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September
26, 2003
ERP KIM Special Report
STABLE
SERBIA-MONTENEGRO A KEY FACTOR IN KEEPING BALKAN ISLAMISTS UNDER CONTROL
ERP KIM Info-service is
presenting two independent reports on the new role of Serbia-Montenegro in
the geopolitical situation after the September 11th and the war in Iraq.
The views expressed in these texts reflect positions of the authors and do
not neccessarily represent views of the ERP KIM Info-Service.
Contents:
 STABLE
SERBIA-MONTENEGRO A KEY FACTOR IN KEEPING ISLAMISTS UNDER CONTROL, M.
DJORDJEVIC (Belgrade)
Recent developments after the
wars in Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated that the Islamist cause cannot
be easily dismissed, particularly in the present grave economic and
political crisis plaguing most of the Balkans, and that it represents a
prime breeding ground for extremist Islamist cells.
SPECIAL
REPORT, STRATFOR INSTITUTE (U.S): BALKAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
The paradox is this.
Should the Islamist forces in Bosnia, Kosovo or other parts of the region
move aggressively, the United States does not have sufficient forces in
either place, and the willingness of European governments to act
decisively is, at least in our minds, questionable. Their definition of
"decisive action" may differ from that of the United States. The only
power that has an interest in controlling Islamic actions in the region
is, interestingly, Serbia. Different time, different regime, but same
national interests. What could happen is that, in the end, the United
States must rely on the Serbs to deal with the current war.
SERBIA-MONTENEGRO - A KEY GEOSTRATEGIC
POSITION IN
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
STABLE SERBIA-MONTENEGRO - A
KEY FACTOR IN KEEPING BALKAN ISLAMISTS UNDER CONTROL
TOP
Recent
developments after the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated that
the Islamist cause cannot be easily dismissed, particularly in the present
grave economic and political crisis plaguing most of the Balkans, and that
it represents a prime breeding ground for extremist Islamist cells....
In the new
political and security situation in the world marked by the September 11,
2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City
and the latest war in Iraq, the Balkans will soon re-emerge as a strategic
battleground in preventing Islamist retaliation on the Western world. With
its traditionally secular Moslem communities, which were not very familiar
with Wahabbi ideas, only a few years ago the problem of the emergence of
predominantly Moslem states in this part of Europe did not seem to pose a
serious threat. This was even viewed as a convenient tool to undermining
the policies of Slobodan Milosevic and strengthening the Western presence
in the Balkans. However, recent developments after the wars in Bosnia and
Kosovo have demonstrated that the Islamist cause cannot be easily
dismissed, particularly in the present grave economic and political crisis
plaguing most of the Balkans, and that it represents a prime breeding
ground for extremist Islamist cells. It has been proven elsewhere that
organized crime and mafia inevitably forge links with terrorists and thus
represent their natural allies. Economically and politically unstable
countries would hardly be able to cope with such a problem. Therefore, the
existence of stronger, stable democratic and multiethnic countries is the
only guarantee that such elements will not prevail and use the Balkans as
a spring board towards Western Europe.
Even a
superficial glance at the map of Southeastern Europe makes it very clear
why the Balkans appears so attractive to terrorists. Predominantly
Moslem-inhabited territories including eastern Macedonia, southern Serbia
(Kosovo, the Presevo Valley and the so-called Sanjak) are geographically
connected to Bosnia. This "green transversal" runs through the territory
of Serbia and Montenegro separating these two Republics of the Union. The
eventual independence of Montenegro and Kosovo will automatically affect
the fragile balance established in Bosnia and Macedonia, which still
remain ethnically divided countries despite the presence of international
troops. The map of the Balkans will become even more complicated and the
resulting territorial fragmentation will leave this part of Europe in a
security and economic limbo. Inherently unstable Kosovo Province in
particular will become a focal point for terrorists together with North
Albania, which are both under control of Moslem Albanian clans and mafia.
Many Western journalists have already called this part of Serbia and
Albania "the most lawless part of Europe". Even the presence of
international peacekeepers will prove inefficient because no one will be
able to cope with the local extremists as well as those who live in these
territories themselves. Additionally, Western countries will be unable to
keep their forces in the Balkans indefinitely. Therefore, preservation of
the state borders of multiethnic and democratic Serbia-Montenegro with
Kosovo as a special autonomous region remains the only way to prevent
further fragmentation of the Balkans and keep the "green transversal"
under control. In order to achieve such a settlement between Belgrade and
Pristina, it will be necessary to politically neutralize radical Albanian
leaders in Kosovo and promote a new political elite that will reach
compromise with Belgrade and co-operate in anti-terrorist operations with
NATO led troops. Common interests and integration within new
post-Milosevic Serbia and Montenegro will strengthen Kosovo's capacities
to resist the Islamists and mafia and keep up the pace with economic
integration in the region. However, if Kosovo leaders continue with their
blatantly hostile attitude towards Serbs and persist in provoking
incidents in Macedonia, Montenegro and the Presevo Valley, Kosovo will
remain politically isolated and soon become the prey of its own extremists
who need independence and ethnically compact state to secure their illegal
activities behind the smokescreen of "democratic" institutions.
In this complex geostrategic situation, Serbia-Montenegro, with its
central position in the Balkans, will naturally become a key ally of the
West in preventing the Islamists from carrying out their operations in
Europe. The country that only a few years ago was seen as a major security
threat in the area will thus be given a new chance to make its
contribution to the preservation of the world peace and stability. For
this new role, the country would need ample assistance from the West and
most of all political support in preserving its sovereignty in Kosovo and
Montenegro.
Marko Djordjevic
Independent analyst, Belgrade
TOP
SPECIAL REPORT
STRATFOR
(USA) THE BALKAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
The paradox is this.
Should the Islamist forces in Bosnia, Kosovo or other parts of the region
move aggressively, the United States does not have sufficient forces in
either place, and the willingness of European governments to act
decisively is, at least in our minds, questionable. Their definition of
"decisive action" may differ from that of the United States. The only
power that has an interest in controlling Islamic actions in the region
is, interestingly, Serbia. Different time, different regime, but same
national interests. What could happen is that, in the end, the United
States must rely on the Serbs to deal with the current war.
TOP
http://www.stratfor.com/corporate/index.neo?page=center&storyId=222655
STRATFOR (USA)
The Balkan Theater of Operations
September 22, 2003
Summary
There are three dimensions to the U.S. war against the Islamist world:
within the United States, within Islamic countries and along the periphery
of the Islamic world. The Balkans has been one of the neglected theaters
of conflict along this periphery. The recent visit of U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers focuses our attention on this area.
Analysis
The U.S.-Islamist war has three dimensions. There is the covert duel
within the United States, between U.S. security forces and what are
assumed to be al Qaeda operatives present in the country. There is a
second dimension within Muslim countries, where Islamist forces struggle
against the current governments. This includes theaters where U.S. forces
are overtly and covertly involved, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In the
third dimension, conflict exists along the frontiers of the Islamic world,
where Muslims and non-Muslims engage in active combat.
These frontier conflicts divide into a number of separate theaters of
operation. There is, of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which
Jews confront Muslims. There is the conflict in Kashmir between Hindu
India and Islamists. There is Chechnya, where Muslims confront Orthodox
Christian Russians, and the Philippines, where Catholics confront Muslims.
There is a range of smaller theaters in Africa. However it is divided, it
is useful to think of three dimensions to the war, which is occurring in
various theaters.
One theater of operations to which our attention has been drawn is the
Balkans. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers visited
the region last week, reminding us not only that U.S. troops are still
deployed there, but also that the Balkans is one of the points where the
Islamic world interfaces with the rest of the globe. It also reminds us of
a critical antecedent of the current war and of an important fact that has
been forgotten: The first major conflict between the Islamic world and its
surroundings took place in the Balkans, and the United States intervened
in that war on the side of the Muslims.
The Balkans historically had been unstable, because the region was where
three worlds -- the Muslim, the Catholic and the Orthodox Christian --
interfaced. This was far from the only fault line: Ethnicity, dynastic
lines and clan conflict created a constantly shifting constellation of
relationships. Geography also played a part, since the rugged hills of the
Balkans allowed various groups to retain their identities in the face of
occupations by Romans, Turks and Germans.
As in Afghanistan and other areas of rugged terrain and long history, it
was possible to suppress but not erase the distinctions that existed. The
distinctions always led to conflict, but -- again, as with most
mountainous regions -- resources were scarce and war was a means toward
building wealth. Relative peace occurred only when there was an external
force so threatening to everyone in the region that solidarity was the
only thing that made sense -- or when the region was occupied by a power
so overwhelming or ruthless that it made sense to bide one's time. Thus,
during the Cold War, there was a consensus that becoming a Soviet
satellite was unacceptable, and therefore Tito was able to impose a stasis
on the region. Alternatively, effective occupation by the Turks in the
18th century did not erase conflict, but suppressed it somewhat.
When the Cold War ended, the Soviet threat disappeared, as did the
legitimacy of Marxism. When the pressure released, the artificial unity of
the South Slavs, or Yugoslavia, evaporated. It was very much as if a
spring, tightly coiled, exploded. The result was not a civil war, but a
series of national wars between nations whose autonomy had been suppressed
by a multinational state. Added to this was a state that had never been
part of Yugoslavia, but which nevertheless was intimately involved and
affected by its policies: Albania. This was not only because it was a
small, vulnerable country surrounded by a much larger and stronger state,
but also because history had left many Albanians on the wrong side of the
border.
A three-way war broke out that roughly, though not perfectly, paralleled
religious distinctions. Catholic Croatia, Orthodox Christian Serbia, and
Muslim Bosnia -- and later Albania -- engaged in a complex war from which
Macedonia and Slovenia managed to hold themselves aloof. The slaughter and
inhumanity on all sides was striking. As would be expected, the most
powerful entity, Serbia, was by definition able to inflict the greatest
atrocities, but only weakness made the other parties more virtuous. The
war was seen by all sides as an opportunity to rectify centuries of
legitimate grievances, so complex and arcane that no outsider could truly
understand the issues and certainly could never grasp the passions.
The United States and the West viewed this conflict through the prism of
the post-Cold War world. In their views, there were no fundamental issues
separating the world's serious powers. They all wanted the same thing --
economic growth and political stability. During Desert Storm, the world
had united to stop a rogue state, Iraq, that had threatened both
objectives. Other peacekeeping operations followed the same line -- a
united world administering a simple world, dealing with occasional rogue
nations.
Yugoslavia -- or more precisely, the Serbian remnant of that entity -- was
ranked with Iraq, North Korea, Libya and other isolated states that
threatened regional stability and had to be stopped before they became
regional hegemons that could disrupt economic development. The further
assumption was that the citizens of these nations, Serbia included, would
welcome the fall of the repressive regimes.
Therefore, the American analysis of the Balkans ran thus: There was no
systemic problem in the Balkans, but rather, a problem rooted in a regime
that would not follow international norms of behavior. That nation was in
the process of committing genocide and had to be stopped. The most desired
means of changing Serbian behavior was negotiation, backed by the threat
of force and followed by peacekeeping troops. That was the model followed
in Bosnia with the Dayton Accords, albeit after the bloodbaths had already
taken place. In the Kosovo model, direct force was applied to Serbia in
the form of an air campaign that targeted the entire country, followed by
a political settlement, followed by peacekeeping troops.
There have been many conspiracy theories about why the United States did
what it did, but the truth is simpler and in some ways more amazing. The
United States did not see the Balkans question as directly affecting any
immediate American geopolitical interest. Rather, the situation there was
of concern because if the disruption was not suppressed, other regions
might destabilize. The United States had an interest in global stability
as the foundation for global economic growth: A tear in the fabric
anywhere was seen as potentially unraveling things elsewhere. Moreover, if
the West could not suppress chaos in Europe itself, its ability to control
chaos elsewhere would be compromised.
Nothing that went on in the Balkans was seen as having a direct effect on
the United States. The United States had no systemic enemies; its task was
to police outbreaks of hooliganism so that the peace Washington now saw as
permanent and desirable would not be compromised. Nothing in the Balkan
situation itself was of direct significance to the United States.
The United States did not see itself as intervening on behalf of anyone.
It saw itself and its coalition partners as neutral, indifferent to the
local issues, acting as umpires to make certain that the contestants
remained within the bounds of humanity and decency. To the extent to which
U.S. forces were intervening on anyone's side, it was the side of the
victim. Since the victim was, by definition, the weaker party, Washington
was intervening against the stronger power -- Serbia -- and in favor of
the weaker powers, Bosnia and Albania.
One of the conceits of peacekeepers is the belief in their neutrality.
Whatever their intentions, it is impossible to intrude into a complex
political and military situation without affecting the outcome. In
affecting the outcome, of course, someone wins and someone loses.
Therefore, on the ground, the intervention is always seen as benefiting
someone and hurting someone else. This is the disconnect between the
peacekeeper and the actors on the ground. The peacekeeper might well
intend to be neutral, but he is always experienced as highly partisan. In
that unintended partisanship lies the complexity of peacekeeping.
In this case, the intervention was seen as being on behalf of Muslims. The
United States could argue that it was on behalf of peace and justice, but
none of the combatants doubted for a moment that the guns were pointing at
the Serbs, not the Muslims. What the region could not understand was why
the United States was intervening on behalf of the Muslims. Interesting
theories circulated -- that the United States was intervening on behalf of
the Muslims because the Saudis had offered to reduce the price of oil;
that the intervention was designed to buy the Israelis room for maneuver
against the Palestinians; that the intervention was designed to support
Chechen Muslims against the Russians.
The lack of an immediate geopolitical interest generated fascinating
theories, but the truly important reason was missed: Washington failed to
understand the world it was facing. Then-President Bill Clinton, Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger
made a profoundly simple miscalculation. They assumed that there were no
longer any major threats to the United States, and that the primary issue
was dealing with rogue states. If that was the case, it didn't matter who
the United States helped or hurt so long as it contained the rogues. They
did not anticipate either Sept. 11 or the complex confrontation that was
looming between the Islamists and the United States. Many others missed
this event, so they were hardly alone, but the fact was that they shaped
their intervention without much reference to the three dimensions we began
by discussing.
Which meant that the United States intervened on behalf of the Islamic
forces. In retrospect, it might have been assumed that the intervention
would have bought the United States some credibility in the Islamic world.
It has not, essentially because it in no way addressed the real interests
of al Qaeda, and because the Clinton administration never effectively
linked the intervention to a strategic demarche in the Islamic world. The
administration's mindset -- the idea that the United States was
intervening, not on behalf of Islamic forces, but on behalf of stability
-- made it impossible for the government to exploit the intervention
effectively. They would have had to admit the obvious -- that it was an
intervention on behalf of Islam -- and that was something the Clinton
administration couldn't do.
The problem now is threefold. First, Islamist elements present in both
Albania and Bosnia are in a position both to use the region as a transit
point and to hit U.S. troops in both areas. Second, the peacekeeping
forces deployed in both countries are not actively involved in the war on
al Qaeda, but are incidental to whatever operations are taking place in
the Balkans. Finally, the region is open to exploitation by al Qaeda at a
time and place of its choosing -- and there are insufficient U.S. forces
in country to be effective, but too many to be safe.
The Balkan theater of operations has not been quiet. Incidents are
constant but not widely reported. Moreover, there are ample indications
that Islamist forces are present and able to carry out operations. U.S.
covert forces have operated in the region as well, searching for al Qaeda.
Nevertheless, the region could explode in Washington's face at any time.
Neither the Bosnian nor Albanian governments want this to happen, but al
Qaeda would not necessarily consult them.
The paradox is this. Should the Islamist forces in Bosnia, Kosovo or other
parts of the region move aggressively, the United States does not have
sufficient forces in either place, and the willingness of European
governments to act decisively is, at least in our minds, questionable.
Their definition of "decisive action" may differ from that of the United
States. The only power that has an interest in controlling Islamic actions
in the region is, interestingly, Serbia. Different time, different regime,
but same national interests. What could happen is that, in the end, the
United States must rely on the Serbs to deal with the current war.
All in all, a cautionary tale about the complexity of geopolitics.
analysis@stratfor.com
TOP
ERP KIM
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