
ALBANIAN TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN KOSOVO AND METOHIJA
BIA (Security Information
Agency)
Belgrade, September 2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
1.
Continuity of terrorist organization of Albanian extremists
2.
Characteristics of ANA activities
3. Data
on the victims of violence in K&M
4.
Organized crime
-
Criminal activities in K&M
-
Activities of the Albanian mafia around the world
-
Influence of criminal factors from the Republic of Albania
5. The
Role of Albanian Emigration
6.
Pan-Islamic Factor
List of terrorists and
members of organized criminal organizations in K&M
1.
Hajdin Abazi
2.
Ekrem Avdija
3.
Alush Agushi
4.
Rasim Agushi
5.
Nazmi Ajeti
6.
Hisni Ahmeti
7.
Abdulah Babalija
8.
Masar Bakija
9. Idriz Balaj
10.
Afrim Basha
11.
Sokol Bashota
12.
Bajram Bega
13.
Gjemajl Bejta
14. Avni Berisha
15. Rustem Berisha
16. Shefik Beqiri
17. Lahi Ibrahimi
18. Ram Buja
19. Shukri Buja
20. Jah
Bushati
21.
Jusuf Velia
22. Azem Veseli
23. Kadri Veseli
24.
Rexhep Veseli
25. Sali Veseli
26. Skender Veseli
27. Besim Vokshi
28. Latif Gashi
29. Fahrudin Gashi.
30. Jetulah Gecaj
31. Sabit Gecaj
32. Gani Geci.
33. Adem Grabovci
34. Jahir Demaku
35. Milazim Derguti
36. Jetulah Dibrani
37. Sokol Dobruna
38. Shaban Dragaj
39. Florim Ejupi
40. Agim Elshani
41. Xhabir Zharku
42. Dritton Zhjeqi
43. Tahir Zemaj
44. Genc Zogaj
45. Bislim Zyrapi
46. Nuredin Ibishi
47. Imri Ilazi
48. Gani Imeri
49. Elisah Imeri
50. Bexhet Imishti
51. Ahmet Isufi
52. Lirim Jakupi
53. Januz Januzaj
54. Bashkim Jashari
55. Musa Jashari
56. Rifat Jashari
57. Sahit Jashari
58. Naim Kadriu
59. Giner Kamberi
60. Ajvaz Karpuzi
61. Ajet Kastrati
62. Kadri Kastrati
63. Mensur Kasumi
64. Naser Kelmendi
65. Hisni Kilaj
66.
Anton Kitaj
67.
Fadhil Kodra
68.
Arif Krasniqi
69.
Gani Krasniqi
70. Gjimshit Krasniqi
71. Emin Krasniqi
72. Jakup Krasniqi
73. Skender Krasniqi
74. Bajram Kryeziu
75. Mazlom Kumnova
76. Mirsad Kurteshi
77. Agim Kuqi
78. Ramiz Lladrovci
79. Fatmir Limaj
80. Ekrem Lluka
81. Isa Latifi
82. Muhamet Latifi
83. Lulzim Leci
84. Afrim Lulaj
85. Nuredin Lushtaku
86. Sami Lushtaku
87. Enver Mavriqi
88. Naim Maloku
89. Faton Mehmetaj
90. Nazif Mehmeti
91. Fadil Mujota
92.
Shefqet Musliu
93.
Isak Musliu
94.
Rustem Mustafa
95.
Salih Mustafa
96.
Arif Muqoli
97.
Maliq Ndrecaj
98.
Selami Neziri
99.
Jakup Nura
100.
Enver Oruçi
101.
Gjumshit Osmani
102. Nebih Preniqi
103.
Rahman Rama
104.
Illmi Ramusholi
105.
Elmi Reqica
106.
Ekrem Rexha
107. Bedri Rexhaj
108. Ismet Sadiku
109.
Ruzhdi Saramati
110.
Rexhep Selimi
111.
Sylejman Selimi
112. Abedin Sogojeva
113. Fatmir Sopi
114. Azem Syla
115. Shemsi Syla
116. Fadil Suljević
117. Emrush Suma
118. Rufki Suma
119.
Ismet Tara
120.
Gani Thaqi
121.
Hashim Thaqi
122.
Ahmet Qeriqi
123.
Ramiz Qeriqi
124.
Sami Ukshini
125. Avni Feta
126. Adem Hagjocaj
127. Abit Haziraj
128. Sadik Halitjaha
129. Xhavit Haliti
130.
Bujar Haradinaj
131.
Daut Haradinaj
132.
Ramush Haradinaj
133.
Nait Hasani
134.
Safet Hasani
135.
Xhabit Hasani
136.
Zeqir Haxhija
137. G¸zim Haxhimusa
138. Hekuran Hoda
139. Fatmir Humolli
140. Sabajdin Cena
141. Agim Çeku
142.
Ethem Çeku
143.
Muhamet Çerkezi
144.
Emrush Xhemajli
145.
Idriz Shabani
146.
Besnik Shala
147.
Shaban Shala
148.
Shaban Shala
149.
Naser Shatri
150.
Xhafer Shatri
151.
Mustafa Shaqiri
152.
Shaqir Shaqiri
153.
Adem Shehu
154.
Elbasan Shoshaj
155.
Bekim Shuti
156.
Met Shuti
Introduction
Albanian terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija
(K&M), as well as in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and
Medvedja, is linked to different types of organized crime. It represents
a permanent danger to the safety of the population and political
stability, not only in our country, but also in other countries in the
region.
The strategists of these activities
want to ensure the legalization of their criminal activities and
accumulated wealth and to enable the establishment of Greater Albania or
Greater Kosovo in order to complete the territory they consider Albanian
ethnic space and spread their internal market and, in proportion to
their economic power, secure the political influence and participation
in the top administrative state bodies on the territory. Support of
violence and permanent disruption of stability in the Balkans make it
possible for the scenario to be effectively implemented in practice.
Having established cooperation with the criminal organizations, the
strategists of terrorist activities have strengthened their political
position which they use for exerting pressure on the overall Albanian
population as well as on autochthonous Albanian political subjects,
enforcing collaboration and concessions.
Thus, the public gets the
impression of complete homogeneity of the Albanian nationals and their
unison endeavors toward a common objective. However, interests of some
criminal organizations are hidden behind the political, ideological and
national motives for the establishment of a unified Albanian state
(regardless of whether they call it Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo).
They tend to take part in the current processes of political and
economic transition, i.e. transformation of the region as a whole, and
to legalize their criminal operations.
Albanians, particularly
those from Kosovo and Metohija, have developed a sense of collective
identity which is a necessary prerequisite for organized crime
activities. This very element, based on the sense of belonging to a
defined group, has linked Albanian organized crime with pan-Albanian
ideals, politics, military activities and terrorism.
A relatively universal model
of terrorist operations in the world - which is, as a rule, usually
funded from criminal sources (trafficking in drugs, arms and people, as
well as in excise goods) - was applied, at one time, by the leaders of
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and was taken over, and is applied
now, by the leaders of the Albanian National Army (ANA).
In this way, unhindered and permanent inflow of resources for criminal
activities has been provided, while the leaders of KLA and ANA, as well
as the most vocal Albanian patriots, have accumulated enormous personal
wealth under the conditions of deep and long-lasting socio-economic
crisis prevailing in the region. This is an additional impetus to the
spreading of criminal activities in the region which is, still, an
inexhaustible source of the so-called dirty money which is the basis for
providing the continuity of terrorist activities and a permanent
recruitment of new fighters.
A characteristic of the
common model of internal organization of Albanian terrorist and criminal
organizations is their compliance with the rule of territorial division,
with the recognition of the interest zones and influence of certain
families. Accordingly, in each of the groups, the basic membership is
recruited from the fis, that is, an extended family, or the clan
that predominates on a certain territory.
Precise territorial and clan
division of the greatest part of Albanian society contributes to the
preservation of traditional hierarchical structure, its distrust of the
outsiders and very strict inner discipline of the members which is still
maintained with the application of the common law of Leka Dugagjini or
the clan honor code. The threat of mandatory execution of blood feud
(vendetta) in cases of betrayal or dishonored agreement, provide for
complete protection of the perpetrators of terrorist activities and
criminal acts and, at the same time, is the most common cause for murder
among the Albanian population.
At the time KLA was being
founded, in the first half of 1993, organized crime was not so prominent
in this region. Primarily for the purpose of arming the newly organized
groups, members of KLA in the areas of Drenica and Metohija established
connections with their relatives, migrant workers in Switzerland,
Germany, Belgium, Sweden and other countries, who had already been
involved in illicit activities, and established multiple channels for
transporting the arms and equipment, as well as financial resources for
the needs of K&M terrorists.
This way, a firm link of the
key persons of Albanian terrorism and the leaders of organized crime in
the region with the highly criminalized and politically manipulated
Albanian diaspora, a very important factor in the operation of the
partnership between Albanian terrorism and criminal organizations, was
established.
At the same time, the
sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the
international community and the trade blockade of the FYRepublic of
Macedonia by Greece have switched drug trafficking from the routes
connecting Turkey with the Western European market to a new one, across
the territory of Albania and K&M. A part of the money earned in these
illicit operations was paid to some allegedly humanitarian funds that
were actually used to sponsor the activities of KLA members.
Of almost DM 900 million
that reached Kosovo and Metohija in the between 1996 and 1999, nearly a
half was the money earned in drug trafficking, which made Interpol
experts conclude (in December 2000) that the activities of fund raising
for Kosmet and KLA were used for laundering of illegally acquired money.
KLA did not use the channels
for illegal transportation of drugs only as a way to ship heroin to
Europe in order to earn enormous profits, but also to smuggle arms to
the Balkans. Drugs were directly traded for arms, or the arms were
purchased with the money earned from drug trafficking in Albania, B&H,
Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, Montenegro, Switzerland and Turkey.
In 1999, "The Washington Times” published a
statement of American anti-drug agents that KLA was linked with a wide
network of organized crime, with the headquarters in Albania. The
documents they possess suggest that it was one of the most powerful
organizations for heroin trafficking in the world, and that most of the
profits generated from this illicit activity were channeled to the
procurement of arms for KLA. The arrival of international forces to K&M
resulted in the disintegration and formal demilitarization of KLA, but
the organization has not as yet discontinued its activities. A part of
the membership re-directed their activities to the political level,
through the Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK)
and the Alliance for the Future of
Kosovo (AFK),
while about 10,000 troops were included into the transformation of KLA
into the Kosovo Protective Corps (KPC) and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).
Since the revitalization of economic activities as the only legal source
of income for the population has not been adequately conducted, a
substantial number of terrorists have continued to produce violence,
actively pursuing their criminal activities.
The foundation of ANA, as a
terrorist organization, was facilitated by the fact that the
organizational and the operational core was composed of the members of
former KLA determined to implement their previously set goals and
complete the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo and Metohija and other,
allegedly Albanian territories. Also, ANA organization mimics the KLA
model, uses the same methods of operation, the same channels for
smuggling weapons and even the same bank accounts and, allegedly,
humanitarian funds abroad by means of which they provide significant
funding for their activities.
It logically appears that
the organized crime in K&M took over the structure and infrastructure of
KLA, developed and branched concomitantly with Albanian terrorism and
now represents a stable and expansive material and financial base of the
Albanian terrorist and separatist movement as a whole. In June 2003, in
his public statement for the media, Barry Fletcher, UNMIK police
spokesman for K&M, said that one of the greatest obstacles the UN faced
was the deeply rooted Albanian mafia that used nationalistic slogans of
Kosmet Albanians whenever it suited their needs.
1. Continuity of
terrorist organization of Albanian extremists
The pretensions of the so-called Government
of the Republic of Kosovo presided by Bujar Bukoshi, an asylum seeker in
Germany, connected with the establishment of a parallel system of
Albanian administration in K&M resulted in foundation of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (AFRK).
The formation was joined by officers
of the former Yugoslav People‘s Army (YPA) of Albanian extraction, all
advocating separatism, who wanted to set up a professional core of the
Kosovo Army. The initiative failed and the leader of the group, Ahmet
Krasniqi, was murdered in 1997 in Tirana.
Since the initiative for
setting up the AFRK was raised by DPK, due to the rivalry among the
Albanian parties, members of these forces, although fully professionally
trained, failed to attain more important positions within the KLA which
the AFRK subsequently joined. However, the rivalry between the members
of these two organizations still exists. KLA was founded by the most
extreme members of the National Kosovo Movement (NKM) and the Popular
Movement for Kosovo Liberation (PMKL), illegal organizations at the
time, led by the members of so-called Marxist-Leninist faction.
The first KLA armed groups
in the region of Drenica were led by Adem Jashari of Donji Prekaz, and
the membership was composed mainly of his close and distant relatives,
usually persons prone to violent behavior and petty crime. Subsequently,
they were joined by the former YPA officers and the Serbian police
officers of Albanian extraction who refused loyalty to the state and its
bodies, as well as participants in the armed conflicts in the regions of
Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina with combat experience.
In spite of the fact that
the initial membership of the organization did not have the necessary
appeal to attract new members, KLA managed to become significantly
large. This is primarily due to the advocacy for secession of K&M from
the Republic of Serbia espoused by the leaders of the Albanian community
who, in the light of the distinguished patriarchal relations, have the
decisive influence on their compatriots. The terror enforced by the
local terrorist organizations over "indifferent" part of the Albanian
population had an almost identical effect. Organized in so-called
"troikas", the extremists visited the heads of the clans and threatened
to liquidate some of those of who had refused to send members to KLA
units.
Strengthening of KLA was substantially helped by crime money and the
support of Albanian diaspora.
In March 1999, the German
police reported that the increase in the heroin trade on the markets of
Germany, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries pursued by the
Albanians coincided with the strengthening of KLA. It was concluded that
KLA had developed from a lightly armed peasant army consisting of
different age groups into a power with tens of thousands of troops armed
with rocket launchers, anti-armor weapons and AK-47 rifles.
KLA troops were the largest
during NATO bombing when they were 20,000 strong. The brigades were
founded which operated, without any significant coordination among them,
in seven operational areas: Drenica, Patrick, Dukadjin, Shalja, Lab,
Nerodimlje and Karadak (maps 1, 2 and 3). The Central Command was set up
with the arrival of Agim Çheku to the position of the chief of staff. At
the same time, territorial rearrangement was conducted resulting in
disappearance of Nerodimlje as an area of operation.
Upon transformation of KLA,
about 5,000 troops remained in the military structures supervised by
international forces, mainly in the ranks of KPC.
Since KLA headquarters and almost full KLA command staff were taken over
by KPC, headed by Agim Çeku, it appears logical that the formation has
maintained the organizational and operational core of KLA (map 4).
Engagement of these people, former terrorists, who continued, within the
legal institution,
Soon after KPC had been set
up, in the OSCE report of November 1999 evidences were presented proving
that some criminal acts and abuse of the population were committed by
the members of KPC. This was subsequently substantiated by the UN
representatives in K&M who stated that they were familiar with the facts
of direct involvement of some KPC representatives in the acts of
terrorism committed in the region.
In addition to the political
motives, the formation of the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and
Bujanovac (LAPMB) and the National Liberation Army (NLA) in charge of
the initiation of armed conflicts in the south of Serbia and western
Macedonia in the late 1999 was also influenced by the need of the
Albanian terrorist leaders to channel the activities of a large number
of idle KLA members. In the stated organizations, the command was taken
over by persons from the local communities who had received KLA military
training and acquired the necessary experience.
In the middle of 2003,
members of UN police in K&M came to the conclusion that from November
2000 the activities of the Albanian extremist groups were expanding to
the south of Serbia and to western FYROM where the territory of K&M was
used as the sanctuary and base for enforcing these destabilizing
operations.
The same, basically criminal
mode of recruitment was used in the field, in an effort to convince the
people that the amount of their national-patriotism corresponded to the
number of the members. The criminal behavior of the members was
manifested in a forceful seizure of property from civilians,
particularly cargo vehicles and luxury cars, allegedly for the needs of
the "liberation struggle".
In the course of 2001,
armed conflicts between Albanian terrorists and security forces in the
south of Serbia were intensified. They were planned and were given
logistic support by some members of KPC command, located in Gnjilane.
Also, some more members of KPC,
engaged in the performance of concrete terrorist actions, were
identified among the LAPMB members.
Shefqet Musliu, up to then
just a local criminal, was the LAPMB commander, with headquarters in
Dobrosin, while the regional headquarters was situated in Char
(commander Muhamet Xhemaili, aka Robeli) and Breznica (commander Ridvan
Çazimi, aka Leshi). Major concentrations of terrorists were also present
in Muhovac, Končulj and regions of Veliki and Mali Trnovac.
The KPC regional command and
operative system provided the complete logistics for the activities of
LAPMB and NLA. This was accomplished by having the members of KPC on the
territory of K&M, recruiting new members for these organizations,
training them and transfering them permanently to the regions of crisis.
Although they were obliged
to hand in all available arms to the KFOR forces, KPC members retained a
substantial part of the arsenal and left it to be used by the LAPMB and
NLA terrorists. These weapons found their way to the illegal market of
K&M thus additionally contributing to the intensification of all forms
of criminal activities in the region.
The LAPMB activities
were mostly funded by illegal trade in cigarettes and drugs in Greece,
FYROM, K&M and Montenegro assisted by several legally registered
companies in the region.
A part of the proceeds was directed
to funding of several camps in K&M where terrorists were trained and
used for the procurement of modern arms and for paying the fees of
professional military instructors from some western countries.
Weapons and military
equipment for LAPMB were supplied by the smuggling of arms carried out
by some members of the organization who did it for their own profit
although a part of the proceeds was set aside for the organization
itself. The said goods were brought in through illegal channels, but
also via border crossings with Albania and FYR Macedonia, such as
Đeneral Janković, Jazince, Tchafa Prushit, Morina and Tropoja.
Some members of LAPMB
bought arms from the members of KPC who have established, together with
former KLA members, their own channels for illegal trade, over the
territory of K&M.
After LAPMB had been demilitarized,
some of the commanders organized illegal transport of a part of the arms
to the territory of FYR Macedonia for the needs of NLA, whereby some of
them generated substantial profits for themselves.
Immediately after the
demilitarization of LAPMB, its members, pretending to be the refugees
from the south of Serbia in K&M, trying to avoid possible criminal
responsibility for their participation in terrorist attacks, established
the Liberation Army of East Kosovo (LAEK)
in Gnjilane. Expectations that this
formation would continue the fight to annex Preševo, Bujanovac and
Medvedja to independent Kosovo, initiated by LAPMB, did not come true,
since this group has not, so far, recruited mass membership.
After the official
disbanding of KLA had been announced in October 1999, activities of
about 40 armed groups of Albanians (with 10 to 300 active members,
usually from the ranks of former KLA and individuals with criminal
background) were recorded in the territory of K&M in different
intervals.
Most of these groups were
set up upon the initiative or through direct engagement of Rustem
Mustafa, aka commander Remi, Fatmir Humoli and some KPC officers who
operate under the supervision of Hashim Thaqi, Ramush Haradinaj or the
so called Albanian secret services established in K&M.
The members of these groups
focused their activities on intimidation of Serbian population and
ethnic cleansing of the territory of K&M, liquidation of potential
witnesses for possible Hague indictments against Albanian terrorists and
elimination of political opponents and their collaborators.
Activities of the groups
called "Ideali", "Skifteri", "BIA", "Kashtjela", "Large Eagles", "Black
Hand", "Eagle‘s Eye", "Black Eagles", "Black Tigers", "Zjari",
"Akatana", "Siguria Vendit", "Homeland Security", "National Flag" etc.
were particularly prominent.
2. Characteristics of
ANA activities
In an effort to become the
so-called umbrella organization of all Albanian terrorist and separatist
groups in the region, ANA intensified its armed activities in 2003 which
were accompanied by strong media coverage. The organization was founded
in late 1999, but became more prominent in the second half of 2001.
In the course of disarmament
of NLA in FYROM, the membership of which included also former members of
KLA and LAPMB, the disarmament process was undermined at the very
beginning by a mass transfer of the members of this organization to the
ranks of the newly founded ANA without any administrative procedure
whatsoever, by simple change of the badge on the uniform. In this way,
Albanian terrorist continued their activities without any risk of
sanctions by the international community that had pronounced NLA a
terrorist organization, which was not the case with ANA.
ANA terrorists observe and
monitor the movements and activities of the police forces and the army,
set up headquarters, supply weapons for their actions and store them in
special bases; they mobilize and train their members and provide for
their transport to the site of action as well as their withdrawal to the
safe territory.
From the organizational point of view, ANA
is a military arm of a more comprehensive political group called the
Front for National Unity of Albanians (FNUA) which also includes an
intelligence service, called Albanian National Security (ANS), and
Albanian National Fund (ANF) as the central financial body.
FNUA was founded by the
Revolutionary Party of Albanians of Tirana, whose sister party in K&M is
a highly extremist UNICOMB (the Party of National Unity). Gafurr Adili,
who uses an alias of Valdet Vardari, born in Kičevo, FYROM, is the FNUA
president, while Idajet Beqiri, aka Alban Vjosa, who is the political
secretary of FNUA of Albania, was a member of the Central Committee of
the Labor Party, which was the only party in communist Albania at the
time. The leadership of FNUA also includes several people from Albania,
among
them some academicians and public figures.
Following a territorial
principle, ANA is organized into "divisions" with command centers.
So-called "Adem Jashari" division, with the seat in Gnjilane, has the
mandate over the region of K&M and south of Serbia. In West FYROM, i.e.
Ilirida, the "Skenderbeu" division is active, with command centers in
Debar and Tetovo. Their commander uses an alias, Idriz Iljaku. The "Mallesia"
division covers the region of the same name in Montenegro, with the
command center located in Ulcinj and directly linked to the headquarters
in Skadar, while "Çameria" division is in charge of the activities in
the south Albania and in the north of Greece (map 5).
General Vigan Gradica is the
ANA commander-in-chief, while Ekrem Asllani is the chief of staff. ANA
leaders, most of them re-activated commanders of KLA, LAPMB and NLA, use
the aliases of Ilir Vardari, Korab Hoxha and Valon Flamuri. Some retired
or former officers of the Albanian Army also work for the ANA
headquarters.
Strategically and
tactically, ANA prefers and pursues a guerilla style combat, with rapid
attacks on the military and police formations in the regions of Preševo,
Bujanovac and Medvedja, as well as on the territory of the FYRepublic of
Macedonia, with combat participants retreating to their logistics base
in Kosovo and Metohija, operating with the participation of some members
of KPC. ANA arouses provocations and organizes attacks on the territory
of K&M in order to urge Serbs to move out and discourage their organized
return. In the foreseeable future, pursuant to the well-known scenario
used in the south of Serbia and FYROM, this organization plans an
expansion of armed conflicts to the territory of Montenegro as well as
to the north of Greece, with the final objective of a unification of the
territories they believe are historically theirs.
Operational forces of
ANA in K&M and in the south of Serbia are composed of about 650
terrorists, most of them situated in the region of Kosovska Kamenica and
Gnjilane where their permanent training camps are located.
ANA members are equipped with light
infantry weapons, hand-held rocket launchers, light portable
anti-aircraft defense systems and are trained in the use of mines and
explosives, as well as the electronic equipment.
Parts of the terrorist
organization are distributed all over Europe, since ANA has branches in
many countries with the main task of raising the funds necessary to
finance their operations, through ANF, with the seat in Zurich.
Transactions take place on the Tirana – Debar – Priština route. Money is
collected from the diaspora to the accounts of Daut Zuri in Vienna and
the Karavan company in Tirana, owned by a Saudi businessman Jashin Kadi.
The money from Saudi Arabia for the Karavan company is laundered in the
construction companies "Mak Albania" and "Cement Albania", owned by
Abdul Latif Sala. The money is, subsequently, paid in the "Dardania"
bank in Tirana, owned by Bujar Bukoshi. Ismet Krueziu, arrested by
international forces in August 2002, used to transfer the money to K&M.
His activities were connected with "Jeta", an Islamic non-governmental
organization funded by the Islamic Bank for Development in Tirana.
Procurement of arms and
equipment for ANA is conducted by KPC, while the purchase itself is
efected through some companies registered in Europe. Before his arrest,
Daut Haradinaj, the former commander of "Dukadjin" territorial group,
was the chief coordinator of these activities.
The action of mining
the railroad bridge near Zvečan which was carried out in April 2003,
showed that a certain number of KPC members were engaged in ANA.
After the action, ANA was pronounced
a terrorist organization by Michael Steiner and its operations were
banned on the territory of K&M. The appearance of ANA members in the
villages reminds one of the presence of KLA members in 1996 and 1997
when they used intimidation and later even liquidations to force
Albanian population to join them in greater numbers.
Thus, in March 2003, members
of ANA perpetrated a typical criminal execution when they murdered Adem
Ahmeti, from the village of Prekaze, the Municipality of Srbica, and
then attacked the family of Ramiz Fejzaj, from the village of Radavac,
the Municipality of Peć, who was seriously wounded. This action was
preceded by a written warning sent to Fejzaj to be loyal to the
"national issue" and stop all contacts with the Serbs.
ANA publicly proclaims its
connections with organized crime, as illustrated by the fact that after
a bombing attack on the premises of the court in Struga, in early spring
2003, this terrorist organization undertook the responsibility for the
attack stating it was a reaction to the arrest of two Albanian mafia
bosses in FYROM.
3. Data on the victims
of violence in K&M
Violence in K&M is inspired
by ethnic, political and economic motives. The most numerous and the
most savage in the execution were the attacks of the Albanians on the
Serbs and Montenegrins provoked by national hatred and carried out for
the purpose of ethnic cleansing. Obviously, a large number of these
crimes were premeditated and the investigation results frequently point
to the involvement of KLA, or ANA now. Nevertheless, very few
perpetrators were discovered, as substantiated in the reports of OECD
representatives in Priština.
From the time of the arrival
of international forces to K&M through August 23rd 2003,
Albanian terrorist perpetrated the total of 6,571 attacks, out of which
5,962 on Serbs in Montenegrins in Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, 207
on Albanians and 335 on people of other ethnic origins. In the same
period, 1,206 persons were killed and, 1,319 civilians and 15 policemen
were wounded. The fate of 846 persons, out of 1,156 kidnapped persons,
is not known.
In the attacks in 2003,
Albanian terrorists carried out 338 terrorist attacks (299 on the Serbs
and Montenegrins, 34 on Albanians and 5 on people from other ethnic
groups), a Serb was kidnapped (and subsequently murdered) and two
Albanians (one managed to escape, while the whereabouts of the other are
not known). An increasing number of murdered Albanian nationals,
witnesses or potential witnesses against the accused members of KLA, is
particularly frustrating.
The victims of these
mafia-like crimes include Azem Musaj and Sadri Rexhaj, while Ilir
Berisha of Janjevo, Rexhep Kelmendi of Peć, Sejdi Maloku of Obilić and
others were also victims of these attacks.
Between July 20th and 26th
2003, as a retaliation for the sentences passed on a number of members
of these groups of terrorists, explosive devices were thrown or planted
at several locations in Priština, Podujevo, southern part of Kosovska
Mitrovica, Lipljan, Kosovo Polje and other places. The targets of these
attacks, among others, were the homes of Ibrahim Rugova and Nexhat Daci,
leaders of DPK, whose prominent members have already been the targets of
retributions with political background.
The existing rivalry between
AFRK as a formation of professional soldiers and heterogeneous,
criminalized KLA groups, i.e. ANA, as they call themselves now, is the
underlying reason for a substantial number of the so-called political
assassinations. Also, prominent members of DPK usually fall victims of
these attacks.
4. Organized crime
-
Criminal activities in K&M
The expansion of organized crime in K&M is
a direct consequence of the KLA terrorist activities, some of whose
leaders have used their authority in this organization to establish
control over illegal trade in the areas under their (para)military
jurisdiction.
Beside the drug trafficking, the
organized criminal groups from K&M are also engaged in the illegal
trafficking of weapons, cigarettes and other excise goods, stolen
vehicles, together with the trafficking of people and human organs
trade.
Very common among the
Albanian organized crime activities are racketeering, blackmail and
violence against both the members of the Albanian community in K&M and
the Albanian migrant workers abroad who are forced to pay the so-called
taxes to finance terrorist groups in this region.
Intimidation and the expulsion of
the Serbs and other non-Albanian population from K&M also appear to be
an easy source of income as the sales of abandoned apartments and other
real-estate generate huge profits to some families. Former leaders of
KLA use some of the money made in this way to pay the arms suppliers and
to provide for the salaries of "meritorious" soldiers and their
families.
Confirming the fact that the
Albanian criminals have also held the key roles in the organized crime
activities in many European countries, especially in connection with the
sale of drugs, the representatives of the Council of Europe have stated,
in their 2000 Report, that the organized crime in K&M is connected with
the former members of KLA and the criminals from the north of Albania.
The findings of European officials show that, beside the previously
described criminal activities, the trafficking in human beings,
intimidation of the members of the police and the judiciary and
ethnically motivated violence are also represented in K&M, where ethnic
cleansing is considered a lucrative business. Out of the 28 murders
committed in January 2000, 25% are in connection with organized crime,
and a highly disturbing fact is that among the perpetrators of the
crimes, including those that are ethnically motivated, there is a
growing number of juveniles.
The representatives of the
Council of Europe pointed to corruption and its strong ties to organized
crime, money laundering, economic criminal acts and the inefficiency of
the financial institutions and tax policy as the key issues that
troubled K&M. In addition to that, the courts are under-equipped, the
number of judges and prosecutors is still small, their salaries are
inadequate to maintain their independence, their safety cannot be
guaranteed and therefore, they are under great pressure, so they can
work efficiently only in those cases that are not connected with ethnic
or political issues.
In 2000, the western media
described K&M as "a gangsters paradise", that is, as a territory the
western leaders ever more often perceive as a base for organized crime,
especially the drug trade.
Most criminal activities in
K&M are conducted by members of the family clans ("fis") who control
their respective territories. The clans are connected and closely
cooperate with similar criminal groups from other European countries,
especially from Turkey, Albania and Bulgaria, due to the fact that the
main smuggling routes run through these countries.
The family structure is
characterized by a strong inner discipline, which is achieved by a means
of punishment for every deviation from the internal rules, so that the
fear should guarantee an unconditional loyalty to the clan, with the
provisions of the official laws considered to be secondary, not
important and non-binding. Due to the fact that the clans are based on
the blood ties, which is a factor that restricts the number of the clan
members, the bonds between them are very strong, which makes getting
close to and infiltrating into them almost impossible. Members of other
ethnic groups can be accepted only to execute certain one time or
secondary jobs. Moreover, the Albanian mafia families are organized in
3-4 or more levels, which enables them to preserve the organizational
action capability even in case some of its members or groups is
captured.
Most members of the criminal
groups in K&M have been active in the ranks of KLA and other Albanian
terrorist organizations, where they have been trained for the armed
combat. Furthermore, they are known for the great flexibility when
making arrangements with other, similar organizations (be they domestic
or foreign), strong connections with local politicians and members of
certain government agencies (the Customs, KPC and KPS), and their
readiness and capability to perform complex operations across national
borders due to the fact that they have strong support of the Albanian
emigration community which is concentrated around different
organizations and societies in Europe and the USA.
With regards to
organized crime, the territory of K&M is divided into three main spheres
of interest: the regions of Drenica, Dukadjin and Lab where criminal
activity is controlled by certain leaders of the former KLA who are now
active in political structures, as well as by former close associates of
KLA who had financed its operations
(maps 6, 7 and 8).
The area of Drenica, located
on the strategic routes which connect Montenegro with FYROM, through
Prizren, Klina and Istok, towards Kosovska Mitrovica, in the region of
Shalja, is controlled by so-called Drenica group, loyal to Hashim Thaqi.
This group is mainly involved in arms trafficking, dealing in stolen
vehicles, in human beings, excise goods and, above all, cigarettes and
fuel. Through his family connections, Thaqi has direct control over the
local institutions through which he provides and secures an unhindered
performance of the said criminal activity. The Thaqi family has ties
with the
Albanian, Macedonian,
Bulgarian and Check mafia.
The territories of the Peć,
Dečani and Djakovica municipalities make the Dukadjin zone, where the
so-called Metohija group, led by Ramush Haradinaj, is active. The
Haradinaj family is mainly oriented toward the illegal trade of weapons,
drugs, excise goods and stolen cars, but also toward the racketeering of
the Albanian population in K&M. Smuggled goods are distributed in FYROM,
in the south of Serbia, the Raška territory and in Montenegro where it
comes via the Peć-Kula-Rožaje route. Taking into consideration the close
links between Ramush Haradinaj and the fighters of the former KLA, who
joined KPC and KPS after it had been demilitarized, Ramush Haradinaj is
in the position to have an indirect control over the border with these
areas, as well as over the criminal and terrorist activities in this
area.
The group loyal to Rrustem
Mustafa, aka "Remi", one of the most influential commanders of KLA and
KPC, operates in the Lab area which is made up of the territories of the
Gnjilane, Vitina and Kačanik municipalities.
This clan is mainly oriented toward drug smuggling and is closely
connected to the Haradinaj family.
In K&M there are also other
families whose operations are oriented toward illegal trade and
smuggling and who conduct the described activities in cooperation with,
or under the supervision of, one of the listed chiefs – Thaqi, Haradinaj
or Mustafa.
The Lluca family is
connected with the Albanian mafia and pursues the activity of arms
smuggling, of drugs and of excise goods (cigarettes, fuel). It operates
under the wing of Hashim Thaqi and Ramush Haradinaj and of the Albanian
mafia.
The Selimi family, together
with the Lluca family, controls the smuggling of arms, drugs and
vehicles in the Dukadjin area. Also they impose illegal taxation on the
Albanians and intimidate the political opponents of DPK. They are
connected with Hashim Thaqi.
The Kelmendi family has
close ties with Ramush Haradinaj and controls the smuggling of drugs and
fuel, trafficking in people and money laundering in the Peć area.
The Elshani family
operations are focused on the smuggling of arms and fuel. It controls
the Vitomirica area and is connected with Ekrem Lluca and Xhavit Haliti.
The Kitaj family is the
leading criminal group which controls the area between Klina and Istok.
It is involved in the smuggling of stolen vehicles and the sales of
explosives in K&M.
The criminal clan of Suma
operates in the area of Kačanik. Besides racketeering and blackmail, it
is also involved in weapons and drugs smuggling from FYROM to K&M and
vice versa. The members of the Suma clan are connected with the group
led by Rrustem Mustafa alias "Remi" from Podujevo. The Syla clan
coordinates a chain of organized crime active in K&M and FYROM and is
concentrated on illegal imports of weapons, ammunition and other
equipment.
The members of the Agushi
family operate in the Klina area. They extort money from the Albanians
whom they force to buy up previously stolen Serbian land and property in
the previously mentioned Municipality and blackmail potential buyers.
The Geci clan is active in
the Peć, Kosovska Mitrovica, Srbica and Priština municipalities. It runs
the smuggling of fuel and is cooperating with Xhavit Haliti and the
Selimi family.
The Babalija clan is
operating in the area of Đakovica. In cooperation with Ramush Haradinaj
it deals in fuel smuggling from Albania as well as in drugs trafficking
(map 2).
Despite the fact that there has been a
precise division of territory between the clans in which each family
controls a certain area and the criminal activity within it, among some
of the clans there is a rivalry whose origins lie in the political
differences between them and the attempts of the groups to acquire more
power in the respective region. Sometimes these clashes are so intense
that they take on the form of a blood feud (vendetta) in which all
members of the rival families are involved. A good example is the
dispute between the clans Musaj and Haradinaj. This feud, caused by
political differences and an attempt of the Musaj clan to take over the
arms and narcotics trafficking business from the Haradinaj clan,
resulted in the murder of Sinan Musaj, and, shortly afterwards, in the
wounding of Ramush Haradinaj.36
The execution of the members of the
Kelmendi family by the Lluca clan shows the brutality which is inherent
to the conflicts between the warring mafia clans. In that particular
case, a woman was killed among others, what is not common in the
conflicts between different Albanian groups, including vendettas.
The illegal drug trade,
carried out on the K&M territory, grew as a part of the overall growth
of the Balkan drug trafficking operations. This was a result of the lack
of strong government institutions (the police and the judiciary) that
would stop the infiltration and cut the drug routes, the existance of a
legal vacuum created in the period between the arrival of the
multinational forces and the establishment of a new legal system by the
UNMIK administration, a control of the borders, rugged terrain and the
poor economy that, all together, made the K&M an ideal place for the
drug trade.
One of the channels
through which drugs are transported from Turkey to Italy and then to
Western Europe goes through Tropoja and the ports of Durachio and Valona
in Albania.
Certain amounts of heroin and
cocaine are processed in the Albanian laboratories and from there they
are transported to the village of Lužane, then to Muhovac and Veliki
Trnovac in the south of Serbia, and to Montenegro, that is, to Tuzi and
Ulcinj, whence they are distributed all over Europe. Unprocessed drugs
from Albania end up in the region around Gnjilane and Prizren where
there are two large laboratories for the production of socalled hard
drugs (map 9).
The transfer of drugs is
conducted over the official border crossings such as Djeneral Janković,
Jazince, Qafa Prushit, Morina and Tropoja, thanks to the cooperation
between the criminal groups and the customs officials, and the members
of KPC and KPS. The arms which come from Albania are usually sold on the
black markets in Junik and Djakovica.
Because of the geographical
links between the regions of Kosovska Mitrovica and Peć with Serbia and
Montenegro this area represents the main transit route for illegal
trafficking in cigarettes. One of the frequently used routes for this
activity follows the line: Northern Kosovska Mitrovica – the village of
Brnjak, Zubin Potok Municipality – lake Tabalije – the village of
Starčevać – Ribarići – Novi Pazar – Kraljevo – Kragujevac – Trstenik.
-
Activities of the Albanian mafia around the world
Up to the beginning of the
armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia, most of the European market and a
smaller part of the USA market have been supplied with narcotics
smuggled via the so-called Balkan route. From the countries of origin
(Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan) and Turkey, where the raw materials for
the narcotics were processed, this road led through Greece, Bulgaria,
former Yugoslav republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia), Romania, Hungary,
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, all the way to the final destinations
in Austria, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and other Western European
countries (map 10).
When fighting erupted
in this area, Albanian mafia created new routes for the drug trafficking
towards Western Europe, avoiding the conflict regions. In that way, two
new, alternative routes were created: the southern one going from
Turkey, through Bulgaria, FYROM, K&M and Albania to Italy and other
Western European countries.
The second, the northern one, goes
from Turkey, through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and the Western European nations
(map 11).
When the conflicts in
Yugoslavia ended, the old Balkan route was re-established all over
again, but the new channels for smuggling the drugs did not disappear
and the smuggling network was greatly expanded. All American agencies
fighting against the drug trade estimate that, along with the Turkish,
the criminal groups of the Kosovo Albanians are the most important drug
smugglers in Europe.
These groups have been described by
experts as extremely violent and involved, also, in the international
arms trade, with more and more substantial evidence of their criminal
activity in the USA.
The fact that as early as
the mid-80s members of the criminal groups were highly organized and
represented a serious threats to the representatives of the judiciary
who were prosecuting them testifies to the strength of the Albanian
mafia in the USA. At that time the American police stated that the
members of the Albanian mafia were involved in all kinds of criminal
activities (extortions, robberies, arms trafficking, shootings, running
of illegal gambling operations in certain parts of New York etc.)
The main criminal activity
of the Albanians in the USA was drug trafficking, and the American
experts for fighting this type of crime had even then issued a warning
that, in only a few years, these criminal groups could take over 25% to
40% of American heroin market.
From the mid-90s, Albanian
criminals from the USA were helping the activities of KLA in K&M by
raising funds to purchase the weapons needed by this terrorist
organization. At first, the fundraising was conducted secretly and later
a branch of the "Fatherland Calls" (Zeri e atdheut) fund was also
established in the USA to channel financial support to the members of
KLA through the bank accounts in the USA and Canada and many other
Western European countries. In addition, money was being transferred
directly through emigrants – couriers, who came to K&M.
Together with the collection
of the money, Albanian emigrants in the USA organized shipments of
humanitarian aid and weapons and sent volunteers to joined the units of
KLA in K&M.
American intelligence
sources warned of the possibility of the "Columbian Syndrome" developing
in the Balkans which means that the Albanian mafia could become strong
enough to take over the control of one or more areas in which the
Albanian population is predominant. At the time it was noted that, in
the political arena, the effect was already accomplished by directing
the profits from the narco-terrorism to the local governments and
political parties. The Democratic Party of Albania (DPA - PDSh), in
power at the time, was suspected of tolerating and directly profiting
from the drug trade and financing secessionist political parties and
other groups in K&M and Macedonia.
The Party for Democratic
Prosperity (PDP - PPD) and other Albanian parties from FYROM, such as
the ultra nationalist National Democratic Party (NDP - PKD), together
with the Albanian parties from K&M have been accused of using
"laundered" money generated through narco-terrorism. In all three cases,
money made through crime was often disguised as emigrant donations, with
the estimate that the profit from narco-terrorism directed to the south
of the Balkans in 1993 had reached the sum of 1 billion dollars. The
same sources claimed that, in addition to the purchase of mafia
"protection", this money was being used for achieving popularity among
the people, through alleged patriotism, but also for other criminal
activities, above all for the purchase of guns.
On the continent of Europe,
the Albanians from K&M hold more than 80% of the heroine trade, their
dealers are located in at least half the European countries and they
smuggle 4 to 6 tons of heroin monthly amounting to two billion US
dollars a year. The Interpol data show that in 1999 the Albanian mafia
earned 38 million dollars from the drug trade, in 2001 fifty and in 2002
seventy million US dollars. The Interpol statistics also shows that
during 1997 out of all arrested heroin smugglers, Albanians accounted
for 14%, but that the average amount of heroin found on non-Albanian
dealers was 2 grams, while the Albanians were found in the possession of
120 grams on the average.
Profits of the Albanian drug
lords reach the amount of one billion USD, with the turnover in K&M
amounting to USD 125 to 150 million, of which KPC receives USD 25
million. Hashim Thaqi receives USD 5 million as his share. Out of the
total amount of drugs that enter the global market, as much as 65%
crosses the K&M territory, while 90% of the heroin distributed in the
European market is smuggled through this region.
The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) recognized Albanians in K&M as the second most
important drug traffickers in the world market.
The French Geopolitical Drug
Observatory published a report containing evidence that the Albanian
drug lords were crucial players in the widespread operations called
"drugs for weapons", while several Albanian dealers arrested in Western
Europe confessed to have procured the arms for KLA in K&M.
This kind of trade was also confirmed by the European Union, at the
meeting held in 1994 in Brussels.
German anti-drug agents
underline the fact that Albanians have organized one of the largest
organizations for drug trafficking in Europe and that the profits
generated by the illicit trade are laundered in 200 private banks and
exchange offices. Representatives of the Italian police state that the
Albanian mafia in the country, due to their violence and numerous
membership, has managed to suppress Turkish drug traffickers and become
a partner to several Italian mafia organizations, including Cosa Nostra,
Camora di Napoli, Ndrangheta di Calabria and Sacra Corona Unita in the
region of Puglia. Besides, the Albanian traffickers have soon progressed
from the status of couriers to that of the organizers of contraband
networks who, in their turn, now hire couriers from the ranks of
criminals of other nationalities.
The seat of activities of
Albanian drug lords is in Calabria, Italy, while Milan is the main
business center. The major lords of these organizations invest their
illegally acquired assets into beauty parlor chains and shops not only
in Italy, but also in Great Britain and other Western European
countries. In addition to the drug trafficking, Albanian criminals in
Italy are also involved in prostitution, racketeering, widely spread
arms deals, as well as in the organization of begging and pick pocketing
for which, with permanent abuse and intimidation, they use the children
purchased from their parents in Albania at the price of USD 1,000 per
child.
In the Ticino canton, on the
border between Italy and Switzerland, it is the Albanians who are in
total control of the smuggling of drugs and people. In 1995, some 2,000
Albanians charged with drug trafficking were incarcerated in the Swiss
penitentiary institutions. According to the reports of the Swiss police,
the proceeds of the illicit trade were used for the procurement of
"Kalashnikovs" (AK-47) and "Uzis" (Israel-manufactured sub-machine guns)
in Bern and Berlin.
In March 1992, a
representative of the Swedish Police Intelligence Service confirmed that
this Service believes there are connections between drug trafficking and
KLA. Based on an analysis conducted in 1998 by officials of the Swedish
and Norwegian Security Forces in relation to the heroin seized in the
last two years, it was evident that Albanians accounted for 80% of the
drugs traded, with the proceeds used for the procurement of arms for
KLA. In 1999 the Police in Bratislava and Budapest discovered warehouses
for thousands of kilos of heroin. Besides, larger quantities of pure
cocaine were also seized by the police from the Albanian traffickers.
In June 1998 over 50
Albanians from K&M were arrested in Spain, involved in almost 1,000
robberies and laundering operations for the money obtained from
robberies on the territory of Germany. Several days later, a group of 70
Albanians was also arrested under suspicion of drug trafficking, money
laundering, robberies and possession of forged documents.
In 1998, a Greek
representative in Interpol filed a report stating that Albanians from
K&M represented the main source of cocaine and heroin supply in illegal
markets of the world. Besides, in the course of 2000, Interpol received
information suggesting that in FYROM, along the FYROM-Greek border,
synthetic drugs were manufactured, while in Albania cannabis was
produced for the Greek market, with the Albanian criminals collaborating
with the Greek ones in the organization of the drug shipment to Greece.
In a joint action of Italian and FYROM police, conducted in 1993 and
1994, a group of drug dealers was discovered in Skopje, when 42 kg of
pure heroin was seized. Also, it was stressed that this amount was only
a small part of the total quantity of heroin that Albanian smugglers
ship via FYRM.
In 2002, representatives of
the Czech security forces announced that Albanian organized crime had
started their activities in the drug trade and trafficking in human
beings in this country in the early 90‘s. According to their reports,
Albanians from K&M were quick to establish contacts with the local
politicians, civil servants and police officials who, because of their
meager wages, were easily corrupted and provided them with the working
and permanent residence permits. Besides, Albanian started purchasing
real estate along the borders with Austria and Germany and establishing
catering facilities some of which were later transformed into brothels
and also used, during armed conflicts in K&M, as transit points for
smuggling arms and ammunitions for KLA.
In 1995, representatives of
the Czech police in Prague stated that the Albanians had managed to make
the Czech Republic one of the target destinations for heroin trade and
to flood the country with the drug. In March 1999, the Czech police
arrested one of the drug lords, Prince Dobroshi, who appeared to have
been present at the celebration organized in Prague on the occasion of
an outstanding award presented to Ibrahim Rugova. The search of
Dobroshi‘s apartment resulted in the discovery of papers confirming the
procurement of the arms for KLA.
In the trafficking in human
beings, Albanians have a complete control over the transfer via the
Balkans to Greece, using the same routes used for drug trafficking into
the country. Albanian mafia has established strong connections with
Turkish, African and Italian criminals for all operations related to
illegal immigrants who are occasionally used as couriers for drug
transport. In addition to the Albanian nationals and the Albanians from
K&M, migrants from Turkey, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, China and other
countries are recruited for the purpose.
Albanian groups are mainly
responsible for the shipment of illegal immigrants from the Albanian
coast, across the Adriatic Sea, to Italy. They usually set off in
Vljora, or from Durs or even Ulcinj, in the south of Montenegro. In 1999
as many as 10,000 persons were smuggled into the EU countries via
Albania. Smuggling illegal migrants is an important source of revenue
for Albanian criminal groups, although it cannot be compared with the
drug trafficking which, it is believed, earned them USD 50 million in
1999.
At any moment about 4
million illegal immigrants are on the move. On a global scale, the 1999
earnings of individuals and the trafficking networks was estimated at
USD 3 – 10 billion. Interpol has unequivocal indications on the
involvement of organized crime in each segment of the travel of illegal
migrants. Recently, Albanian have revived the trade in stolen cars and
have re-established the networks for their transport from Italy,
Switzerland, Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland to K&M, whence some
of them are sent further.
According to Interpol
reports, trafficking in women and enforced prostitution have become
important for the Albanian mafia in 1999 when thousands of women left
K&M and went to Albania because of armed conflicts in the region. The
Albanian prostitution networks increasingly involve women of other
nationalities, such as women from Romania, Moldova, the Russian
Federation, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries. The pimps
usually state that they originate from K&M in order to obtain the status
of political refugees although actually most of them come from Albania
and not from K&M. Some Albanians control these operations from abroad,
where Belgium is the seat of some of the bosses of this activity (map
12).
Representatives of the
Council of Europe believe that the rise of prostitution in K&M resulted,
among other things, from the presence of a large number of international
troops and civilians in the region. According to the reports of the
International Organization for Migrations (IOM), thousands of women and
girls from Eastern Europe are taken by force and brought to K&M for
sexual exploitation and forced prostitution. Besides, trafficking in
women takes place within K&M as well as from it.
- Influence of
criminal factors from the Republic of Albania.
Albania is the largest money
laundering and drug trafficking center in the Balkans. The proceeds
generated from the drug trade were channeled through the pyramidal
savings schemes, the breakdown of which led to the drastic political
unrest in that country in 1997. The ensuing anarchy in the country made
it possible for the Albanian drug mafia to develop their operations to
an unprecedented level.
The link of terrorism and
organized crime in K&M was established under the strong influence of
certain political factors in the Republic of Albania, suspected of
corruption and connections with criminal organizations. It is important
not to overlook the fact that KLA expansion coincided with the rule of
Sali Berisha who is believed to be "tolerant" to drug trafficking, more
so since DPA maintains close links with Hashim Thaqi even now.
Groups dealing in organized
crime in the Republic of Albania have a significant influence on the
decisions made by the government and by political parties. In the town
of Skadar and its surroundings, paramilitary organizations of Albanian
drug lords and arms dealers have better and more modern equipment than
the Albanian Army. Mafia groups frequently assist individuals to get to
power, but once they are at the position of power, they have to "pay the
debt", so that mafia groups can control operations of the governmental
bodies, primarily the police, in order to maintain their privileged
status.
In addition to the strongest
and most dangerous mafia clan known as Kula, which controls a part of
the drug trade from Turkey and deals with trafficking in arms and
illegal immigrants to Italy, the Abazi family is also engaged in the
trafficking in drugs and arms, while the Borici clan works together with
the Italian criminal gangs engaged in illegal drug trade and in
prostitution. The Brokaj group, engaged in drug and arms trafficking, as
well as in prostitution, is particularly interesting since its
membership is composed of former Sigurimi Secret Service officials.
In this region several other
organized groups are active, like: Halkaj, Kerkiku, Caushi, Shehu,
Kakami and Hasani.
Although the former communist regime in the
Republic of Albania had also expressed territorial pretensions,
primarily toward the territory of K&M, the military activities of KLA
are openly supported by the Tirana government. During that period,
Albania was a logistics base for terrorists from K&M, as well as a busy
transit region for trafficking in arms, drugs and excise goods. During
the civil unrest in Albania in 1997, a large number of arms and
ammunition was taken out of the arsenals of the Albanian Army and
shipped, for the largest part, to FYROM and K&M.
The weapons originating from Albania
were usually sold at very low prices, at the black market of Junik and
Djakovica. Because of the easy accessibility of these weapons to the
general public, additional favorable conditions were created for both
the escalation of terrorism in this region and the development of all
forms of crime, including organized crime.
After the termination of
armed conflicts in K&M, as suggested by the officials of the Albanian
Ministry of the Interior, the most wanted criminals in their country
went to the territory of K&M in order to avoid arrest. Accordingly, a
large number of crimes perpetrated on the territory of K&M may be
attributed to the nationals of the Republic of Albania who are
frequently in conflict with the criminal gangs of K&M Albanians.
The conflict in Kosovo and
Metohija and the problems with the refugees in Albania, resulted in a
large inflow of financial aid from the West. Albanian organized crime,
with their connections with the official regime in Albania, greatly
profited from these sources estimated at about USD 163 million.
5. The Role of
Albanian Emigration
Albanian emigration in
Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, Holland and the USA operated via a number
of illegal organizations of extremists recruiting Albanians and sending
them to K&M to join KLA, while some of them organized, on the territory
of their respective countries, the centers for military and terrorist
training of already recruited troops. Albanian emigration in
Switzerland, particularly the leading members of former KLA and NKM,
sponsored new activities of terrorist in the south of Serbia and in
FYROM.
Activities of Albanian emigration consists
of collecting of the large amounts of financial means necessary for the
procurement of arms and equipment to the terrorist groups. The moneys
are collected in an organized manner, by direct contributions, or by
payments for alleged humanitarian needs of the Albanian population.
The deposited amounts are
transferred, via selected banks or illegal channels, to Albania and K&M
and, in some cases, the money is carried by "couriers" which is
described as the "home visit". In the said countries, the members of
Albanian emigration were exposed to torture by the members of Albanian
mafia to ensure enforced collaboration and, in this way, support to
terrorism in K&M, the south of Serbia and in FYROM.
Interpol reports suggest
that a certain number of persons granted the status of refugees from K&M
in Western Europe or North America, were very carefully selected by the
Albanian mafia and directed to stay in the host country ready to become,
at some future date, the links with criminal activities. The power of
Albanian mafia is based on the obedience of the clans ("fis"). A group
of clans, up to 20, makes a mafia line, headed by a political leader.
Albanian mafia is not a pyramid with a "godfather" at the top, but a
series of pyramids with several "godfathers".
Through the said
humanitarian funds, the influential and financially powerful Albanian
mafia clans launder the money generated from drug trafficking and other
methods and activities of the mafia (blackmail, racketeering,
extortion). According to the Interpol data, KLA and other Albanian
groups use a sophisticated network of accounts and companies to forward
the money where necessary. In 1998 Germany froze two bank accounts
belonging to the "United Kosovo" organization after they had discovered
that an Albanian from K&M, convicted for drug trafficking, deposited
several hundreds of thousands of US dollars to the account.
The best known institution
for organized collection of money for the procurement of arms and
equipment for the terrorists in K&M is the "Fatherland Calls" fund
founded in December 1993. It was registered in Germany, within the
Albanian Democratic Community. Leaders of NKM and later of KLA were
among the founding fathers. The fund has branches in 12 European
countries and in the USA. The collected assets were used partly for
training, equipment, arms and hiring of foreign mercenaries for KLA and
partly for propaganda and hiring of lobbyists and influential groups in
the Western ruling circles.
In 1998, the obvious links
of the activities of the Fund with the sale of arms in K&M made the
governments of certain Western countries pass a decision putting a
temporary ban on its operation. Analytical investigations suggest that
Albanians in the diaspora transfer between USD 150 and 400 million to
K&M through this fund, as voluntary contributions, illegal income tax
and the proceeds from the drug deals. In an effort to collect as much
financial assets as possible from the Albanians in the diaspora, FNUA
opened branches of the Albanian National Fund in most Western European
cities, which fact pointed to their ambition to set up an Albanian Bank
of international reputation which would make it possible for the capital
of Albanian mafia to enter the regular financial transactions.
The role of the
Albanian lobby is of enormous importance for Albanian terrorists since
their emigration is composed of 1.8 million Albanians worldwide.
Rich and influential Albanians in
the USA and Western European countries tried, in addition to providing
them with financial support, to present KLA as a national movement,
presenting their terrorist activities as liberation struggle of the
Albanian people in K&M, which they succeeded to a substantial degree. In
this respect, they made a stronghold with some western politicians and
diplomats.
6. Pan-Islamic Factor
The presence of the radical
Islamic factor on the territory of K&M has been confirmed by an active
participation of mujahedins in the armed conflicts in Kosovo and
Metohija within KLA formations, as well as by the activities of various
Islamic humanitarian organizations. At the 16th Islamic Conference held
in Pakistan, in October 1998, Albanian separatism in K&M was defined as
jihad and the Islamic world was called to help with all available means
this "fight for freedom on the occupied Muslim territories". Referring
to jihad, the terrorist organization of Osama Bin Laden announced
terrorist attacks against the "infidels", i.e. Great Britain, the USA,
France, Israel, Russia, India and Serbia.
The presence of the radical
Islam in K&M is illustrated by the fact that in 1995 Osama Bin Laden
visited Albania as a guest of Sali Berisha, who was the President of
Albania at the time, when bases for the logistic and financial support
to the Al Khaida organization were set up, with cells in K&M. In
addition to Bin Laden, the meeting was attended by Bashkim Gazideda,
former head of secret police of Albania, Hashim Thaqi and Ramush
Haradinaj. On the occasion, Bashkim Gazideda was elected into a group of
Al Khaida leaders for the region of Balkan.
Senator Pat Roberts,
chairman of the Senate Security Commission, stated that the USA had
evidence on the connections of KLA with Osama Bin Laden, as well as on
the involvement of KLA members in illicit drug trade.
Intelligence circles in
Albania confirm a strong presence of Bin Laden‘s network in this
country, as well as the existence of their plans for attack on American
citizens and facilities. The same sources have confirmed the presence of
four groups of "Jihad Warriors" (from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algiers,
Tunisia and the Sudan) in Northern Albania and the participation of
their members in the conflicts in K&M, as parts of KLA forces.
Fanatic Islamic fighters
from Afghanistan, Algiers, Egypt, Chechnya, Iran and other countries
were included into the command structures of KLA in K&M. In some
instances, these radically oriented and highly professionally trained
persons set up their independent units for special operations and
tactical assignments. They participated directly in the taking of the
territories and the cleaning-up operations, in kidnapping civilians and
members of the police forces, in brutal tortures and murders. They were
also hired as trainers for special training of some KLA formations.
In 1998, the State
Department placed KLA on the list of terrorist organizations,
substantiating it with the facts that KLA operations were sponsored by
the proceeds of international drug sale and the loans from Islamic
countries and individuals, among whom, apparently, was Osama Bin Laden
himself. According to the information supplied by Interpol, another link
with Bin Laden is the fact that Muhammed Al Zawahiri, a brother of Dr
Yaman Al Zawahiri, the leader of the organization of Egyptian Jihad and
an ideologist of Al Khaida, was the leader of an elite KLA unit in the
conflict in K&M.
In the region of Drenica, within KLA
forces, in the period May through late June 1998, a combined unit of
mujahedins, called "Abu Bekir Sidik" was operating, under the command of
Ekrem Avdi of Kosovska Mitrovica. Activities of the "Abu Bekir Sidik"
unit, that is, the procurement and illegal supply of arms were funded by
organizations from Zenica (B&H) called "Islamic Balkan Center" and
"Active Islamic Youth" (AIY).
The unit was comprised of 115
mujahedins, of whom about 40 were foreign nationals (10 from Saudi
Arabia, 2 from Egypt, 4 from Albania, 2 from England and one from
Ireland, Scotland each, while the rest were the citizens of FYROM and
B&H).
A large number of fighters in the
"Abu Bekir Sadik" of Albanian ethnic background returned to their places
of residence in K&M after the unit was disbanded, while some tried to
enter the territory of Albania.
On the occasion, in August
1998, the Security Forces of the Republic of Albania arrested Ekrem
Avdija, Shpend Kopriva and Nexhmedin Laush and, subsequently, other
members of the unit as well. Because of their terrorist activities, they
were sentenced to long-term imprisonment, but in 2001, the whole group
was pardoned under the pressure of international community. Soon after
his release form prison, Ekrem Avdija continued to lead the organization
named "Kosovo Islamic Bureau" that has, over a period of time, expanded
the scope of its activities by setting up numerous branches in all
larger towns of Kosovo and Metohija. Soon after that, he re-activated a
group of mujahedins under the same name, "Abu Bekir Sidik", with the
seat in the southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica.
In addition to all this, the
activities of NLA in Macedonia were supported by direct participation of
about 150 mujahedins from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Turkey, as well as from Albania, FYROM and K&M who had
previously lived in some other Arabian countries where they had been
trained. The substantiating data were obtained at the time of the arrest
of Sedula Morati, a member of the "Ismet Jashari" unit that operated in
the regions of Kumanovo and Lipkovo. The transfer of the mujahedins to
the territory of Macedonia was organized by Daut Haradinaj, in addition
to others.
Under the pretext of
humanitarian activities, the "Albanian-Haramain" organization with the
seat in Prizren transports weapons illegally, participates in the
training and sponsoring terrorists and provides logistic support to
Albanian extremists in K&M and FYROM. Most of the funds used to sponsor
this organization come from Saudi Arabia.
"The United Saudi Aid for
Kosovo" is an organization that provides arms for ANA membership. Eleven
members of this organization were arrested by KFOR because of their
connections with the international terrorist organization known as Al
Khaida. "The Global Relief Foundation" is a nongovernmental organization
with the fund of about one million US dollars, sponsored by Islamic
countries. The head of the K&M office and two other activists were
arrested by KFOR under suspicion of terrorist activities.
Some representatives of the
humanitarian organization "El-Yila" represent the main link between
Islamic countries and terrorist in the south Serbia, K&M and FYROM and
are engaged in the recruitment and transfer of terrorists to K&M and the
south of Serbia.
Abu Muhamed and Yamel
Lamprani, aka "Abu Musab", who was, during the armed conflicts in Kosovo
and Metohija, one of the trainers of "Abu Bekir Sidik" unit, are the
respective heads of branches of the humanitarian organization "Igasa" in
Skopje and Zagreb. Both of them used to study at the University of
Belgrade and, in early nineties, were arrested as members of a
religiousterrorist organization named "Islamic Salvation Front". This
organization, in collaboration with the Islamic resistance movement
called "Hamas", i.e. the radical wing of the organization called "The
Muslim Brothers" gathered students from the Sudan, Algiers, Palestine
and Egypt.
The assignments and tasks that used to be
carried out by a humanitarian organization known as "Islamic Relief"
were taken over by two Islamic organizations - "Humanitarian Islamic
Foundation" of Saudi Arabia and "Bin Laden‘s Flowers".
Over a longer time period, the
"Islamic Relief" recruited Albanian children without parents for
suicidal terrorist actions. The recruitment of children was carried out
in the Lion Hotel in Uroševac situated close to the premises of the
organization. After the USA attacked Iraq substantial fall of activities
in the organization ensued.
"It
is hard to prove the existence of organized crime in Kosovo, and even
harder not to see the evidence supporting it!"
(State Department Official)
"It
is hard to anticipate further development of Albanian organized crime.
Since it is a recent phenomenon, its stability cannot be estimated.
Nevertheless, future threats are real, having in mind mercilessness and
unscrupulousness characteristic of Albanian criminal groups, already
existing international connections, professionalism of their activities,
as well as strong connections established on the basis of their common,
ethnic Albanian origins. Additionally, strong positions of the Albanian
criminal groups in Kosovo and Metohija, Macedonia and Albania itself are
definitely the subject of concern
of international
community, particularly when geopolitical instability of the
region and the presence
of the UN peace-keeping forces are kept in mind".
(Interpol)

The list of terrorists
and members of the organized crime groups in K&M
(in alphabetical order)
which is, like the list of their crimes, incomplete.
|