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May 23,
2003
ERP KIM Newsletter -
Special Edition
Independent Kosovo or a part of
a Serbia-Monenegro Federation
BAGHDAD, BELGRADE, AND
BORDERS
The end of the war in Iraq provides a unique opportunity for the US to
address the situation in the Balkans, in a way that enhances stability, is
fair and equitable, and reassures the international community.
By John ZAVALES
John Zavales served in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1991 to 2001. During the 1999
Kosovo crisis he was based in Albania as a part of Operation Shining Hope,
the relief operation in support of Kosovar refugees. He later served as
the OSD desk officer for Albania, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia,
and the Czech Republic. His earlier article, "Kosovo: Time for the Hard
Decisions", appeared in the journal of the Western Policy Center in July
2002.
Even as organized fighting was drawing to a close in Iraq, ominous signs
began to emerge. Kurds displaced over the past two decades are returning
to Kirkuk and Mosul, in many cases clashing with Arabs from the south who
had been moved into their homes by Saddam Hussein. Sporadic violence has
broken out between Kurds and Turkomen. Among ethnic Arabs, it appears that
a large part of the Shiite majority favors some type of theocratic regime
along Iranian lines, raising fears among Sunni Muslims and Christians.
Violent confrontations have been very limited, and are currently under
control. Nonetheless, the potential for them to explode remains a concern
for the US and the international community.
American officials overseeing the short-term transition of Iraq are faced
with an ethnic and religious mosaic as bewildering as any in the Balkans
or the former Soviet Union. However, it is already clear that US policy
there will differ in one very important respect. The Administration has
stated publicly that the territorial integrity of the Iraqi nation must be
preserved, and that US actions will be taken with an eye toward
reinforcing that unity. This goal enjoys broad bipartisan support in the
US, among opponents as well as supporters of the war against Iraq.
A number of steps have been taken to check centrifugal tendencies. US
commanders, sensitive to Turkish concerns, ensured that Kurdish pershmerga
fighters limited their offensive operations, and generally acted under US
direction. Kurdish leaders provided assurances that their forces would not
permanently occupy Kirkuk and its surrounding oil fields, and have moved
their troops out in accordance with these promises. Turkey’s refusal to
permit US ground forces to use its territory to open a northern front,
while complicating war planning and delaying deployment of the 4th
Infantry Division, may have been a long-term blessing. Had Turkish troops
participated in offensive operations, even well to the rear of US forces,
there would likely have been clashes with residual PKK units and other
Kurds fearing a Turkish invasion. Nominal US allies would have been
shooting at each other, resulting in casualties on both sides, and
fighting might then have spread into southeastern Turkey. The US has also
warned Iran against intervention in Iraq, hopefully limiting the risk of
Shiite separatism in the south.
There are a number of interesting parallels between US intervention in the
Balkans during the 1990s, and in Iraq in 2003. Following the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, both areas included numerous
intermixed ethnic and religious groups, most of whom had never had their
own nation states, all pursuing conflicting national aspirations. As a
result, both situations entailed the actual or potential redrawing of
national boundaries, to reflect new realities on the ground. Most
importantly, military action was undertaken in both cases at the
initiative of US presidents, and in the face of significant opposition at
home and abroad. Leaving aside the relative merits of these interventions,
both unquestionably damaged relations, for at least the short term, with a
number of critical allies and friends. Some terrorism analysts have
postulated that strong opposition to US policy in Kosovo made the Russians
more reluctant to share critical intelligence on al Qaeda capabilities and
intentions, in the period before September 11, 2001. It is still too early
to predict what the long term fallout from the Iraq war will be on
relations with France, Russia, and Germany.
For this reason, the eventual success or failure of both the Balkans
(especially Kosovo) and Iraq will, fairly or not, be stamped Made in the
USA. Obviously a number of factors will be beyond our control, and, at
least in the case of Kosovo, are dependent on NATO and UN policies.
However, the entire world recognizes that these interventions would not
have occurred without US initiative. How our allies and friends, as well
as potential adversaries, view future US attempts to exercise power and
intervene in regions of crisis will depend heavily on how these situations
turn out. This is not simply a matter of international opinion or winning
votes in the UN Security Council, though these are both important goals in
their own right. The manner in which we address both these regions will
help determine whether the world of 2010 views the US as a responsible
partner for promoting stability, or as a reckless power whose policies
must be questioned and opposed.
It is useful to begin by considering what long-term objectives US
policies, both in the Balkans and Iraq, should accomplish. First should be
the enhancement of regional stability, and prevention of further ethnic
conflict and fragmentation. Second is the prevention of terrorism,
including the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. Third is the
need to reduce and eventually pull out US troops in as timely a manner as
possible, to prevent expensive long term deployments that drain forces
needed for other operations, and can create local resentment. Finally, and
perhaps most difficult to achieve, is the need to demonstrate to the
international community that US policy is consistent and evenhanded, and
is based on principles which can be understood and supported.
In the case of Iraq, we have made very clear that the splintering of that
country into two or more independent states would not be in the interests
of the US or the region. The most troubling part of this position is that
it explicitly rejects the national aspirations of the Kurds, a people of
nearly thirty million (a larger population than most European nations)
whose dreams of an independent state have been deferred repeatedly. Given
the repression the Kurds have suffered from Saddam’s Iraq (to the point of
genocide), as well as from Iran, Syria, and Turkey, it would seem that
historical justice demands their independence.
Nevertheless, our position, one with which most of the international
community concurs, has been that a separate country is not a prerequisite
for the Kurds to live in peace, with full cultural rights and a degree of
political autonomy. Rather, the creation of a new democratic Iraq, with
the fervent hope that such values might eventually spread to other nations
in the region, is seen as the best route to realizing Kurdish aspirations,
without any redrawing of international boundaries. The extreme
personalization of the war in Iraq, to focus on Saddam Hussein, his sons,
and the rest of the 55-card deck, has made this approach easier to uphold,
since we have scrupulously avoided attacking the Iraqi nation itself as
the problem.
In the Balkans, the US approach to sovereignty issues has been
considerably more muddled, incremental, and subject to frequent revision.
When Yugoslavia began coming apart in 1991, the administration then in
office initially supported (though somewhat halfheartedly) its territorial
integrity, until Germany forced our hand by recognizing Slovenia and
Croatia. Such recognition seemed to suggest that states based on the
national aspirations of one ethnic group were the order of the day
(relatively easy for homogeneous Slovenia, less so in the case of Croatia
with its large Serb minority). In Bosnia, however, we shifted to the other
end of the spectrum. Understandably outraged by atrocities committed
mainly, but certainly not exclusively, by Bosnian Serb forces, we assumed
that because their methods were illegitimate, their political goals must
be as well.
This introduced an inherent, and tragic, contradiction into our Balkan
policy. The attempt by Yugoslavia to preserve one multiethnic nation by
force was seen as wrong, but that of Bosnia-Herzegovina to preserve its
multiethnic nation, against the wishes of most of its Serb and Croat
residents, was right. The struggle by Slovenes and Croatians to proclaim
independence on ethnic grounds was seen as laudable; that of the Bosnian
Serbs to break away for similar reasons, as wrong and dangerous. When
heavy fighting broke out in Kosovo in 1998, leading to NATO intervention
the following year, it appeared that we had come full circle. Yugoslav
atrocities were cited as the rationale, but again we were now supporting
ethnic secessionists hoping for their own homogeneous state. Since the end
of the war, US and UN rhetoric has taken a surreal turn. Having forcibly
split Kosovo from the rest of Serbia, in de facto support of an entirely
monoethnic independence movement, the UN Mission is now criticizing Kosovo
Serbs who favor cantonization, on the grounds that their actions would
undermine Kosovo’s supposed multiethnic nature.
From the regional stability perspective, there is a general recognition
that Kurdish independence at this time would have a destabilizing effect
not only on Iraq (because of the difficulty of determining where exactly
to draw a new border, in areas that are ethnically mixed) but also on
Turkey, Iran, and Syria. There is a high probability that a wider regional
conflict would ensue. An independent Kosovo, dominated by former KLA
combatants, would certainly have at least as serious an effect on
destabilizing the rest of Serbia, Macedonia, and perhaps Albania. Even in
the presence of a UN Administration and thousands of NATO troops, armed
ethnic Albanian separatists, using Kosovo as a base, have launched attacks
on the Presevo Valley in Serbia and on Macedonia over the last three
years.
Kosovo has already emerged as a significant source and/or transit route
for illegal weapons, drugs, and human traffic. While an independent
Kosovo, unlike Afghanistan, would not likely be a source of Islamist
terrorism per se, the lack of effective law enforcement in the province,
and the involvement of criminals in its government, would provide
dangerous opportunities for al Qaeda and similar groups. In the case of
Iraq, the US has made clear its concerns about WMD expertise leaving the
country (especially in light of Iranian weapons programs), and the
potential that disaffected young Iraqis could be recruited by terrorist
organizations. To minimize such problems, the restoration of a strong
Iraqi central government, able to control its borders and provide for its
people, is clearly in our interest.
Turning to the issue of US troop presence, we have now had forces in
Bosnia for over seven years, and in Kosovo for almost four. US forces are
being stretched thin, creating problems with operational tempo, and
perhaps morale and retention. It is likely we will need to keep
significant numbers of troops in Afghanistan for some time, and as such
need to reduce forces in Iraq as soon as possible. It is important to
remember that each separate deployment creates requirements beyond just
the number of combat troops, to include headquarters elements, planning
cells, logistics infrastructure, transportation assets, and additional
units for rotation and relief. In some cases a US troop presence can
create local resentment, as in Saudi Arabia and most likely in Iraq
(though generally not in the Balkans). Long-term deployments can also
raise international (and now considerable domestic US) suspicions about
American empire building.
Perhaps the most critical issue involves international perceptions of US
policy. The question to address is how conflicting and inconsistent
approaches to different regions resonate with our friends, allies, and
others. The attack on Iraq was opposed by most of the world, and the UN
Security Council process was clearly not used effectively. In the wake of
our failure so far to find weapons of mass destruction, recent statements
by the Administration that liberating the Iraqi people (an issue barely
mentioned in the lead up to war) was always a crucial goal, create
confusion about our motives. Actions like this, and public documents such
as the current National Security Strategy, lead many to fear that an
American Imperium is the real objective. Given the twists and turns and
tortured compromises of our various regional policies, is it any wonder
that many observers are confused and deeply suspicious when the United
States speaks of regional stability, human rights, and democratization?
What do these terms signify? Do they have a different meaning in the
Balkans than they do in the Middle East, or in Africa?
Many of the contradictions in US foreign policy will prove difficult to
ever reconcile. However, we have a responsibility to address those that we
can. We need to take advantage of the immediate opportunities provided by
the end of the war in Iraq, to make a definite statement on the future of
Kosovo as well. If we support the territorial integrity of Iraq, we should
apply the same standard to Serbia. Some senior figures in the last
Administration remarked that Serbia had lost the moral right to govern
Kosovo. Leaving aside the staggering hubris of such a statement, by any
representative of a superpower whose global reach has left few nations
untouched, it should be tested with respect to Iraq. If the genocidal
slaughter by chemical weapons of civilians at Halabja does not disqualify
Iraq (whose dictator had to be removed by force) from governing Kurdistan,
how can the policies of Slobodan Milosevic (removed by his people in a
democratic election) disqualify Serbia from governing Kosovo? We should
also establish a consistent approach to respect for UN resolutions. The
major rationale employed by the Administration, in its attempt to win UN
approval for the attack on Iraq, was Saddam’s violation of UNSC
resolutions on disarmament. If UN resolutions are sacred enough for us to
launch a war over, how can we then discard Resolution 1244, which states
that Kosovo remains a part of Serbia?
There is a risk that the change of administration here in 2001, and the
sense that everything is different post-9/11, means that the US is
entitled to apply different standards in different countries, as we see
fit. While we may wish otherwise, this perception is not shared in the
rest of the world. Because the US was the motive force behind both
interventions, the world will be reassured about our intentions by fair
and consistent solutions. American endorsement of Iraq’s territorial
integrity highlights the fact that no convincing argument has emerged,
either from Washington or Pristina, that the national aspirations of the
Kosovar Albanians are more compelling, from either a moral or a
Realpolitik standpoint, than those of the Kurds or a dozen other
separatist movements.
As we begin the necessary dialogue with the UN and European allies about
their role in Iraq, we need to discuss with NATO and UNMIK a revised
position on Kosovo.
This will not be difficult with most Europeans, who have been much more
skeptical of independence all along. We should begin the gradual and
measured transition to bring Kosovo back into a loose federation of
Serbia-Montenegro. As a first step, the ongoing transfer of more
responsibilities from UNMIK to local elected officials, which has
continued despite the lack of any meaningful improvement in refugee
returns, public safety, or law enforcement, and which flies in the face of
all logic, should be halted. Next, we need to begin serious consideration
of the issue, raised by Prime Minister Djindjic shortly before his
assassination, of reintroducing into Kosovo limited numbers of Serbian
police and troops to protect cultural sites and secure borders, as
authorized by UN Resolution 1244. It is important that the impetus for
this process come from the US, since ethnic Albanians trust Americans more
than Europeans to protect their interests. We should publicly emphasize
the parallel with Iraq, and the dangers of redrawing international
boundaries.
The critical point is that the future lies in regional integration. Kosovo
Albanians are seeking a concept of the nation state that is already
obsolete in the 21st century. Given rapid changes in communication,
travel, technology, and business, regions emerging from crisis cannot
afford lengthy periods of nation-state building and consolidation, as in
the 19th and early 20th centuries. The tangible benefits of association
with, and eventual membership in, the European Union will come to Kosovars
sooner as part of a Serbia-Montenegro federation than as an unstable
independent country. Statements made to Kosovo Albanians and Iraqi Kurds
disappointing their national aspirations should reinforce one another. The
US should emphasize that it cares about the cultural and human rights of
these groups, and has demonstrated its willingness to protect them with
force when they were threatened, but that an independent state is not
necessary in this day and age.
ERP KIM
Info-Service is the official Information Service of the Serbian Orthodox
Diocese of Raska and Prizren and works with the blessing of His Grace
Bishop Artemije.
Our Information Service is distributing news on Kosovo related issues. The
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