
Pristina was brought on the innitiative of the Pristina University and
the Ministry of Education which hold the banner of anti-Christian
campaign in Kosovo by promotion of falsified history and anti-Serbian
sentiments among Albanian youth. The Church welcomed the decisive
response of UNMIK authorities who immediately suspended the municipal
decision and expects the UNMIK chief to abrogate the suspended decision
by his executive order. The Serbian Orthodox Church plans to lodge
official complaints to the international organizations for human and
religious rights and the Governments of the leading countries
contributing to the Kosovo peace mission.
TOP
Serbian
Orthodox Diocese of Raska-Prizren
and Kosovo-Metohija
Press Release (new and amended version)
for immediate release
Gracanica, January 3,
2003
The Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska-Prizren and
Kosovo-Metohija expresses its most profound protest and disgust
regarding the notorious decision of the Municipal Assembly of Pristina
on December 30, 2003 to take away the right of use of construction land
in the very center of Pristina from the Serbian Orthodox Church, which
is the location of the still incomplete Church of Christ the Savior, and
to transfer this parcel to the municipality which would simultaneously
turn it over to the University of Pristina "for the use of the
University Center complex" in accordance with the request of the
University of Pristina (dated August 12, 2003) and the Kosovo Ministry
of Education (dated September 9, 2003).
A few days ago, the Diocese
inadvertently learned of the request of the University and the Ministry
of Education and managed subsequently to obtain the draft of the
decision adopted yesterday by the Municipal Assembly of Pristina,
according to which the decision on issuance of a building permit to the
Diocese of Raska and Prizren for the construction of the Orthodox
Cathedral of Christ the Savior on land that the Church previously
obtained in a completely manner in 1991 from the municipal authorities
then in power in accordance with all relevant laws of the Republic of
Serbia is declared invalid, without any prior consultation with the
Serbian Orthodox Church and UNMIK.
This latest
"Christmas present" from the provisional Kosovo institutions, which
seriously violates the basic religious and land ownership rights of the
Serbian Orthodox Church, provoked a very sharp response on the part of
Bishop Artemije of Raska and Prizren who, prior to yesterday's session
of the municipal assembly, sent protest letters to the president of the
Municipal Assembly of Pristina, Mr. Ismet Beqiri, and the head of UNMIK,
Mr. Harri Holkeri. Bishop Artemije asked UNMIK for an urgent response to
the aforementioned initiative of the Municipal Assembly of Pristina
and to put a stop to the institutional terror that is being carried out
in a completely shameless and callous manner to the detriment of the
Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian people in the Province.
According to
the latest information in Pristina
media, the deputy head of UNMIK for civil administration
Francesco Bastagli authorized the civil administrator of the
Municipality of Pristina yesterday afternoon to immediately
suspend as invalid the
decision of the Municipal Assembly to take away the
property of the Church, and this was immediately done.
Only two Serb members of the Municipal
Assembly of Pristina did not vote in favor of the decision, which was
supported by all Albanian deputies. One of them, Mrs. Ana
Kostic, stated that "the Municipality does not have the right to take
away the property and transfer it to the University because there is
already an Orthodox church on it".
Albanian language media (including
radicalized "Koha Ditora" in an article published on Dec. 31, 2003)
reported on the takeover of the church land in extremely biased fashion,
explaining that "the municipality had only returned property taken from
the University at the time of the Serbian occupation of Kosovo". Of
course, none of the reports mentions that the property on which the
Serbian Orthodox Church has built a church and which it obtained in a
completely legal manner has never been owned by the University of
Pristina. Not one Albanian journalist or municipal representative even
bothered to consult the Church regarding this case, which best
demonstrates their true intentions and "objectivity".
The Diocese
of Raska and Prizren welcomes the rapid response on the part of UNMIK
officials preventing yet another misuse of the law and serious violation
of the recently proclaimed "Standards for Kosovo"
and requests from Mr. Harri Holkeri to
issue an executive order which will abrogate the decision of the
Municipal Assembly of Pristina and proclaim it null and void.
The Diocese of Raska-Prizren and
Kosovo-Metohija also welcomes the statement of the Coordinating Center
for Kosovo and Metohija condemning the misuse of provisional Kosovo
institutions against the Serbian Orthodox Church and its legitimate
rights, and urges the Coordinating Center and the Serbian Government to
take all necessary measures in a timely fashion in order to prevent such
instances from reoccurring in the future.
TOP
Coordinating Center requests protection for Serbian Orthodox property
The
Coordinating Center for Kosovo and Metohija today requested that UNMIK
chief Harri Holkeri block the initiative of the Municipality of Pristina
to take away the land parcel which is the location of the Serbian
Orthodox Church of Christ the Savior.
TOP
Beta News
Agency, Belgrade
December 31, 2003
BELGRADE - The Coordinating Center for Kosovo and Metohija today
requested that UNMIK chief Harri Holkeri block the initiative of the
Municipality of Pristina to take away the land parcel which is the
location of the Serbian Orthodox Church of Christ the Savior.
In a written statement the Coordinating Center also requested protection
for the property of the Serbian Orthodox Church and assessed that the
initiative of the Municipal Assembly of Pristina is more proof that "the
Albanian institutions are doing everything to wipe out the traces of the
centuries-old existence of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija".
"Unfortunately, this process is being carried out with the silent
acquiescence of the global community, as well as of UNMIK officials
whose mandate in Kosovo and Metohija includes the protection of the
property and religious facilities of the Serbian Orthodox Church," it is
said in the statement.
TOP
UN
transfers final government responsibilities to Kosovo institutions
The United Nations
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has completed the transfer of specific
responsibilities to local provisional institutions as part of its
commitment to gradually introduce self-government to Kosovo.
TOP
UNITED NATIONS NEWS
CENTRE
30 December, 2003 - The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has
completed the transfer of specific responsibilities to local provisional
institutions as part of its commitment to gradually introduce
self-government to Kosovo.
Harri Holkeri, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for
Kosovo, sent a letter today to Kosovo's Prime Minister, Bajram Rexhepi,
stating that 25 remaining "competencies" would now be carried out by
Kosovo's major provisional institutions - the presidency, the government
and the Kosovo assembly - bringing the total to 44.
The competencies transferred include specific powers over agriculture,
the media, culture and the environment. They are the final batch of
government responsibilities to be transferred according to Kosovo's
Constitutional Framework. UNMIK, which has been in place since June
1999, is trying to establish progressively greater autonomy and more
effective self-government in Kosovo.
In a statement issued today, UNMIK said "a small number of specific
responsibilities," such as the work of an independent media commission,
would not become functional until relevant laws are passed or the
relevant administering body is established. But every competency is now
the formal responsibility of Kosovo's provisional institutions.
UNMIK retains certain reserved powers in Kosovo, including control over
security, foreign relations, minority rights protection and energy,
until the province's final status is determined.
TOP
=================================
UNMIK
transfers some responsibilities from Constitutional Framework to Kosovo
government
UNMIK
chief Harri Holkeri confirmed today the transfer of remaining
responsibilities from the UN civil mission to provisional institutions
in Kosovo on the basis of section five of the Constitutional Framework.
Beta News
Agency, Belgrade
December 30, 2003
PRISTINA - UNMIK chief Harri Holkeri confirmed today the transfer of
remaining responsibilities from the UN civil mission to provisional
institutions in Kosovo on the basis of section five of the
Constitutional Framework.
In a letter to Kosovo premier Bajram Rexhepi, Holkeri confirmed the
transfer of responsibilities and stated that at the meeting of the
council for transfer of competencies held on May 28, 2003, 44
responsibilities in this process were identified.
Members of the council authorized UNMIK and Kosovo institutions to
transfer responsibilities by the end of this year, it is said in a
statement provided to Beta news agency.
The UN Security Council has approved this transfer.
Among the transferred responsibilities a small number of specific
responsibilities cannot become effective until the relevant legislation
is adopted, such as the creation of an Independent Commission for Media
or until the relevant administrative body is constituted.
"Continuing its dedication to the establishment of substantial autonomy
and effective self-administration, UNMIK will also strive to include
provisional institutions in an advisory and consultative capacity in
areas reserved fro UNMIK," the statement says.
Participation in this process, within the framework of which UNMIK is
considering the proposal of the Kosovo government for the opening of
several offices as part of the Kosovo government or the establishment of
ties between UNMIK and the Kosovo government, will be reserved for all
kosovo.netmunities and their elected representatives.
"The offices will held in capacity building and increase transparency in
complete accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the
Constitutional Framework," it is said in the UNMIK statement.
TOP
Oliver Ivanovic: Fear of pressure that Kosovo Government will be given
all responsibilities
Kosovo parliament presidency member Oliver Ivanovic assessed this
evening that UNMIK's announcement that it will appoint advisors from
Kosovo institutions in areas reserved fro Harri Holkeri "is actually a
transitional phase" toward the complete assumption of those
responsibilities by the Kosovo government.
TOP
Beta News
Agency, Belgrade
December 30, 2003
KOSOVSKA MITROVICA - Kosovo parliament presidency member Oliver Ivanovic
assessed this evening that UNMIK's announcement that it will appoint
advisors from Kosovo institutions in areas reserved fro Harri Holkeri
"is actually a transitional phase" toward the complete assumption of
those responsibilities by the Kosovo government.
"Obviously UNMIK is taking advantage of the situation in Serbia after
the parliamentary elections, in which the Serbian Radical Party and the
Socialist Party of Serbia won a large number of votes, which is a good
excuse for continuing the process of completing the transfer of
responsibilities from UNMIK to the provisional institutions," said
Ivanovic.
Commenting on the transfer of all responsibilities from section five of
the Constitutional Framework to Kosovo institutions, Ivanovic said that
an eventual crisis regarding the forming of the [Serbian] government
could be dangerous for the future fate of Kosovo and Metohija.
Ivanovic emphasized that responsibilities from section eight, including
foreign affairs, police, judiciary and security, cannot be transferred
by the UNMIK chief to the Kosovo government.
"These responsibilities can be transferred only after the final status
of Kosovo and Metohija is resolved," said Ivanovic, adding that
provisional institutions in the province so far have shown absolute
political immaturity and incompetence for conducting a society.
UNMIK chief Harri Holkeri confirmed today the transfer of remaining
responsibilities from the UN civil mission to provisional institutions
in Kosovo on the basis of section five of the Constitutional Framework.
In a letter to Kosovo premier Bajram Rexhepi, Holkeri confirmed the
transfer of responsibilities and stated that UNMIK "will also strive to
include provisional institutions in an advisory and consultative
capacity in regions reserved fro UNMIK".
TOP
Coordinating Center protests transfer of responsibilities
The
Coordinating Center of Kosovo and Metohija has lodged a sharp protest
following the decision of Harri Holkeri to complete the transfer of
remaining responsibilities defined by section five of the Constitutional
Framework to provisional Kosovo institutions of self-administration.
TOP
Beta News
Agency, Belgrade
December 30, 2003
BELGRADE - The Coordinating Center of Kosovo and Metohija has lodged a
sharp protest following the decision of Harri Holkeri to complete the
transfer of remaining responsibilities defined by section five of the
Constitutional Framework to provisional Kosovo institutions of
self-administration.
"These are responsibilities in the areas of industry, culture,
education, energy, commerce, media... which are being transferred
despite the fact that not even the basic provisions foreseen by the
Constitutional Framework and UNSC Resolution 1244 have been fulfilled,"
the Coordinating Center said in a written statement.
The Coordinating Center "is especially concerned by the announcement of
Holkeri's office that provisional self-administration, that is, the
Albanians, will have an advisory and consultative resole in areas
reserved for UNMIK, which is contrary to Resolution 1244 and the
Constitutional Framework".
The Coordinating Center believes "that this is new evidence of the
biased and dangerous behavior of Harri Holkeri and a new step in the
direction of the creation of an independent Kosovo and Metohija".
Covic
Addresses severe protest to Holkeri
Covic
said that it is alarming that Holkeri intends to grant the consultative
role to interim local self-government institutions in the affairs
administered by UNMIK, as announced by Holkeri's office recently. Such a
move would be contrary to provisions of the Resolution 1244. Covic
concluded that this is just a new piece of evidence of UNMIK's biased
and perilous policy which can only lead to independent Kosovo-Metohija.
SERBIAN
GOVERNMENT
Belgrade, Dec 31, 2003 - In a statement issued by the Coordinating
Centre, Covic said that the present UNMIK chief wants to complete what
his predecessor Michael Steiner begin.
The authorities in question are from the sectors of industry, culture,
education, energy, trade and media, Covic said. The UNMIK wants to
transfer these authorities despite the fact that not even the basic
preconditions for such a move, stipulated in the Constitutional
Framework and the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, have been
fulfilled.
Covic said that it is alarming that Holkeri intends to grant the
consultative role to interim local self-government institutions in the
affairs administered by UNMIK, as announced by Holkeri's office
recently. Such a move would be contrary to provisions of the Resolution
1244.
Covic concluded that this is just a new piece of evidence of UNMIK's
biased and perilous policy which can only lead to independent
Kosovo-Metohija.
TOP
Bissett: War on Terrorism skipped the KLA
As
early as 1998, the U.S. State Department listed the KLA as a terrorist
organization financing its operations with money from the international
heroin trade and funds supplied from Islamic countries and individuals,
including Osama bin Laden. This did not stop the United States from
arming and training KLA members in Albania and in the summer of 1998
sending them back into Kosovo to assassinate Serbian mayors, ambush
Serbian policemen and intimidate hesitant Kosovo Albanians. The aim was
to destabilize Kosovo and overthrow Serbian strongman Slobodan
Milosevic.
TOP
Centre for Research on Globalisation, December 29, 2003
by James Bissett
U.S. President George W. Bush has made it clear the war against
terrorists will be unremitting and relentless. Even those countries
affording shelter to terrorists will not be spared. These words come too
late for the Serbs, Gypsies, Jews, Turks and other non-Albanians who
have been driven from their ancestral homes in Kosovo by the terrorist
Kosovo Liberation Army. It is too late as well for Macedonia, which has
been forced by the United States, the European Union and NATO to yield
to all the demands of the Albanian terrorists in that country.
This double standard and lack of consistency when dealing with
terrorists calls into question the policies the United States and its
NATO allies followed in the Balkans. It also underlines the necessity
for the United States and its allies to clean up their act if they wish
to retain credibility in the war against terrorism.
The bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 allegedly to stop ethnic
cleansing and prevent the Balkans from becoming once again the powder
keg of Europe has backfired. Kosovo has become exclusively an Albanian
province with the exception of a few stalwart Serbians in the Mitrovica
area who live surrounded by barbed wire and are threatened daily with
murder and mayhem by their Albanian neighbours. The Balkans, since the
end of the bombing, have been in constant turmoil caused by the KLA
terrorist activities.
NATO allowed the KLA, which under the terms of United Nations Resolution
1244 was to be disarmed after the end of the bombing, to keep its
weapons. The KLA was renamed the Kosovo Protection Force and been given
the task of maintaining peace and security in Kosovo. How well it has
been able to carry out this task is summed up in a report dated Feb. 26,
2001, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, which
accuses the protection corps of widespread acts of murder, torture and
extortion.
That condemnation should not have come as a surprise. As early as 1998,
the U.S. State Department listed the KLA as a terrorist organization
financing its operations with money from the international heroin trade
and funds supplied from Islamic countries and individuals, including
Osama bin Laden. This did not stop the United States from arming and
training KLA members in Albania and in the summer of 1998 sending them
back into Kosovo to assassinate Serbian mayors, ambush Serbian policemen
and intimidate hesitant Kosovo Albanians. The aim was to destabilize
Kosovo and overthrow Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic.
Bin Laden and radical Muslim groups have been deeply involved in the
Balkans since the civil wars in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. Despite a UN
arms embargo and with the knowledge and support of the United States,
arms, ammunition and thousands of Mujahideen fighters were smuggled into
Bosnia to help the Muslims. Many remain in Bosnia today and are
recognized as a serious threat to Western forces there. The Bosnian
government is said to have presented bin Laden with a Bosnian passport
in recognition of his contribution to their cause. He and his al-Qaeda
network were also active in Kosovo, and KLA members trained in his camps
in Afghanistan and Albania.
Emboldened by the knowledge it could achieve its political objectives by
terror, the KLA moved into southern Serbia and initiated, under the eyes
of 40,000 NATO troops, a campaign of terror against the Serbian
population. Not until NATO permitted the new democratic government of
Serbia to send the Serb army back into the area was the KLA routed and
sent back across the border into Kosovo.
Macedonia, with its large Albanian minority, was the KLA's next target.
In February, its forces moved against this small and newly independent
democracy. The familiar pattern of murder, ambush and intimidation
followed. Unlike Serbia, which still possessed a powerful and
well-equipped army, Macedonia had little with which to defend itself
against the well equipped and battle-hardened KLA fighters. The promises
of assistance made by former U.S. president Bill Clinton in return for
Macedonia's co-operation during the Yugoslav bombing were forgotten.
Nevertheless, when the fighting started, it appeared NATO and the
European Union might help Macedonia resist the terrorist threat. In
March 2001, Lord Robertson, the Secretary-General of NATO, condemned the
KLA terror campaign and described them as "murderous thugs." He
supported the Macedonian government's refusal to negotiate with the
terrorists. Obviously, Lord Robertson was not aware the United States
had other ideas about which side to support in Macedonia.
The message was made clear in May 2001, when U.S. diplomat Robert
Fenwick, ostensibly the head of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, in Macedonia, met secretly in Prizren, Kosovo,
with the leaders of the Albanian political parties and KLA
representatives. Macedonian officials were not invited. It was clear the
United States was backing the Albanian terrorist cause. This was
confirmed a month later, when a force of 400 KLA fighters was surrounded
in the town of Aracinovo near the capital, Skopje. As Macedonian
security forces moved in, they were halted on NATO orders.
U.S. army buses from Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo arrived to remove all the
heavily armed terrorists to a safer area of Macedonia. German reporters
later revealed that 17 U.S. military advisors were accompanying the KLA
terrorists in Aracinovo.
In August 2001, fearing the Macedonian forces might be able to defeat
the KLA, U.S. Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice flew to Kiev and ordered
the Ukrainian government to stop sending further military equipment to
Macedonia. Since Ukraine was the only country supplying Macedonia with
military assistance, the Macedonians realized continued resistance
against the KLA terrorists, the EU and NATO was futile. Macedonia was
forced to concede defeat and obliged to accept all the terrorist
demands. When the peace treaty was signed, Lord Robertson proclaimed,
"This day marks the entry of Macedonia into modern, mainstream Europe
... a very proud day for their country."
TOP
Balkananalysis: Macedonia year in review part 3 - security and defense
The year
began with now-perennial worries over a "spring offensive" from Albanian
paramilitaries. While this did not in fact occur, numerous low-intensity
attacks and terrorist bombings did go on throughout the year.
TOP
BALKANALYSIS
(www. balkananalysis.com)
Posted on Wednesday, December 31 @ 13:00:00 EST by CDeliso
Introduction
The year began with now-perennial worries over a "spring offensive" from
Albanian paramilitaries. While this did not in fact occur, numerous
low-intensity attacks and terrorist bombings did go on throughout the
year. As most of these were Kosovo-related, it seemed that, yet again,
the unresolved situation there was the biggest threat to Macedonia's
security. Growing dissent in the UN-administered province led to an
upsurge in violence, against Serbs but also against UNMIK and KFOR
personnel. Terrorist attacks carried out by the same "Albanian
Liberation Army" active in Macedonia proved that the organization was at
least partially staffed by the KPC- Kosovo's allegedly legitimate police
force, composed of old KLA members. Reports from Kosovo Albanian media
indicated a close intelligence cooperation between the SHIK (Kosovo
Intelligence) and its counterpart in Tirana. Later comments from AKSH
representative Idajet Beqiri also attested to connections for the group
in Albania itself.
In general terms, 2003 saw a continuing process of Westernization and
cooperation with NATO and the US. Macedonian security officials attended
conferences and training seminars in far-flung European cities.
Cooperation on anti-terrorist training was increased as the reshaping of
the military got underway.
Western reforms and re-orientation; weaknesses and strengths
Defense Minister Buchkovski's stated goal- eventual NATO accession-
involved adherence to the larger goals of the NATO alliance and US
defense planners in Europe- a lighter, faster and more dynamic defense
force capable of countering urban terrorism, that is, "asymmetrical
threats." This philosophy was behind the projected sale of Macedonia's
few Sukhoi jet fighters in favor of acquiring more helicopters.
Another tactic for appeasing the West was sending troops to Iraq. Since
they all returned safe, one might say all's well that ends well. In
Iraq, these crack troops no doubt picked up valuable experience in a
truly "hot" zone, and seemed to be outfitted with much better, American
style gear upon their return. And they won America's undying love, too.
America was not Macedonia's only military partner, however. In October,
PM Branko Crvenkovski met with his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Kasyanov
in Moscow, and signed a pact on military cooperation (mostly, however in
the area of repairing existing Russian made equipment). Still, this was
a good sign in an improved year for bilateral relations with Moscow.
Additionally, Macedonian police, defense and intelligence forces
expanded cooperation with neighboring countries on matters ranging from
Albanian militants to customs checks to weapons smuggling. While the
little country is still finding its place in Europe, Macedonia's
geography meant that it continued to be of interest to security forces
of many countries, even if a war was not taking place.
In 2003, Macedonia's strength continued to be direct, human
intelligence, while open-source intelligence and high-tech remained
under-used. Since Kosovo remained the country's number one concern, one
would have expected that cooperation with Serbia would have been solid.
However, this issue was ambivalent as informed sources on both sides
argued for or against the quality of cooperation. Serbia's armed forces
proceeded along the same lines of NATO reform, though its leadership was
afflicted additionally by never-ending Hague indictments.
On the level of personnel, Macedonia's greatest problem continued to be
the suspect allegiances of ranking members of the police, intelligence
and defense ministries. All of these ministerial slots had been given to
Macedonians, meaning that (for reasons of political
correctness) the ministers' immediate subordinates had to be from the
Albanian DUI party. This meant, essentially, that the same people who
had participated in terrorist attacks against the state in 2001 would
have access to the most classified information available- and,
conceivably, shares it with paramilitaries. This thorny problem is not
likely to be solved, though it did not present overt and publicized
dangers to the fragile coalition in 2003.
Terrorism and militant attacks: imagined and real
While Islamic extremism received plenty of coverage, in 2003 Macedonia
fortunately escaped the wrath of the jihadis. There had been fears that
the country's support for Iraq would make it a target. Yet Macedonia
likely did not seem a juicy enough target for al Qaeda to waste its time
on. However, if we are to believe recent Bulgarian reports, a small
amount of Albanian "students" from Macedonia sent for religious
education in Jordan and the Gulf were being indoctrinated, and either
sent to Afghanistan, or sent home to seek new converts.
Macedonian authorities continued their scrutiny of specific figures in
the Islamic religious community, and even became interested in a few
more.
As usual, the biggest threat to life and limb came from the ostensibly
secular Albanian extremists based in Kosovo, Skopska Crna Gora and
Lipkovo. Yet save for a few needless deaths, they were unable to do
much. The overnight sensation "Commander Chakala," blustering his
demands and deadlines from the hills, only provoked a limited police
action, checkpoints, and jokes from Macedonians. The Interior Ministry
claimed that Chakala only had 20-30 followers, all "criminals." These
opinions were publicly backed by the US, EU and OSCE.
A provocation of unquestionably criminal nature occurred after the
escape and re-capture of Dilaver Bojku, or "Leka," a famous prostitution
boss from Struga. He had escaped in a suspiciously easy way, leading
critics to wonder whether his friends in high places were helping him.
After a vociferous outcry from the internationals, Leku was recaptured.
He subsequent bombing of a courthouse in Struga was meant as a warning
to the authorities. Still, the intimidated locals were glad to see him
go.
The deaths of two Polish NATO soldiers who drove over an
Albanian-planted landmine on March 4 internationalized the issue. The
mine had been meant for a Macedonian army patrol. Waning support for the
Albanian cause dropped to nil in the immediate aftermath of the murders.
May was a trying month for Macedonian security officials. First was the
embarrassing Vejce incident, which proved that no force on earth, not
even the US Ambassador, is capable of persuading stubborn Albanian
peasants to give way. A planned and pre-announced ceremony, for family
members to lay flowers on the place where a massacre of soldiers had
taken place in 2001, was stymied by Albanian villagers in Vejce. Their
refusal to stop blocking the road made Minister Kostov threaten to quit,
and even angered US Ambassador Butler. The government's inability to
deal decisively with the villagers showed the continuing political
fragility of the "Albanian question" in Macedonia. A similar affirmation
of this was seen just over the border in Kosovo, where an
internationally sanctioned, UN-implemented border crossing plan was
scrapped at the last minute due to the bellyaching of Albanian
villagers.
In late May, following the arrest of an Albanian over the 2 NATO deaths,
the village of Sopot (near south Serbia, north of Kumanovo) made its own
threats. Villagers gave the Macedonian police an ultimatum of 48 hours
to release the suspect, Sulejman Sulejmani. This member of the "Albanian
National Army" was viewed as a hero by the locals, who interestingly
enough made it clear that the EU-led Concordia mission was not welcome,
either. This Albanian turning against the West, increasingly noted in
Kosovo, was one of the year's most ominous signs for the future.
Some foreign journalists were tipped off that a new conflict would began
in early September, perhaps meant to coincide with the arrival of the
English football team on the 5th. A small disturbance did occur, near
the village of Brest on Skopska Crne Gora, when the police and army
(supported by helicopters) took on about 5 Albanian militants led by a
so-called "Commander Brechta." Two Albanians were killed in the
fighting, one wounded and two escaped. The "international community"
cautiously voiced support for the government's action, which had
occurred as a result of typical Albanian provocations (the kidnapping of
police officers in Aracinovo and a bombing in Skopje).
As temperatures dipped, the guns cooled off too, and verbal provocations
took the place of military ones. Safe in their diaspora lairs, Albanian
extremist leaders plotted and raised funds for whatever adventures are
to come next. However, a growing international disdain for the movement
and better intelligence have helped the Macedonians to suppress this
threat.
Weapons collection theatrics
An operation that provoked great Western unease was the weapons
collection of November and December. One of the Ohrid Accord's key
stipulations, this ill-fated plan was meant to disarm those citizens (in
villages, mostly) who distrusted the state and who might wage war again.
A massive advertising campaign before the month-long event failed to
change anyone's minds. As expected, not even the prospect of prizes such
as washing machines and cars could inspire many people to turn over the
goods; in the end, only about 5,000 guns were turned in, most of them
too old or rusty to use. As with NATO's disarmament of the NLA in 2001,
this was merely a simulated show of good will and progress. That very
few people handed in their guns indicated their belief in a potential
future war.
While the weapons collection was mainly a political stunt and thus to be
discussed in that context, we can say that for the security forces, the
mission was successful. That is to say, no one was killed or injured and
tensions were kept to a minimum. The West had feared the worst and
begged the Macedonians to defer the collections 'til spring.
However, their fears proved unfounded- just as was their optimism for a
rich "harvest."
Conclusions
For Macedonian security and defense, 2003 was a year characterized by
three themes: NATO cooperation and modernization programs; keeping the
Kosovo and Kosovo-directed threats under control; and restoring Western
trust through executing cool-headed security actions and a peaceful
weapons collection program.
The first was by and large a success. Defense Minister Buchkovski
recently stated that Macedonia is on track to join NATO in 2006. Almost
as a reward, the EU military mission was ended in December in favor of
Proxima- an unarmed 200-strong battalion designed to fight crime. For
its part, NATO decided against removing its entire staff, even though
its official mission had concluded- because they may as well stay to
help oversee the modernization and accession process.
A late-breaking incident that may get ugly saw the US slap sanctions on
a Macedonian businessman, Blagoja Samakoski, and his company, Mikrosam
on 24 December. The US placed a two-year contract ban on Mikrosam,
claiming that the company's "missile proliferation technology violated
the US Arms Export Control Act. As this story continues to unfold, more
interesting details are likely to emerge.
As for the Kosovo situation, results here were more ambivalent. Attacks
on border posts and forts continued, and land mines and bombings took
the lives of Macedonian soldiers, civilians and foreign troops as well.
The growing despair of the UNMIK administration over the lack of a happy
exit strategy was readily apparent. For this reason, perhaps, 2003 saw
an increased international resolve against Albanian extremists, as
international troops and civilian officials started to come under fire
too. For the first time since very early 2001, Macedonian actions
against rogue elements were tolerated and even respected. International
cooperation resulted in the arrests of several important figures,
including AKSH leader Gaiffur Adili in Albania and Idajet Beqiri in
Germany. However, the former was released, and the similar release of
Agim Ceku- detained by Slovenia on a Serbian Interpol warrant- showed
the extent to which the situation is still being dictated by the men
with guns, men who still have designs on Macedonia. We're not out of the
woods yet.
TOP
Macedonia 2004: Our Predictions (extract)
The
removal of Serbian security forces opened the floodgates, and now (with
the West coming under increasing threats and violent attacks from the
"friendly" Albanians) only their return could close them. Serbia's
return to the province (as envisioned in Resolution 1244) would of
course mean a bloodbath. Yet should Kosovo become independent, and
ethnic cleansing of minorities accelerate, would anyone stop them? And,
if Kosovo were to be independent, would the Albanian secessionist
movement in Macedonia not increase? Indeed, while no one wants a war,
there is a residual fear and feeling from all sides that things are not
over yet. As one Skopje man told us the other day, "I kept my gun just
in case."
BALKANALYSIS (www. balkananalysis.com)
Posted on Thursday, January 01 @ 06:00:00 EST by CDeliso
(...)
Security
Macedonia's main security problem in 2004 continues to be the
unresolved, agitated state of affairs in Kosovo. Until there is some
final solution to that particular mess, tensions will continue to
simmer. Unfortunately, all of the likely solutions are detrimental to
Macedonian security.
KFOR has proven to be less than stellar in policing the border, though
in 2003 it improved considerably. Nevertheless, it remains highly
probable that the 2001 war could not have occurred if Serbia's police
had been guarding the border from within Kosovo.
The removal of Serbian security forces opened the floodgates, and now
(with the West coming under increasing threats and violent attacks from
the "friendly" Albanians) only their return could close them.
Serbia's return to the province (as envisioned in Resolution 1244) would
of course mean a bloodbath. Yet should Kosovo become independent, and
ethnic cleansing of minorities accelerate, would anyone stop them? And,
if Kosovo were to be independent, would the Albanian secessionist
movement in Macedonia not increase? Indeed, while no one wants a war,
there is a residual fear and feeling from all sides that things are not
over yet. As one Skopje man told us the other day, "I kept my gun just
in case."
Apparently a majority of the population thinks as he does, if the
pathetic "harvest" of the November-December weapons collection is
anything to judge by.
In the bigger picture, Macedonia and its Balkan neighbors will all alike
be affected by greater world events. First of all is the continuing
morass in Iraq, which keeps the US bogged down in continuing death and
destruction, even as Washington's war hawks press on for war with other
Middle Eastern countries. And, considering that it's an election year in
America as well, the Balkans is likely to receive scant attention. Had
Milosevic or Seselj polled big two or three years ago, the US might have
started bombing again (or at least gone the sanctions route). Now,
despite the media fretting from the usual folks, no one really has the
time to care.
Related to that is the Greek Olympics, which will feature more security
than any in history. The Balkans- and particularly Bosnia- have already
been fingered as posing a threat. The Greeks (and the hundreds of
American agents secretly helping to prepare for the Games) believe that
al Qaeda sympathizers may be lurking in Muslim-populated areas of the
Balkans, and lying in wait to make mischief this August. That said,
troublemaking of any kind is likely to be frowned upon by Europe. Again,
this does not seem to be the year for a successful Albanian "liberation"
war. In the case that Islamic terrorists with links to the Albanian
paramilitaries are discovered, foreign support for the cause will sink
even further.
This does not mean, however, that Macedonia will be completely free from
violence. The same low-level attacks will probably continue, though more
sporadically. And, the growing resentment Albanians in Kosovo have for
their UNMIK overlords may make the Westerners- for the first time- more
of a target than Macedonians.
As mentioned above, Microsoft's new "strategic partnership" with the
government is sure to have benefits, but it also involves some amount of
risk. Frequently in 2003, bugs in Windows were discovered and
increasingly hackers targeted the American company. In the US, lawmakers
have voiced concerns over national security threats posed by an
over-reliance on Microsoft software. Similar threats could apply
anywhere that a state depends on the software of one country. Macedonia,
which has less safeguards and alternative forms of protection as
America, is conceivably more vulnerable to crippling bugs, viruses and
hacker attacks.
In 2004, the Ministry of Defense will continue its cooperation with
NATO, though we should not expect to see any ground-making initiatives
to be unveiled at May's NATO summit in Istanbul. In all likelihood, the
alliance's existing goals- decreasing troop sizes across Europe and
focusing more and more on terrorism- will be the topic. Macedonian NATO
accession will remain at least two years away. If the current EU Proxima
police mission goes successfully, as it should, Macedonia will have one
more notch in its belt to show the internationals. Even now, police and
military forces have been professionalized considerably and are able to
spend less time on immediate threats, and more on anti-terrorism,
guarding against arms smuggling, etc.
Conclusions
Macedonia on January 1, 2005, will be considerably than it is today. The
trajectory of world events will carry it along and, in the case of
Kosovo, even present a threat. Security concerns will continue to irk
the government.
However, the fact that more and more foreign companies are choosing to
put their money here implies a certain commitment to the country's
stability. Much-needed changes in the media will revitalize the
industry, increase advertising potentials and encourage real competition
and Western standards. The difference now is that the money will no
longer come from "goodwill" donors in the West but from Western
businessmen with a real interest in the quality of their product. In
other words, the Western gravy train has sputtered to a halt, and it's
make-or-break time for those sham artists made fat and happy by years of
foreign largesse. About time!
For the first time, in 2004 the Macedonian media is going to be
interesting- and this more than anything, perhaps, will jolt the country
out of its political and economic torpor. And not only media but
government and business will benefit from the arrival of high-speed and
affordable DSL internet- thus ending a long dark age in Macedonian
history.
TOP
Reconsidering our foreign policy: War when we're not attacked -
Comparing Serbia with Iraq
By
contrast, Serbia was never a threat to other countries. Whatever Serbia
did to the people living in Kosovo, Kosovo was and remains, under
American and international law, part of Serbia. Serbia had never
attacked the United States or our allies, or any of its neighbors.
Serbia never even retaliated when the United States was bombing its
capital city, Belgrade.
TOP
San Francisco
Chronicle (California, U.S.A)
OPINION
Tom Campbell
Tom Campbell served five terms in Congress and was a member of the House
International Relations Committee.
Sunday, December 21, 2003
Kosovo and Iraq are both instances of U.S. military action against a
country that had not attacked us. The United States bombed Serbia for 79
days in 1999 -- until Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic gave up. The
United States bombed and sent ground forces into Iraq in 2003 -- until
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gave up.
In comparing these two, it is worth noting that neither is at peace
today. American troops still patrol Iraq; NATO troops still patrol the
Serbian province of Kosovo, and they likely will continue to patrol for
years to come.
Which situation posed a greater threat to international peace? What
started the involvement in Iraq was Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. It
attacked, claimed to incorporate Kuwait and, during the Persian Gulf
War, fired missiles into the territory of two U.S. allies, Saudi Arabia
and Israel. After the cease-fire, Iraq expelled U.N. weapons inspectors
whose presence it had agreed to as a condition of ending the Persian
Gulf War.
By contrast, Serbia was never a threat to other countries. Whatever
Serbia did to the people living in Kosovo, Kosovo was and remains, under
American and international law, part of Serbia. Serbia had never
attacked the United States or our allies, or any of its neighbors.
Serbia never even retaliated when the United States was bombing its
capital city, Belgrade.
Human-rights abuses were present in both Iraq and Serbia. The CIA
documented that 2,000 people were killed by Milosevic in Kosovo in the
years prior to the U.S. bombing. Saddam Hussein gassed, shot, tortured
and starved hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens before the United
States went to war to overthrow the dictator. The now regular unearthing
of mass graves in Iraq compels the conclusion that Iraq, not Kosovo,
presented the stronger human- rights justification for intervention.
Those who doubt the United States will exit Iraq anytime soon suspect
that U.S. and British troops will have to stay for a long time to quell
centuries-old Shiite, Sunni and Kurd hostility. The same has proved true
for the need for U.S. and other NATO troops in Kosovo: NATO troops are
now in their fifth year of occupation to protect both ethnic Serbs and
Albanians from annihilating each other.
Critics fault President Bush for not obtaining prior U.N. approval for
the recent Iraq war, forgetting that President Bill Clinton did not
obtain prior U.N. approval to wage war over Kosovo, either. In Iraq, the
U.N. Security Council had given open-ended authority in 1991 to the
United States "to restore . . . security to the area." While one can
argue whether that wording was sufficient to justify the United States'
action 12 years later, President Clinton had nothing like that authority
when he dropped the first bomb on Belgrade.
After the capitulation of Milosevic, the U.N. Security Council did pass
a resolution recognizing the de facto status of the United States and
NATO in Kosovo. The Clinton administration pointed to this as
after-the-fact U.N. ratification, claiming that the international
community condoned the action. The same can be said about Iraq: Just two
months ago, the U.N. Security Council passed a similar resolution
regarding the United States' and the United Kingdom's presence in Iraq.
Whatever international law says, what about legality under the U.S.
Constitution? President Bush sought and obtained approval from Congress
before acting in Iraq (and, in a separate, earlier vote, in
Afghanistan). President Clinton never did. When I asked Madeleine
Albright, President Clinton's secretary of state, about the
constitutional legality in congressional hearings, she said the U.S.
action in Kosovo wasn't "war," it was "armed conflict," and therefore no
congressional approval was constitutionally needed. I asked her what the
difference was; she replied that she would let the lawyers figure it
out.
In terms of announced rationale, President Clinton said Serbia posed a
threat to NATO's security. President Bush said Iraq possessed weapons of
mass destruction. Both prior-announced justifications gave way to others
as time passed, rationales that became based on human rights and
self-determination in both places.
I can understand opposing U.S. action in both Iraq and Serbia. I can
understand supporting it in both. I can understand concluding that, on
grounds of human rights, attacks on U.S. allies, international law and
U.S. Constitutional law, the war in Iraq was a clearer case than the war
in Serbia. To support the decision to attack Serbia, but not Iraq,
however, is illogical.
It seems that it comes down to this: To some, President Bush can do no
good, and President Clinton could do no wrong. Loyalties to both
Presidents Clinton and Bush excite the strong feelings of many, but
personalizing American foreign policy impedes objective judgment.
TOP
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